TILL (See also TIME (COMPUTATION OF), vol. 26, p. 3; UnTIL). See note 1. TILLAGE.—Husbandry; the cultivation of land, particularly by the plow.2 TIMBER (See LOGS AND LUMBER, vol. 13, p. 1018; TREES, vol. 26). The term timber includes the body, stem, or trunk of a tree, or the larger pieces or sticks of wood which enter the framework of a building, excluding the planks, boards, shingles, or laths used to complete the structure.3 1. "Till" includes the day to which it is prefixed. Bunce v. Reed, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 352; Dakins v. Wagner, 3 Dowl. P. C. 535. "Till Next Term" does not include any part of said term. DeHaven v. DeHaven, 46 Ind. 296. 2. U. S. v. Williams, 18 Fed. Rep. 478. In this case, it was held that a settler on public land under the preemption and homestead acts, after clearing the same of timber for the purpose of "tillage or actual cultiva tion, could dispose of the timber to the best advantage to himself, but the timber could not be cut for the purpose of disposing of it by sale or otherwise. In Vigar v. Dudman, L. R., 7 C. P. 72, aff'g L. R., 6 C. P. 470, it was held that where a house was built upon a portion of an acre field, and the other portion, to the extent of twentytwo perches, converted into a garden by the owner, who fenced off the house and garden from the rest of the field, the remaining portion being used as an orchard, the manner in which the field had been dealt with did not amount to a conversion of it or, any part of it, into "tillage." Land sown to clover, with corn, is not thereby restored to a state of permanent pasture, but is still in tillage. Birch v. Stephenson, 3 Taunt. 469. 3. Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis. 189; Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393. In Battis v. Hamlin, 22 Wis. 669, it seems to have been assumed that shingles are lumber and not timber. And see Gross v. Eiden, 53 Wis. 343. In Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis. 189, laths were also held not to be timber but lumber. In Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393, railroad ties were held to be timber. In McCauley v. State, 43 Tex. 374, it was held that an indictment for cutting, destroying, and carrying away fence rails did not lie under Texas Penal Code, art. 717, punishing or imposing a penalty for knowingly cutting down or destroying any "timber" without the consent of the owner. In U. S. v. Stores, 14 Fed. Rep. 825, it was said that the particular meaning of the term depends upon the connection in which the word is used, or the calling of the person making use of it, and where parties were indicted for cutting "timber" on government land in violation of the act of congress, the term was held to apply not alone to large trees fitted for house or ship building, but to include trees of any size of a character or sort that could be used in any kind of manufacture, or the construction of any article. In this case, it was also held that selling the timber for fire wood, or burning it into charcoal, would be no defense or excuse for cutting or removing it, nor could it be sufficient evidence of the worthlessness of the timber cut, to justify the act. But in Nash v. Drisco, 51 Me. 417, it was held that the purchaser, under a contract for the purchase of all, the "timber" growing on a certain place, acquired no title to trees suitable only for fire wood. In U. S. v. Shuler, 6 McLean (U. S.) 28, it was said: "Unless the contrary clearly appears from the context, it will be presumed that the word was employed in its ordinary popular sense. It is not the interpretation of an artistic or technical word, or a word of equivocal meaning. It is a word in common use, and has an enlarged or restricted sense, according to the connection in which it is employed. As a generic term, it properly signifies only such trees as are used in building either ships or dwellings. But its signification is not limited to trees; it applies to the wood, or the particular form which the tree assumes when no longer growing or standing in the TIME (COMPUTATION OF).-See also MONTH, vol. 15, p. 712; REASONABLE TIME, vol. 19, p. 1089; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, vol. 22, p. 908.) I. Definition, 3. III. Rule as to Fractions of a Day (See DAY, vol. 5, p. 89), 9. II. General Rule for Computation, 3. 1. From Time of an Act Done, IV. Use of the Words "Until" and Till," 9. V. 3. Solar and Standard Time, 10. 2. From the Date, or from the VI. Sunday in the Computation of Day After the Date, 7. Time, 10. I. DEFINITION.-Time is the system of those relations which any event has to any other, as past, present, or future. It is, also, defined as the measure of duration.2 II. GENERAL RULE FOR COMPUTATION—1. From Time of an Act Done. The old rule was that where computation was to be made from the time of an act done, the day on which the act was done should be included,3 unless a right would be divested, an estoppel created, or a forfeiture incurred, when the computation would Timber Culture and Timber Lands.— See PUBLIC LANDS, vol. 19, pp. 310, 331 and 364. A statute giving a bounty for planting trees, to be paid by the county in which they are planted, is void, under Missouri Const., art. 4, § 47, and also because the giving of such bounties is an abuse of the power of taxation. Deal v. Mississippi County, 107 Mo. 464; 14 L. R. A. 622. License to Cut.-See LOGS AND LUMBER, vol. 13, p. 1030. Trespass for Cutting.-See TRESPASS. Restraining Cutting. See INJUNCTION, Vol. 10, p. 883. Replevin for Timber Cut.-See REPLEVIN, vol. 20, pp. 1061-1063. Measure of Damages.-See DAMAGES, vol. 5, p. 36. Waste in Cutting.-See WASTE. 1. Century Dict. 2. Black's Law Dict.; Bouvier's Law Dict. 3. Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cranch (U.S.) 104; Priest v. Tarlton, 3 N. H. 93; Wheeler v. Bent, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 167; Adams v. Cummiskey, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 420; Butler v. Fessenden, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 78; Blake v. Crowinshield, 9 N. H. 304; Wayne v. Duffy, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 367; Snyder v. Warren, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 518; 15 Am. Dec. 519; Griffith v. Bogert, 18 How. (U. S.) 158; Mooar v. Covington City Nat. Bank, 80 Ky. 305; Jacobs v. Graham, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 392; Northrop v. Cooper, 23 Kan. 432; English v. Ozburn, 59 Ga. 392; Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194. In Chiles v. Smith, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 461, Simpson, J., citing Bellaris v. Hester, 1 Ld. Raym. 280, said: "The rule in regard to the computation of time seems to be, that when the computation is to be made from an act done, the day in which the act was done must be included, because, since there is no fraction in a day, the act relates to the first moment of the day in which it was done." (Overruling Smith v. Cassity, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 192; 48 Am. Dec. 420.) See also Perry v. Provident L. Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 162; Handley v.Cunningham, 12 Bush (Ky.) 401; Hampton v. Erenzeller, 2 P. A. Browne (Pa.) 18; Batman v. Megowan, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 533; White v. Crutcher, 1 Bush (Ky.) 472; Wood v. Com., 11 Bush (Ky.) 220; Glassington v. Rawlins, 3 East 407; Rex v. Adderley, 2 Dougl. 463; Lebus v. Wayne-Ratterman Co. (Ky. 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 652; Thrower v. Brandon, 89 Ala. 406. In Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. (U. S.) 232, Washington, J., said: "Where the computation of time is to be made exclusive of such day. But the general tendency of the modern authorities, where an act is required to be done within be made from an act done, the day on which the act is performed is included, because the act is the terminus a quo the computation is to be made; and there being in contemplation of law no fraction of a day, unless when an inquiry as to priority of acts done in the same day becomes necessary, the terminus is considered as commencing on the first moment of that day;" citing Clayton's Case, L. R., 5 Ch. 15; Castle v. Burditt, 3 T. R. 623; Norris v. The Hundred of Gaustin, 2 Roll. Ab. 520. In Thomas 7. Afflick, 16 Pa. St. 14, it was held that the rule of common law as to the computation of time is to include the first day and exclude the last, and, therefore, where notice to a justice of the peace of an intended suit, given in pursuance of Pennsylvania Act of March 21, 1772, § 1, was served on May 19, and suit brought on June 18, the notice was given thirty days before the suit. The rule laid down in Goswiler's Estate, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 200, was disapproved in the above case; but the court, in Cromelin v. Brink, 29 Pa. St. 522, said that Goswiler's Case was overthrown without an attempt at either reason or authority, and, overruling Thomas v. Afflick, 16 Pa. St. 14, adhered to the modern doctrine. Under the Delaware statute for discharging debtors after five days imprisonment, the first and last days are to be included. Fortner's Case, 2 Harr. (Del.) 461. In computing the time for the limitation of actions against a person from the day of his coming of age, the day he attained his majority is to be counted; in computing his majority, the day of his birth is to be included. Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172. See also Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How. Pr. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 193. Under the Connecticut Gen. Sts., p. 83, § 2, requiring notice to be given of town meetings, by a warning sign set on a post at least five days, inclusive, before the meeting, it was held that the term "five days, inclusive," means five days inclusive of the day on which the notice is posted, but exclusive of the day on which the meeting is to be held. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Hebron, 51 Conn. 22. Where a lease was made for one year from the first day of April, the term was held to expire at the close of the 31st day of March next. But in this case the decision is put expressly on the understanding of the country respecting the end of a tenant's term. Marys v. Anderson, 24 Pa. St. 272. In computing the time between the teste of an execution and the return, the day of the teste is to be included and the day of the return excluded. Ogden v. Redman, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 234. In applications for a new trial under the Kentucky Civ. Code, § 371, where the requirement is that the motion be made within three days after the decision, the day of the decision and the day of the motion must both be computed. Long v. Hughes, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 387. The day on which an execution issues is included in the time which it has to run. Ryman . Clark, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 329. In Indiana, the day fixed by a justice of the peace for the trial of the right of property in goods taken in execution, must be within five days after the claim to the goods is filed. In reckoning the time, the day on which the claim was filed must be counted. Long v. McClure, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 319. When a statute requires service for a fixed number of days, the mode of computation is to include the day of service and to exclude the other. But when it requires a number of entire days, both must be excluded. Garner v. Johnson, 22 Ala. 494. 1. In the computation of time, whether the day on which an act is done or an event happened, is to be included or excluded, must depend upon the circumstances and the reason of the thing, so that the intention of the parties may be effected. Such a construction should be given as would operate most to the ease of the parties entitled to favor, and by which rights would be secured and forfeitures avoided. O'Connor v. Towns, I Tex. 107. See also Dowling v. Foxall, 1 B. & B. 193; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; Blaymire v. Hayley, 6 M. & W. 49; Taylor v. Brown, 147 U. S. 640. In the computation of time from an act done, the day on which the act is done will be excluded, whenever such a limited period, from or after a particular time or event, is to exclusion will prevent an estoppel or In Blake v. Crowninshield, 9 N. H. 304, Wilcox, J., said: “The tendency of the more recent decisions, undoubt- edly, is to exclude the day of the act, unless to save a forfeiture, or for some other special reason, it becomes neces- 1. Dutcher v. Wright, 94 U. S. 553; Farwell v. Rogers, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 460; Portland Bank v. Maine Bank, 11 Mass. 204; Buttrick v. Holden, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 233; Fuller v. Russell, 6 Gray (Mass.) 128; Seekonk v. Rehoboth, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 371; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502; 19 Am. Dec. 470; Swift 7. Tousey, 5 Ind. 196; Krohn v. Temp- lin, 2 Ind. 146; Hathaway v. Hathaway, 2 Ind. 513; Womack v. McAhren, 9 Ind. 6; Faure v. U. S. Exp. Co., 23 Ind. 48; Vogel v. State, 107 Ind. 374; Hill v. Pressley, 96 Ind. 447; Catterlin v. Frankfort, 87 Ind. 45; Reigelsberger v. Stapp, 91 Ind. 311; Kerr v. Haver- stick, 94 Ind. 178; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 12; Homan v. Liswell, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 659; Matter of Carhart, 2 Dem. (N. Y.) 627; Ex p. Dean, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 605; 14 Am. Dec. 521; Hoffman v. Duel, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 232; Judd v. Fulton, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 117; Commercial Bank v. Ives, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 355; Magnusson v. Williams, III Ill. 450; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, 39 Ill. App. 261; Roan v. Rohrer, 72 Ill. 582; Bowman v. Wood, 41 Ill. 203; Ewing v. Bailey, 5 Ill. 420; Higgins v. Halligan, 46 II. 173; Harper v. Ely, 56 III. 179; Pugh v. Reat, 107 Ill. 440; Ford, 14 Ill. 332; Vairin v. Edmonson, 27 Ala. 311; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Watson, 90 Ala. 68; Loosse v. Vogel, So Ala. 308; State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179; Wing v. Davis, 7 Me. 31; Peables v. Hannaford, 18 Me. 106; Ward v. Walters, 63 Wis. 39; Elder v. Bradley, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 247; Gorham 7. Wing, 10 Mich. 486; Chaddock v. Barry, 93 Mich. 542; Warren v. Slade, 23 Mich. 1; 9 Am. Rep. 70; Shelton v. Gillett, 79 Mich. 173; Anderson v. Baughman, 6 Mich. 298; Burr v. Lewis, 6 Tex. 76; Hill v. Kerr, 78 Tex. 213; White v. German Ins. Co., 15 Neb. 660; State v. Weld, 39 Minn. 426; Spencer v. Haug, 45 Minn. 231; Hall v. Cassidy, 25 Miss. 48: Howbert v. Heyle, 47 Kan. 58; State v. Winter Park, 25 Fla. 371; Sheldon Bank v. Royce, 84 Iowa 288; Backer v. Pyne, 130 Ind. 288; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Flinn, 2 Ind. App. 55; Montgomery v. Souder, 8 Lanc. L. Rev. (Pa.) 185; Pellew v. Wonford, 9 B. & C. 134; 17 In Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248, the Master of the Rolls said: "It is not necessary to lay down any general rule upon this subject, but, upon tech- nical reasoning, I rather think it would be more easy to maintain that the day of an act done or event happening ought, in all cases, to be excluded than that it should in all cases be included." In Carothers 7. Wheeler, 1 Oregon 194, the court said: "We hold upon authority, as well as in accordance with the rule laid down in our statute, that the first day and including the last." See also Hahn v. Dierkes, 37 Mo. 574. Under a statute requiring that certain penalties incurred by railroad companies shall be sued for within ten days, the day on which the penalty is incurred is to be excluded. People v. New York Cent. R. Co., 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 284. In computing the time in which a debtor, who has been arrested on execution, and given bond, must apply and be admitted to take the oath prescribed for poor debtors, the statute fixes the method of computation, which is to be exclusive of the day of the arrest. Bell v. Adams, 10 N. H. 181. See also Odiorne v. Quimby, 11 N. H. 224. By the New Hampshire Rev. Sts., ch. 1, § 25, one uniform rule is established excluding the day of the date in all cases not otherwise provided for. Scovell v. Holbrook, 22 N. H. 269; LaFavour v. Bartlett, 42 N. H. 555; Soldiers' Voting Bill, 45 N. H. 613. The day on which judgment is rendered is not to be included in the computation of the two years within which a writ of error may be sued out. Lubbock v. Cook, 49 Tex. 96. A proper construction of the Texas Act of 1846, to regulate proceedings in the district courts, requires that the day of the meeting of the court should be excluded, in the computation of the time in which a defendant is allowed to file his answer. Hollis v. Francois, I Tex. 118. In Cromelien v. Brink, 29 Pa. St. 522, the doctrine formerly held by the courts that the first day of the computation is to be excluded, was reaffirmed, and the reason supporting the cases of Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485, and People v. Sheriff, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 87, adopted. It was held that land sold for taxes on the roth of June, 1850, was redeemed in time on the 10th of June, 1852; the law requiring the redemption to be made within two years after the sale. See also Marks v. Russell, 40 Pa. St. 372, affg Goswiler's Estate, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 200; Duffy v. Ogden, 64 Pa. St. 240. Where a contract recited that defendants conveyed to plaintiff certain real estate by deed dated November 25, 1848, and covenanted "that if at the expiration of one year from the date of said deed, said O. shall prefer to reconvey said land and house, and shall offer to do the same, that the undersigned shall accept such reconveyance of said land and house, and shall pay to said O. therefor the sum of sixteen hundred dollars," it was held that an offer made by the plaintiff on November 26, 1849, was made on the proper day, and entitled him to recover the money. Oatman v. Walker, 33 Me. 67. Where a lien claim required by statute to be filed at or before the expiration of six months after materials were furnished, it was held that a claim filed for record on the 9th of July was in sufficient time; the last item in the account for materials furnished having been delivered on the 9th of January preceding, this day being excluded in the calculation. Trustees v. Heise, 44 Md. 453. In Goswiler's Estate, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 200, it was held that whenever by a rule of court, or an act of the legislature, a given number of days are allowed to do an act, or it is said an act may be done within a given number of days, the day in which the rule is taken or the decision made, is excluded. In computing the time within which an action of account is barred by the Statute of Limitations, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded. Menges v. Frick, 73 Pa. St. 137; 13 Am. Rep. 731. See also Cascade v. Lewis, 148. Pa. St. 334; McCulloch v. Hopper, 47 N. J. L. 189; 54 Am. Rep. 146; State v. Jackson, 4 N. J. L. 323; Den v. Drake, 8 N. J. L. 303; Day v. Hall, 12 N. J. L. 203. In Evans' Case, 29 N. J. Eq. 571, the question was as to the computation of the ten days from the death of the testator, after which time a will might be proved before a surrogate. It was held that where the testator died on the 19th of the month, the admission of his will to probate on the 29th of the month was contrary to law; the statute declaring in explicit terms that the will should not be admitted to probate until after ten days. The thirty days' grace allowed by a mortgage for the payment of interest after it.has become due and payable, are to be counted exclusive of the day on which the interest becomes due. Serrell v. Rothstein, 49 N. J. Eq. 385. In Nebraska, the rule of computation excluding the first day and including the last, is prescribed by statute. Monell v. Terwilliger, 8 Neb. 360. In Chapman v. Allen, 33 Neb. 129, it was held that proceedings in error commenced July 9, 1891, where judgment had been rendered July 8, 1890, |