ancien régime. It was an expiring struggle. We have since heard no more of the rights of kings and princes, except in the paper protests of petty Italian dukes and such potentates. Belgium, Greece, Germany, Italy, Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, all point to another principle-the spirit of nationality. The Congress of Vienna tried to solder up the claims of princes and rulers. The Congress of Berlin discussed only questions of nationality. A state is now a free union of free men. And these states are now united by law. It is significant to note that the disgraceful squabbles among ambassadors as to precedence were put an end to at the Congress of Vienna. The kings were no longer the states. The balance of power which was intended, and failed, to keep the conterminous proprietors within specific bounds, was spasmodically revived by the Russian war, but it has now disappeared from practical politics. The idea of law has given rise to the concert of Europe, and the practice, still somewhat unsettled, of authorising one power to carry out the decision of the whole. In this society of nations are now included American and Asiatic States, and though we still divide men into civilised, semi-civilised, and uncivilised, these distinctions will no doubt gradually disappear. It is a more humane division than the Greek or the Medieval one; but in international intercourse, a tremendous responsibility is thrown on civilised states to see that their conduct towards their inferior neighbours is regulated by justice and morality, and not by cupidity and selfishness. It is beyond my present purpose to discuss the effect of those ideas on the special doctrines of international law. I have already indicated the revolution which has taken place in our ideas of war, and particularly, in our ideas of neutrality, and it may be sufficient to note in addition, that nine-tenths of what is called international law in the books, is law of procedure and forms— adjective law including laws of war, neutrality, contrabrand, blockade, treaties, ambassadors, &c. It is Professor Lorimer's. great merit as a publicist that he has reminded lawyers that there is an idea of right underlying those forms-a substantive law, which they are intended to enforce. Parallel to and simultaneously with this change in the idea of the state and of the relations between states, we have the progress formerly noticed in private and mercantile law, caused by the invention of the compass and steam navigation; and, as a necessary result, the doctrines of private international law. But, while we are tracing the history of the legal idea of person in municipal law, and the corresponding idea of citizen in constitutional law which unites the individuals into a state, and also the prolongation of this process in international law-the "person giving rise to private international law, and public law making the individual a member of a world-state-we must also trace the history of the individual states which now form this world-system. We must answer the question why England and not Ireland or Scotland became the leading power in the British islands. We have to show how Gaul became France and not Burgundy. We must explain how Russia rose and Poland fell. We must trace the union external and physical, of the small kingdoms in the Spanish peninsula; the disappearance of the small German principalities and ecclesiastical powers, and their absorption into Prussia and Austria; the division and subsequent union of Italy, and such changes. For this purpose, treaties and other legal documents form a veritable quarry of information; but this is not the history of law. It is the history of an organic self-conscious unity which is the subject of law, and originates law in and by the process of living and growing. These external changes have been brought about by associations of race, religion, and geographical position; by great inventions,gun-powder, bayonets, rifled guns, breech-loaders, iron-clad ships, heavy artillery, steam, electricity; and by great preachers, statesmen, soldiers, and sailors. This history of the states actually existing, is a necessary complement to the history of the legal ideas which have been growing up along with them. Law in this way supplies to some extent the place of a philosophy of history; but legal ideas are not the only ones involved in the growth and history of humanity, and if we would underst fully what is comprehended in civilisation, we must treat same way the history of religion, morals, science, art, p industry, and commerce. But as lawyers we must rest conter can contribute our share to the solution of the question:-W the end of Humanity? E. BIBLIOGRAPHY.1 I. ANCIENT WRITERS. PLATO-The Republic and The Laws. II. EARLY CHRISTIAN WRITERS. LACTANTIUS (330 A.D.) Institutiones Divinæ. ST. AUGUSTIN (354-430) De diversis Quæstionibus; De Civitate III. THE SCHOOLMEN AND MEDIEVAL WRITERS. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274) Summa Theologiæ; De Regimine Principis. 'This list is borrowed chiefly from Ahrens, omitting the special works on international law given by him. Of these a somewhat complete list will be found in Appendix I. to Woolsey's Introduction to the Study of International Law. The subject of Law is often discussed in works on Morals under the idea of Justice. Down to a comparatively late period the legal works of Grotius and Pufendorf were used as ethical text-books, and both Ethics and Theology show decided traces of their treatment by lawyers; but I have generally omitted writers who have treated solely of Ethics. I have also omitted works on Political Economy. This science deals only with things which are the objects of rights, treating even the body as merely a machinea supply of labour. But, as it is impossible entirely to abstract things from their relation to persons, writers on Economics frequently discuss ethical and political questions. This abstract science of things as property, corresponds to the equally abstract science of Natural Law which deals with individuals as persons. Students commencing the study of the Philosophy of Law are recommended to read Maine's Ancient Law and Holland's Jurisprudence, along with either Trendelenburg's Naturrecht, Ahrens' Cours de droit naturel, or Lorimer's Institutes of Law. DANTE (1265-1321) De Monarchia. ENGELBERT, of Admont, in Styria-(1331) De Ortu, Progressu, et Fine Romani Imperii. MARSILIUS, of Padua (1328) De Translatione Imperii. WILLIAM, of Occam-(1347) Disputatio de Potestate Ecclesiastica et Seculari. LUDOLF, of Bebenburg-(1354) Tractatus de Juribus Regni et Imperii Romanorum. DOMINIC SOTO--De Justitia et Jure (1560). FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1548-1617) De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore. PETER DENS-Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica, 8 vols. (2d ed.). Dublin, 1832. IV. EARLY PROTESTANT WRITERS. MELANCTHON-Epitome Philosophiæ Moralis (1538). HEMMING (Danish), De Lege Naturæ (1562). ALB. BOLOGNETUS-(1585) De Lege Jure et Equitate Disputa tiones. ALBERICO GENTILI-De Legationibus (1583); De Jure Belli (1588). WINKLER-Principiorum Juris Libri V., Lipsia (1615). The following writers of this period treated the subject of LANGUET (Junius Brutus)-Vindicia contra Tyrannos (1577). CLAUDIUS SALMASIUS-Defensio Regia pro Carolo I. (1649). JUAN DE MARIANA (Jesuit)-(1536-1623) De Rege et Regis Institutione. ALGERNON SIDNEY—(d. 1683) Discourses concerning Government. V. THE SCHOOL OF GROTIUS. HUGO GROTIUS-De Jure Belli ac Pacis Lib. iii. Parisiis (1625). Published, with an English translation, by Dr. Whewell, with Barbeyrac's notes: Bell & Co., Cambridge; De Jure Prædæ, Hage (1858). (The introductions to those works deal with the general subject.) J. BARBEYRAC-Le Droit de la guerre et de la paix; translated from the Latin of H. Grotius, with notes. Amsterdam (1724); new ed., Basle (1768), 2 vols. SAMUEL PUFENDORF-Elementa Juris Universalis Methodo Mathematica, Haga (1660); De Jure Naturæ et Gentium Libri viii. (1672); cum notis variorum, Francofurti et Lipsiæ (1744); De Officiis Hominis et Civis (1673); the same, cum notis Barbeyracii, Lugd. Bat. (1769); Le Droit de la nature et des gens, translated from the Latin of Samuel Pufendorf, by Jean Barbeyrac, Amsterdam (1706); new edition (1771), 2 vols.; translated into English, with Barbeyrac's notes, by Basil Kennett, London (1729); Des devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen, Amsterdam (1707); new edition, Paris (1830). RICHARD CUMBERLAND-De Legibus Naturæ Disquisitio Philosophica, London, 1672; translated into English by Towers. Dublin (1750). "This work is particularly directed against Hobbes, and has exercised a great influence on subsequent English writers" (Ahrens). HEINRICH VON COCCEJI-Grotius Illustratus, &c., 3 vols., published by his son (1744-1747). SAMUEL VON COCCEJI-Tractatus Juris Gentium; De Principio Juris Naturalis unico, vero et adæquato (1699). T. RUTHERFORTH Institutes of Natural Law. Cambridge (1754-1756). "The following works are specially directed against Pufendorf:"ALBERTI-Compendium Juris Naturæ orthodoxa theologia confirmatum. Lipsia (1678). “RACHEL—Dissertationes de Jure Naturæ et Gentium (1676).” (Ahrens). VI. THE SCHOOL OF THOMASIUS. CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS-Fundamenta Juris Naturæ et Gentium (1605). |