exception of collaborateur as far as possible, and so destroy the injustice of the rule by the exceptions. In this state of the law the agitation by working-men's champions continued, not to have the personality and dignity of the working-man completely respected, but to have the injustice of secondary responsibility, logically or illogically, extended so as to give the working-classes the full benefit of it. Another step would give a careless servant compensation for injuring himself.

The Employers' Liability Act of 1880 was passed in consequence of this agitation. This Act created a liability of the master quasi ex delicto in certain cases and to a limited amount. The absurd compromises which are apparent on the face of the Act, and the limitation of the liability should surely convince us that the Act on its present basis is quite unjust. It would have been much more satisfactory to provide that every contract of service shall imply a contract of insurance on the part of the master towards his servant or his representatives. It would then have been possible for him to recover for injuries done to himself, if not done wilfully. The master would insure with an Accident Insurance Company, and retain the premiums from the servant's wages.1 The present Act has already caused more litigation than it is worth.

I may remark in passing, that if the liability in such cases had been regarded as an implied obligation of indemnity or insurance, instead of being looked at as a sort of constructive culpability, the questions discussed in such cases as The Mersey Dock Trustees v. Gibbs,2 and Virtue v. The Alloa Police Commissioners, and the earlier case of Findlater v. Duncan, could hardly have arisen. The insurance of the public against accidents would then have been a legitimate part of the defenders' business. At all events a great part of the difficulty of such cases would have been avoided.

On the general question, the only change, if I might be allowed to suggest one, which would do justice to all, would be to make the

1 Lord Shand, in an address to the Glasgow Juridical Society, strongly urged the general adoption of insurance as a solution of all those difficulties. 2 L. R. 1. E. and I. App. 81.

3 (1873) 1 Rettie, 285.

master in all cases responsible, unless he proved he was personally innocent. This would substitute a simple for an absolute presumption against him. This would secure at once the freedom of the public from the negligence of a servant, and at the same time avoid as far as possible doing injustice to the master. But perhaps, even here the extension of the principle of insurance against injuries to third parties would afford a satisfactory practical solution of the difficulty. An employer, whose servants are likely to injure third parties, might then insure himself against all risk, and the premiums being a charge on the business would ultimately fall on the public.

C.-NOTE AS TO THE HISTORY OF IPSO JURE INVESTITURE IN SCOTLAND.1

It was formerly held by our law that no property was transmitted by succession unless the successor animo et facto took possession. The possession might be constructive, but still there must be some act as proprietor, such as service or confirmation-some aditio hereditatis-before it could be said that the person had become proprietor with an animus sibi habendi. The idea was similar to that prevailing in the law of sale, that the contract merely gives a title, and that the title is "completed" by delivery, actual or constructive. The change in Scotland was introduced very gradually and extends over a period of about 200 years. The first innovation was in 1690. In that year an act was passed (cap. 26) whereby special assignations granted by the deceased, though unintimated, were made valid to carry the full right without confirmation. In other words, the state, instead of recognising such assignations in detail, recognised them all by anticipation en bloc. In 1729, in Gordon's case (Morr. Dict., 14,384) it was decided that special legacies fell under the statute of 1690, and that they vested without confirmation. The next change was in 1823, by the Act 4 George IV., cap. 98, which provided, that if any persons who would have succeeded to movable property of an intestate died before confirmation, the right should transmit to their representatives. Thus ipso jure investiture was the whole rule as to movables.

The changes as to heritable property have been somewhat different. Prior to the passing of the Act, 1695, cap. 24, an heir might succeed to an estate and sell it, but, if his title was not complete, the purchaser would have no claim against his heir who made up a title passing over his immediate ancestor. This was partially remedied by the Act just referred to, which provided that if an heir were three years in possession of an estate without

1 See p. 265, supra.

having completed a title, it should be liable for his debts. Moreover, in 1850, an Act was passed (13 Vict., cap. 13),1 by which it was provided that when once a title was recorded in favour of a body of trustees for such an institution as a church or school, their successors should not require to make up a title. The title simply flowed into the persons of their duly elected successors. Again, in 1868, it was provided by the Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act (§ 46), that a decree of service should vest a title equivalent to a conveyance by the deceased ancestor in favour of his heir. But it was not till 1874 that the complete change was made. The Conveyancing Act of that year made heritable property vest immediately on the death of a predecessor, adopting to its full extent the maxim mortuus sasit vivum. Prior to this at common law a mortis causa conveyance of land vested a right as a general rule on the death of the testator; but this was in consequence of the form of the deed, viz., a de presenti conveyance under reservation of liferent. And no question appears ever to have been raised as to the effect of the 20th section of the Titles' Act of 1868 on vesting. By that enactment it may be assumed that the decision in Gordon's case as to movables, above referred to, was simply extended to heritage. When may we expect ipso jure investiture to result from the mere contract of sale?

1 This Act is repealed, but the provision is embodied in the Titles to Land Act, 1868, § 26.

D.-NOTE AS TO THE RELATION OF LAW AND HISTORY.'

THE intimate relation of law and history is generally recognised. In constitutional and international law the cases with which we deal are generally great historical events. Thus, the transference of the crown from Harold to William of Normandy, the signing of Magna Charta, the summoning of Simon de Montfort's Parliament, the execution of Charles the First, the Revolution settlement, the Wilkes and the Bradlaugh agitations are matter of history, but to the constitutional lawyer they are merely "cases." He abstracts more or less consciously, and with greater or less success the purely legal aspects of these events, and confines his attention to these aspects, or in other words, he classifies the events under certain legal categories. And so in international law, the wars of Francis the First and Charles the Fifth, the wars of the French Revolution, European interventions in Turkey and Greece, the affair of the Trent, the Alabama Arbitration, are all historical events in the ordinary sense; but to the publicist who abstracts their legal points, they are merely "cases." It is thus obvious on the surface that it is impossible to study constitutional or international law without a previous knowledge of history, which supplies the facts of the cases with which the student deals.

When we deal with special separate doctrines it is not difficult to trace a progress; but serious difficulty arises when we attempt to trace an organic development in the whole body of law, and not merely in individual laws. The cases appear to arise without a connection much closer than that which we find in any odd volume of law reports, or of the statutes at large. The cases A. v. B., C. v. D., E. v. F., and so on throughout the alphabet, are entirely unconnected. The chaotic arrangement of our statutes is frequent matter of comment. In one volume a money act is followed by one as to burials, and that by one as to the Privy Council, and that again by two Irish Acts, and so forth. If, however, we put our

1 Read to the Public Law Class, as an introductory lecture, 2nd Nov., 1883.