CHAPTER II.

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.

"ALL the facts," says Cousin, "which fall under the Consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which contain all others. These facts which, beyond doubt, are never in reality, solitary, and separate from each other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and which a careful analysis ought to distinguish without dividing, in the complex phenomena of intellectual life; these three facts are expressed in the words TO FEEL, TO THINK, TO ACT." Is this a full and correct classification of the phenomena of the human mind? Are these distinctions real? Are all mental phenomena included in these fundamental facts? These questions I answer in the affirmative for the following reasons:

1. No mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feeling, or choice, purpose, or determination?

2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, not in degree but in kind. How entirely distinct, for example, is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling, on the one hand, and mental determination, on the other. Feelings, also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal remove from thoughts and mental acts or determinations. So of the class last mentioned. Choice in every degree or form makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no approach whatever to thoughts or feelings.

3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the above expressions, as actually existing in human Consciousness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other.

When

I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time, that I think so and so; at another that I have particular feelings; and at another still, that I have resolved, or determined upon a particular course of conduct; both alike readily apprehend my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind perfectly distinct.

4. In all known languages there are terms employed to designate these three classes of phenomena; terms, each of which is applied to one class exclusively, and never to either of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to any mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think. We never use it to designate feelings, or mental determinations of any kind. The terms sensation or emotion are never applied to any but the phenomena of feeling. In a similar manner we never apply the terms purpose, willing, determining, &c., to the phenomena of thought or feeling, but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. The existence of such terms undeniably evince, that the different classes of phenomena, under consideration, are recognized by universal Consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct from one another.

5. As a final reason I would adduce an argument presented in the work, recently published, on the Will. "The clearness and particularity with which the universal Intelligence has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifying terms in common use, which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of the others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously applied to all classes of phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied but to one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, then, must the universal Consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as phenomena entirely distinct from one another-phenomena differing not in degree but in kind" Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified.

The three fold classification of mental phenomena, above. established and elucidated, clearly indicate a tri-unity of

mental faculties and susceptibilities equally distinct from one another. These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the terms Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and affections. To the Will we refer all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, purposes, &c.

Object of Mental Philosophy.

The object of Mental Philosophy is a full development of the phenomena, characteristics, laws, and mutual relationships and dependencies of these different faculties.

• Meaning of the words Mental Faculties.

When I speak of a diversity of Mental Faculties, I would by no means be understood as teaching the strange dogma, that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of substances. It is one substance, incapable of division. Yet this simple substance, remaining, as it does, always one and dentical, is capable of a diversity of functions, or operations, entirely distinct from one another. This diversity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words Mental Faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, are entirely distinct from each other, so we speak of the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will, as distinct faculties. of the Mind.

The remarks made above respecting the Mind itself, will, at once, appear equally applicable to each of the Mental Faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the Intelligence, for example, as a Faculty of the Mind entirely distinct from those of the Sensibility and Will, without supposing that the Mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak of the different Powers, or Faculties of the Intelligence itself, without implying that that Faculty is composed of a diversity of parts. The term Faculty, whether applied to the whole Mind, or to any of the departments of the Mind, implies a diversity of functions of the same power, or substance, and not a diversity of substances, or parts.

CHAPTER III.

PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.

WE are now prepared to enter directly upon the great inquiry to be pursued in this Treatise, the Phenomena, Faculties, and Laws of the human Intelligence, As all that we know, or can know, of this, as well as of every other department of the Mind, is revealed to us through the phenomena which lie under the eye of Consciousness, the first inquiries which now present themselves are, What are the phenomena of thought thus revealed? What are their fundamental characteristics? In conformity to what principles shall they be classified and arranged?

Principle of Classification.

There is one principle, in conformity to which all intellectual phenomena may be properly classified, and in the light of which, the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena may be very distinctly presented. I refer to the modes in which all objects of thought are conceived of by the Intelligence. Of these modes, there are two entirely distinct and separate, the one from the other. Every object of thought is conceived of as existing either contingently or of necessity, that is, that object is conceived of as existing, with the possibility of conceiving of its non-existence, or it is conceived of as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence. If we have any conceptions of an object at all, we must conceive of it as falling under one or the other of these relations. The principle of classification, therefore, is fundamental, and of universal application.

Contingent and necessary Phenomena of Thought defined. Every thought, conception, cognition, or idea, then, by

whatever term we may choose to designate it, all the phenomena of the Intelligence, may be classed, as contingent, or necessary. A conception is contingent, when its object may be conceived of as existing with the possibility of conceiving of its non-existence.

An idea is necessary when its object is conceived of as existing with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence. All the phenomena of the Intelligence must, as shown above, fall under one or the other of these relations. It remains now, to illustrate the principle of classification here adopted, by a reference to an adequate number of particular phenomena, as the basis of important distinctions pertaining to the different functions or powers of the Intelligence. In the notice which we shall take of particular phenomena, other important characteristics, aside from those under consideration, will be developed, while these will be kept prominently in mind, as the grounds of classification.

IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.

We will commence our analysis with the consideration of two prominent ideas, those of body and space. We are to contemplate them as they now lie in the Intelligence, in its present state of development. That these ideas are in all minds, which have attained to any considerable degree of development, there can be no doubt. The question is, what are their fundamental characteristics?

Idea of Body contingent.

We will begin with the idea of body. Take any one body we please, the book, for an example, which lies before us. While we conceive of this body, as existing, we can also, with perfect readiness, conceive its non-existence. We believe, that the time was, when it had no existence, and that the time may come, when it will cease to exist. The power which brought it into being, may also annihilate it. The same holds true of all bodies, of every kind. All objects around us, the world itself, and the entire universe we contemplate as existing with the possibility of, at the same time, conceiving of their non-existence. They do exist. They may cease to be. They may be annihilated. There is no