subject is concerned. Logic, to judging and reasoning, is what Grammar is to speaking and writing. Logic pertains not at all to the particular objects about which the Intelligence is, from time to time, employed, but to rules or laws in conformity to which it does act, whatever the objects may be.

Relations of Logic to other Sciences.

In the chronological order of intellectual procedure, Logic is preceded by judging and reasoning, just as speaking and writing precede Grammar. In the logical order, however, it is the antecedent of all other sciences. In all sciences the Intelligence, from given data, judges in respect to truths resulting from such data. We also reason from such data for the establishment of such truths. Logic develops the laws of thought which govern the action of the Intelligence in all such procedures. As a science, it is distinct from all other sciences, yet it permeates them all, giving laws to the Intelligence, in all its judgments and reasonings, whatever the objects may be about which it is employed.

CHAPTER XVII1.

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.

THERE are a few topics of a miscellaneous character connected with our previous investigation, which I have reserved for a distinct and separate Chapter. The first to which I would direct attention is,

The Bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Science, properly so called.

In the philosophy of Locke, axioms have no place, except as objects of ridicule and contempt. He directly denies that any science whatever is founded upon them. Equally removed from his philosophy are all ideas of pure Reason. All the objects of knowledge are qualities external and internal. Now in what sense and in what form is science pertaining to any subject possible, according to the fundamental principles of this philosophy? The answer which I give to this question is this: In no form whatever is science of any kind possible, according to the fundamental principles of this philosophy. We will take in illustration the science of external and material substances. All that we know of these substances, according to this philosophy, is by sensation—that is, qualities, and nothing else. Now the first step in a scientific process pertaining to these qualities, is that of making abstraction of them, in thought, separating those which differ, and uniting those which agree. On what condition can this process take place? On one condition only, to wit: that we have in our minds the ideas of resemblance and difference. But these ideas are pure conceptions of Reason, and are not given by sensation at all. Sensation may give the colors red and yellow, for example; but it can never give the fact, that the one color differs from the other. This

judgment is conditioned on the prior existence in the mind of a pure conception of Reason, the ideas above named. But the reality of such ideas this philosophy denies. lt thereby, in its fundamental principles, renders the first step in a scientific process impossible.

But let us suppose that this philosophy did admit of abstraction. Simple classification and generalization would be possible that is, these qualities, as they exist in combination, might be classed into genera and species, and then qualities, common to all individuals of given classes, might be found. This would be the utmost limit of scientific procedure, according to this philosophy, and this comprehends the limits of the sphere of the Intelligence as presented in the school of Locke. But this is the starting point of real science, properly defined. When substances have been classified and generalized, the Intelligence is then brought into circumstances to evolve their properties and relations in the light of fundamental ideas. This is science-a thing impossible according to the philosophy of Locke.

In the denial of the axioms, also, as the foundation of science, Locke renders science of all kinds impossible, Suppose we did not know the axiom, Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, how could we affirm that because A and B are equal to C, therefore they are equal to one another? It would be impossible to make such an affirmation. The same holds in respect to every step in all the sciences, pure and mixed. Take away the axioms, and "darkness all, and ever-during night" enshrouds the sun of science. Whenever we meet with scientific Treatises in the school of Locke (and we meet with many), they exist in spite of his philosophy, and not as a consequent of it.

KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL

JUDGMENTS.

I have reserved for this place, the consideration of the distinction above named, a distinction which constitutes one of the fundamental peculiarities of the philosophy of Kant, and which laid the foundation for the various systems which have risen out of the principles and fragments of his philosophy.

Analytical and Synthetical Judgments defined and distinguished.

The first thing to be done is to define these judgments,

and to distinguish the one from the other. All judgments pertain to the relation between a subject and predicate. This relation is possible only in two ways. Either the predicate is really contained in the subject, and the judgment evolves, or designates it as a quality necessarily embraced in our conception of the subject; or the predicate lies completely out of the subject, although it sustains a certain relation to it. Thus when we affirm that all bodies are extended, the predicate is really embraced in our conception of the subject; since it is impossible to conceive of a body which is not extended. The judgment in this case simply designates the quality named as thus embraced in the conception. All such judgments proceed on the principle of contradiction. No individual for example can deny the proposition, All bodies are extended, without contradicting the essential conception which every one has of body. All such judgments, Kant denominates analytical. To find them, we have only to analyze our conceptions and find the elements essentially embraced in them.

On the other hand, when we say all bodies are heavy, the predicate does not, as in the former case, lie within the subject, as an essential element of our conception of the subject. We cannot conceive of body which is not extended. But we can conceive of body as extended, without including in the conception the idea of weight. That all bodies have weight, we learn from experience alone. Through experience this element is added to our notions of body. All judgments of this character, Kant denominates synthetical.

All pure experience-judgments are synthetical, that is, when, by investigation, we have discovered, as connected with an object, or an essential element of it, some quality unknown before, we then, in thought, add that quality to our former conception of the object.

But we find, on analysis of our judgments, that we have not only empirical, but a priori judgments, which are synthetical. Of this character are all the primary principles of Reason-judgments, such as, Body supposes space : succession time; events causes, &c. In all such judgments the predicate is not contained in the subject, as an essential element of any conception of that subject, but lies wholly without it, and the Judgment affirms the relation between them.

Thus far the analysis of Kant is deeply profound and cor

rect.

Much light is thrown thereby upon the procedure of

the Intelligence. Further, when this philosopher affirms that all the sciences "contain synthetical judgments, a priori, as principles," he has asserted a true and very important fact. When philosophers have discovered new and important principles, however, they are very much exposed to become intoxicated by their own discoveries, and, as a consequence, employ such principles in destroying the temple of philosophy, instead of adding them as polished stones to that temple. Whether this philosopher has done this in the instance under consideration, remains to be seen.

Errors of Kant in the Application of the above Principles.

At first thought, it would appear that the principles above elucidated would be very harmless, at least, in their results (and so they will be found to be when legitimately applied), and that they would lead to no disastrous conclusions pertaining to the validity of our knowledge relative to realities within and around us. Yet upon these principles, this philosopher has founded most of his conclusions, in which the validity of our faculties, in reference to all affirmations pertaining to realities, material and mental, finite and infinite, is denied. The conclusions to which he pushes these principles, may be thus stated:

1. Not only are all experience-judgments synthetical, but also all judgments of pure science, such, for example, as mathematical judgments.

2. As in all such judgments the predicate lies wholly out of the subject, such judgments have no claim whatever to objective validity. They are entirely foundationless. In themselves they are without foundation, of course, and as the predicate lies wholly out of the subject, it can have no foundation in that.

3. As such judgments are themselves without foundation, so also must be all sciences founded on them as principles.

4. As all pure sciences rest exclusively upon such judgments, and as all judgments pertaining to such sciences, such for example, as mathematics, are purely synthetical, such sciences, with all judgments pertaining to them, are wholly without any objective validity.

5. As synthetical judgments, a priori, precede as laws of thought, and determine the character of all experiencejudgments, and all conclusions based upon them, these last judgments, like the former, are wholly destitute of all claims