The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives for the New European Regulatory FrameworkPierre A. Buigues, Patrick Rey Bringing together contributions from high level EU officials and prominent academic economists on one of the most exciting issues in industrial economics, this timely book aims to promote dialogue between policy and academic research, and provides a unique forum for debate on the new European regulatory framework in telecommunications. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 54
Page xiv
... dominant position in a given market . He compares the concept of collective dominance with the economic concept of tacit collusion , and considers the difficulties that antitrust authorities might encounter in applying this concept ...
... dominant position in a given market . He compares the concept of collective dominance with the economic concept of tacit collusion , and considers the difficulties that antitrust authorities might encounter in applying this concept ...
Page 4
... position , built during former monopoly times . Competition law cannot ... dominance of the incumbents , the situation . we see today is somewhat different ... dominant players can remain unchanged for long periods of time . Experience ...
... position , built during former monopoly times . Competition law cannot ... dominance of the incumbents , the situation . we see today is somewhat different ... dominant players can remain unchanged for long periods of time . Experience ...
Page 14
... dominate new markets is that of broadband services . In some Member States , the political goal of increasing the ... dominant position in form of predatory pricing in ADSL - based Internet access services for the general public ...
... dominate new markets is that of broadband services . In some Member States , the political goal of increasing the ... dominant position in form of predatory pricing in ADSL - based Internet access services for the general public ...
Page 15
... dominant operator being able to use its market position in the medium term to charge high prices ( for instance for access to content ) to recover losses incurred during its predatory pricing policy . In conclusion , the fragmentation ...
... dominant operator being able to use its market position in the medium term to charge high prices ( for instance for access to content ) to recover losses incurred during its predatory pricing policy . In conclusion , the fragmentation ...
Page 20
... dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty . That new definition of SMP is clarified in the ' Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power ' in order to assist NRAS in applying ...
... dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty . That new definition of SMP is clarified in the ' Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power ' in order to assist NRAS in applying ...
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
9 | |
27 | |
Market Definition in Telecommunications Markets | 43 |
4 Market definition in the telecoms industry | 45 |
5 The approach to market definition in the Commissions Guidelines and Recommendation | 71 |
Economic Analysis of Collective Dominance in Telecoms Markets | 89 |
13 Antitrust or regulation? US public policy in telecommunications markets | 243 |
14 Telecommunications and competition | 260 |
Monitoring Competition in the Telecommunications Sector | 267 |
European Commission Sector Inquiries | 269 |
The New Regulatory Framework Main Regulatory Texts | 285 |
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services Framework Directive | 287 |
on the authorization of electronic communications networks and services Authorization Directive | 305 |
on access to and interconnection of electronic communications networks and associated facilities Access Directive | 317 |
6 Collective dominance and the telecommunications industry | 91 |
7 Some thoughts on collective dominance from a lawyers perspective | 114 |
Economic Aspects of Access to Networks | 133 |
8 Access to telecommunications networks | 135 |
the unbundling of the local loop in the EU | 169 |
Competition and Allocation of Scarce Resources the Case of UMTS | 183 |
the case of UMTS | 185 |
the case of UMTS | 213 |
Roundtable Discussion | 237 |
12 Introduction to the Roundtable on the economics of antitrust and regulation in the telecoms sector | 239 |
on universal service and users rights relating to electronic communications networks and services Universal Service Directive | 331 |
on competition in the market for electronic communications networks and services | 358 |
on unbundled access to the local loop | 364 |
establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications Networks and Services | 369 |
2002C 16503 | 372 |
Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law | 398 |
Commission Recommendation of 11022003 | 410 |
Index | 457 |
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The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications ... Pierre-André Buigues,Patrick Rey No preview available - 2004 |
Common terms and phrases
Access Directive access prices allocation Annex antitrust apply assessment auction authorisation broadband call origination call termination charges collective dominance collusion Commission competition law competitors consumers decisions defined demand dominant position economic effective competition efficiency electronic communications networks electronic communications services end users end-users ensure entrants European Communities European Parliament ex ante ex ante regulation example existing facilities firms fixed location Guidelines identified imposed incentives incumbent industry infrastructure interconnection Internet investment leased lines licences local loop unbundling loop market analysis market definition market shares Member merger mobile network national regulatory authorities network operators networks and services NRAS Official Journal Oftel oligopolistic paragraph particular principle procedures public telephone network publicly available radio frequencies Recommendation regulatory framework relevant market sector inquiry service providers significant market power specific spectrum structure subscribers tariffs telecommunications telecoms tion transparent UMTS unbundled access undertakings universal service obligations wholesale
Popular passages
Page 321 - In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Page 305 - Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 95 thereof. Having regard to the proposal from the Commission...
Page 320 - June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations...
Page 257 - The case law sets forth four elements necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.
Page 288 - June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market Directive on electronic commerce, OJEC, L178, 17/07/2000 pp.
Page 287 - October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23 November 1995. [6] Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002, concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communication), OJ L 201/37, 3 1 July 2002.
Page 126 - Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 1990 L 257, p.
Page 119 - ... profits by restricting production with a view to increasing prices. In such a context, each trader is aware that highly competitive action on its part designed to increase its market share (for example a price cut) would provoke identical action by the others, so that it would derive no benefit from its initiative.
Page 338 - States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective, HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: Article 1 Subject matter and scope 1.