letters, the professional classes, whose heritage is the universe. But, for the lower orders, it would seem desirable that they should have a clear and determinate interest in the country, and so the ownership of small landed properties should be encouraged and extended. Land is as necessary for them as food, for every one must have a home. And yet, though the population of England is six or sevenfold greater than it was in the time of Elizabeth, the land it occupies is very much less now than then. Communism would be a mistake, for it is an attempt to grasp an abstract universal. It would be a serious blow to the personality of the individual, and through him, to the state and humanity itself. In organic society there is a truer communism than human ingenuity could invent. And so with land; it will only be "nationalised" when it is held by individuals in private property, for behoof of the nation, and its utmost capacity is developed. The practical discussion of how this is to be done belongs to economics. The aim of economists should be to reduce large estates, and set property free for other individuals by freedom of commerce. Confiscation would do irreparable injury, not only to the material interests, but to the moral sense of the community which adopted such a course. We do not reduce the superfluous fat of an athlete with a surgeon's knife, but by judicious training and natural means. We must, therefore, reject Mr. George's proposal to confiscate rents,' as this would reduce land1 Progress and Poverty, bk. viii., chap. ii.

owners to the position of farmers of a land-tax. This would merely aggravate the evils of which he complains, and deprive the state of all benefit it presently derives from the social influence of the landowners. Besides, land has so long been treated as an investment in this country, that it would be unfair to deprive the landowners of their property, without paying them all they have expended on it. And so, even ardent land reformers, like Mr. Wallace, propose compensation.1 It is impossible to discuss his scheme here, but I may point out one objection to it, which I cannot overcome, and that is, that he treats a man who has made an investment in land, as if he were a mere donee of the Crown.

But, if economists fail to devise a remedy, it may be necessary for law to interfere with some rougher means of adjusting the rights of individuals. There is no

doubt, nature will cure all in the end, either by exterminating the inhabitants of the land, or by depriving the landowners of their exclusive rights by a revolution. Every patriot must desire to avoid both of those painful extremes, and we cannot, therefore, wonder at the attention which this subject is attracting at present. In a century which has witnessed a revival of medievalism in religious worship, we cannot be surprised to find advocates of medieval revivals in law. But, while revivals, such as Gothic architecture, Gregorian music,

1 Land Nationalisation (2nd ed.), p. 197.

and Eastern postures, may appear ridiculous to the impartial spectator, they do no particular harm to any one, except perhaps to those immediately concerned. A similar revival of meliæval law such as the Anglo-Saxon land-laws, would lead to practical absurdities. But, is there no honest and thorough-going conservative, who can suggest a remedy? We "restore " with pious hands our ancient cathedrals, and make them serviceable for the present day. Are our old legal customs not as valuable? Can the Anglo-Saxon land-laws not be "restored" in spirit, by adapting them to the circumstances of the present age? Is our modern conservatism as great a sham as our modern æstheticism? Do we merely admire antiquity when it happens to coincide with our present interests or some passing whim? Is patriotism only a cloak for unadulterated selfishness? It is hard to imagine that this should be so. I refuse to believe that the great bulk of those who claim to represent at the present day our old historical parties, are merely two sets of selfish, grasping hypocrites, and that their professions are utterly hollow. The day of reform cannot long be delayed, and surely the times will call forth some statesman of commanding influence, who will be able to devise and carry some radical conservative measure of reform which will satisfy, not only the abstract form of law, but also every material interest involved.1

1 See Maine's Village Communities; Laveleye's Primitive Property (translated by Marriot); Seebohm, The English Village Community.

In the ultimate and highest conception of property, we return to the old idea of property in the body, but in a higher form. In contract, a freeman is arbiter of his own conduct, and has full power, not only over his body, but also over his mental powers and their products. Thus, property in works of art, the laws of patent and copyright, rights in obligations of others— i.e., rights over the bodies of others, but not slavery, bonds, paper-money, and such things; in short, our modern system of credit-all involve the highest organic development of society, simultaneously with the greatest possible expansion of the powers and rights of the individual. Property and possession can no longer be identified. Persons express their personality in things; but, as wealth becomes expressed by written titles, things appear as if no longer necessary, for the same gold stored in some bank's coffers will serve to embody the personality of thousands of individuals. Proprietors are no longer exclusive and isolated. In the organism of society all men possess all things, and each man regards himself as only a temporary trustee for the whole. Mankind do not live on the

earth. They are its soul.

LECTURE VI.

THE FAMILY.

WE have now seen that rights are declared and enforced in the legal forms of legislation, judgment, and execution; that their infringements are treated under the forms of crime and civil injury; and that the matter of those rights is person and property. But, still the questions may be asked, Whence do those rights arise? By whom, in favour of whom, and against whom, are the rights enforced? In answer, it may be said that the rights discussed arise from the necessary relations of human beings in society. These relations are not merely between isolated individuals, but also between individuals and groups of which they form a part, and from which they are yet distinguished. We have seen that the group, as representing and embodying the "universal," has taken into its own hands the enforcement of right by its judges and legislators, and also the repression of wrong by the same means under the category of crime. But, while it has been so doing, it has been, perhaps unconsciously, creating the rights of person and property, by defining the wrongs which it would repress, and the rights which it would protect. So prominent has this "universal" become, that many