The Book of EvidenceWhat is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided to the "grue," "ravens," "lottery," and "old-evidence" paradoxes, and to a series of questions. These include whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight, whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support, what counts as a scientific discovery, and what sort of evidence is required for it. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules, what type of evidence J. J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron, and whether, as is usually supposed, he really discovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers in terms of the concepts of evidence introduced. As the premier book in the fabulous new series Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science, this volume is essential for philosophers of science and historians of science, as well as for statisticians, scientists with philosophical interests, and anyone curious about scientific reasoning. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 89
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... Theories of Evidence 44 4. What's Wrong with These Probabilistic Theories of Evidence ? 69 5. Objective Epistemic Probability 95 6. Evidence , High Probability , and Belief 114 7 . The Explanatory Connection 8. Final Definitions and ...
... Theories of Evidence 44 4. What's Wrong with These Probabilistic Theories of Evidence ? 69 5. Objective Epistemic Probability 95 6. Evidence , High Probability , and Belief 114 7 . The Explanatory Connection 8. Final Definitions and ...
Page 3
... theories about evidence are ( and ought to be ) ignored by scientists . They ought to be ignored because they propose concepts of evidence that are based on assumptions incompatible with ones scientists make when they speak of , and ...
... theories about evidence are ( and ought to be ) ignored by scientists . They ought to be ignored because they propose concepts of evidence that are based on assumptions incompatible with ones scientists make when they speak of , and ...
Page 5
... theories of evidence . A corollary - one emphasized by Carnap - is to develop a theory of evidence that will enable scientists to settle disputes , such as the ones I mentioned , over whether , or to what extent , putative evidence ...
... theories of evidence . A corollary - one emphasized by Carnap - is to develop a theory of evidence that will enable scientists to settle disputes , such as the ones I mentioned , over whether , or to what extent , putative evidence ...
Page 6
... theories of evi- dence . The first theory is a Bayesian one : for a fact e to be evidence that a hy- pothesis h is true , it is both necessary and sufficient that e increase h's probabil- ity over its prior probability . So , for ...
... theories of evi- dence . The first theory is a Bayesian one : for a fact e to be evidence that a hy- pothesis h is true , it is both necessary and sufficient that e increase h's probabil- ity over its prior probability . So , for ...
Page 7
... theories . The fact that I am about to toss this fair coin is not evidence that it will land heads and evidence that it will land tails . It is not evidence -- not even a little bit of evidence -- that either " theory " is true ...
... theories . The fact that I am about to toss this fair coin is not evidence that it will land heads and evidence that it will land tails . It is not evidence -- not even a little bit of evidence -- that either " theory " is true ...
Contents
| 3 | |
| 13 | |
3 Two Major Probabilistic Theories of Evidence | 44 |
4 Whats Wrong with These Probabilistic Theories of Evidence? | 69 |
5 Objective Epistemic Probability | 95 |
6 Evidence High Probability and Belief | 114 |
7 The Explanatory Connection | 145 |
8 Final Definitions and Realism | 168 |
Ravens and Grue | 185 |
Which Carries More Evidential Weight? | 210 |
11 OldAge and NewAge Holism | 231 |
Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality | 243 |
13 Who Really Discovered the Electron? | 266 |
Index | 287 |
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Common terms and phrases
argument assumption atoms Avogadro's number believe h bleen Brownian motion Carnap cathode rays chapter concept of evidence condition connection between h counterexamples definition of evidence degree of belief degree of reasonableness dence depends determine discovery e is evidence electrical emeralds empirical entails h epistemic probability epistemic situation ES-evidence evidence that h example experimental results explanatory connection fact false given Glymour grue h is true h's probability Hertz's Hertz's experiments high probability holism hypothesis h J. J. Thomson justified in believing land heads lottery Maher Michael Jordan microconditions nonblack things nonravens objective epistemic observed obtain p(there particles Perrin Peter Achinstein potential and veridical potential evidence prediction priori probabilistic probability of h propensity proposition question ravens reason to believe relative frequency relativized requires satisfied saves the phenomena scientists selection procedure sense SP green subjective evidence Suppose theory Thomson threshold tickets tion toss truth veridical evidence Wheaties
Popular passages
Page 283 - As the cathode rays carry a charge of negative electricity, are deflected by an electrostatic force as if they were negatively electrified, and are acted on by a magnetic force in just the way in which this force would act on a negatively electrified body moving along the path of these rays, I can see no escape from the conclusion that they are charges of negative electricity carried by particles of matter.
Page 233 - Aufbau, is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.
Page 231 - A physicist decides to demonstrate the inaccuracy of a proposition; in order to deduce from this proposition the prediction of a phenomenon and institute the experiment which is to show whether this phenomenon is or is not produced, in order to interpret the results of this experiment and establish that the predicted phenomenon is not produced, he does not confine himself to making use of the proposition in question; he makes use also of a whole group of theories accepted by him as beyond dispute....
Page 233 - The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all.
Page 277 - Thus for the carriers of the electricity in the cathode rays m/e is very small compared with its value in electrolysis. The smallness of m/e may be due to the smallness of m or the largeness of e, or to a combination of these two. That the carriers of the charges in the cathode rays are small compared with ordinary molecules is shown, I think, by Lenard's results as to the rate at which the brightness of the phosphorescence produced by these rays diminishes with the length of path travelled by the...
Page 225 - The peculiar virtue of prediction or predesignation is altogether imaginary. The number of instances examined and the analogy between them are the essential points, and the question as to whether a particular hypothesis happens to be propounded before or after their examination is quite irrelevant" (A Treatise on Probability [London, 1921], p.
Page 108 - In the application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence available must be taken as basis for determining the degree of confirmation.
Page 273 - That is a mystery, as all matter is ; the luminiferous ether is no greater mystery. We know the luminiferous ether better than we know any other kind of matter in some particulars ; we know it in respect to the constancy of the velocity of propagation of light of different periods (p.
Page 15 - ... on repeating this experiment I at first got the same result, but subsequent experiments showed that the absence of deflexion is due to the conductivity conferred on the rarefied gas by the cathode rays. On measuring this conductivity it was...