instead of being the sport of wild and blind assumptions, will stand unmoved upon the rock of eternal truth. This subject will be resumed again in a subsequent part of our investigations.

Classification of Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant.

It was stated above, that Kant has given a most profound and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a development equally correct of the intellectual faculties pre-supposed by those phenomena. I will close this chapter. by giving a concise statement of the results of his analysis.

Intellectual phenomena, according to this philosopher, are divided into two classes-those derived from experience, and those not derived from experience-the empirical and rational.

The operations of our own minds, for example, together with the qualities of external material substances, are given us by the direct intuitions of Sense and Consciousness. Such intuitions, therefore, are exclusively empirical, being derived solely from experience.

On the other hand, space is an object neither of Sense nor Consciousness. Its reality we know, and know absolutely; but not as an object of experience. The same is true of the ideas of Time, the Infinite, Substance, Cause and Effect, &c.

Rational intuitions are by Kant denominated "intuitions à priori." Events, for example, are objects of experience; as such we know them. But the proposition, every event has a cause, we know à priori, and not by experience.

Intuitions à priori, have these characteristics, and by these they are distinguished from empirical intuitions, viz.: universality and necessity. Though we might know by experience, that such and such events have a particular cause, we cannot know from experience, that every event has a cause; much less, that every event must have a cause. Experience, if it could give us what is, could not give us the fact that what is, must be.

The above classification, it will readily be perceived, is, in reality, identical with that elucidated in the preceding Chapter, and leads to precisely the same division of the Intellectual faculties, a division which Kant, in fact, presents, as the result of his investigations. The "à priori" phenomena of Kant are those there given as necessary, while his empirical intuitions are the contingent phenomena of Sense and Consciousness.

CHAPTER V.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

Consciousness Defined.

Or this function of the Intelligence various definitions have been given by different philosophers. The following is the definition given by Dr. Webster. "The knowledge of sensations and mental operations, or of what passes in our own mind; the act of the mind which makes known an internal object." Cousin represents it as that function of the Intelligence which "gives us information of everything which takes place in the interior of our minds." "Perhaps the most correct description of the mind in Consciousness, i. e. of the conscious states of the mind," says the translator of Cousin's Psychology, "is the being aware of the phenomena of the mind-of that which is present to the mind; and if self-consciousness be distinguished, not in genera, but as a special determination of Consciousness, it is the being aware of ourselves, as of the me, in opposition to the not me, or as the permanent subject, distinct from the phenomena of the mind, and from all outward causes of them." In simple Consciousness, according to this author, we have a knowledge, in conformity to the statement of Cousin, of whatever passes in the interior of our own minds, that is, of all our mental exercises. In self-Consciousness, which is only a special form or determination of the former, we know ourselves in those phenomena, and thus distinguish ourselves from all external causes of them. This, certainly, is a very distinct and correct exposition of the subject.

The definition of Professor Tappan, given in his work on the Will, though somewhat lengthy, demands special atten

tion, on account of the distinctness and correctness with which the subject is there presented.

"Consciousness," he says, "is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is common, universal, and spontaneous Consciousness.

"This definition may appear to some an identical proposition-the mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows emotions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels, and wills. Therefore, we would say further:

"By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not, if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but the mind knowing itself in these."

In the above definitions the subject is presented with such distinctness, and correctness, that I shall attempt no particular definition of my own. In the exercise of Consciousness, we are not only aware of some mental state, or exercise, but we know ourselves, in that state, as the subjects of it. In every exercise of thought, feeling, and willing, we not only know what these states are, but know ourselves in them, as exercising or pursuing them, and as the subjects of them. Hence all mental phenomena, as given in Consciousness, are expressed in propositions like the following ;-I think, I feel, I will;-the mental phenomena being given, together with the self, the I, as the subject of them.

In every act of Self-Consciousness, also, three terms are given ;-the particular phenomenon, the I, or self, as its subject, and something not ourselves, as its object, or cause. In Consciousness, we find ourselves, and all external objects, as distinct from ourselves.

A remark, which I deem of special importance to make here, is this. In Consciousness, we not only know mental phenomena as they are, but what is in reality implied in such knowledge, we know also the fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of such phenomena. If we could merely know, by Consciousness, mental phenomena, and not also their distinguishing characteristics, we could never classify and arrange such phenomena as the basis of important con

clusions in the science of Mind. Whatever intelligent affirmations we can make respecting ourselves, as beings capable of thinking, feeling, and willing, we must affirm, on the exclusive authority of the characteristics of such phenomena, characteristics perceived and affirmed by Consciousness.

Self-Consciousness conditioned on Reason, but not a function of Reason.

The exercise of Self-Consciousness, contemplated as a particular form or determination of Simple Consciousness, is conditioned on the prior exercise of the Reason. It is by Reason, as we have already seen, that we know that phenomenon supposes substance, or a subject, and that each particular phenomenon supposes a particular subject. But for Reason, therefore, whatever mental phenomena might be given in Consciousness, we could not know, that, for such phenomena, any subject whatever is supposed. Simple Consciousness gives us mental phenomena. Self-Consciousness, a particular form, or determination of the former, connects such phenomena with the subject, the reality of which Reason has affirmed, and connects them in the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. While, therefore, Self-Consciousness is conditioned on the Reason, the former, as a function of the Intelligence, is clearly distinguishable from the latter. This is further evident from a single consideration. Reason is the organ of à priori, that is, universal and necessary truths. This is its exclusive sphere. All the affirmations of Consciousness, even in the form called Self-Consciousness, bear the characteristics of contingency. A sound philosophy, therefore, will not fail, as philosophers sometimes have done, to distinguish these different functions of the Intelligence from each other.

Natural, or spontaneous, and philosophical, or reflective Consciousness.

Consciousness, in its simple spontaneous form, is common to all mankind, in the natural development of their Intelligence. In the language of Cousin, it is, " in all men a natural process." Every individual is accustomed to use the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. All persons are accustomed, also, to speak of themselves, as conscious of particular states, or exercises of mind. This shows, that they not only are conscious of their mental exercises, but also are

aware of the function of the Intelligence exercised under such circumstances. All men, also, in the spontaneous developments of Consciousness, clearly distinguish themselves as subjects of mental phenomena, from all external causes, or objects of the same. They may not be able technically to this distinction with the clearness and definiteness that a philosopher would. They may not be able to understand at first, the meaning of the terms he would employ to express that distinction. Still it is, to them, a no less palpable reality, than to him.

express

Now Consciousness, which is thus seen to be, "in all men, a natural process, some," in the language of the philosopher above named, "elevate this natural process to the degree of an art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second Consciousness—a free re-production of the first; and as Consciousness gives all men an idea of what is passing in them, so reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge of everything which falls under the eye of Consciousness." Reflection, or philosophic Consciousness, is simple or natural Consciousness directed by the Will, in the act of careful attention to the phenomena of our own minds. As natural Consciousness is one of the characteristics which distinguishes man from the brute, so philosophic Consciousness is the characteristic which distinguishes the mental philosopher from the rest of mankind.

Men

The above remarks may be illustrated by a reference to two common forms of observation in respect to external material substances. The phenomena of such substances all mankind alike notice, and to some degree reason about. It is the natural philosopher, however, who attentively observes these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their fundamental characteristics, as the basis of philosophic classification, generalization, &c. The same holds true in respect to the two forms of Consciousness under consideration. tal phenomena all men are conscious of, and all men, to a greater or less degree, are accustomed to reason about. The philosopher, however, by laborious efforts of self reflection, most critically attends to these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their characteristics, classifying and arranging them according to philosophic principles, and thus determining the powers and laws of mental operations. In simple Consciousness, we have a knowledge of whatever passes in our minds. In reflection, we have the same phenomena