CHAPTER VI.

SENSE.

SENSE has been defined, as that faculty or function of the Intelligence, by which we apprehend the phenomena, or qualities, of external, material substances.

To be distinguished from Sensation.

The exercise of this faculty should be carefully distinguished from those states of the Sensibility which always accompany it, but which are, notwithstanding, none the less, for that reason, distinct from it, to wit, sensation. Sensation is the state of the Sensibility which immediately succeeds any impression made upon our physical organization, by some material substance. In the exercise of the faculty of Sense, the Intelligence apprehends the object, or the quality in the object, which caused the sensation. Sensation is exclusively a state of the Sensibility. Sense is no less exclusively a function of the Intelligence. Of these distinctions we should never lose sight, when reasoning upon this department of mental science.

Spontaneous and voluntary determination of Sense.

Sense, like Consciousness, is, in its primitive developments, a simple spontaniety of the Intelligence. Its action, in this state, is, in no sense, conditioned on the Will. Perception, in its distinct forms, is conditioned on attention, which is nothing but the perceptive faculty, directed by the Will; and hence, for the want of a better term or phrase, called the Voluntary determination of the faculty. Attention, in the direction of Consciousness-that is, when directed to mental

phenomena is called reflection. When in the direction of the faculty of external perception-that is, towards the phenomena of material substances-it is called observation.

The necessity of observation, that is, of attention, in the voluntary direction of the perceptive faculty towards phenomena obscurely given in the spontaneous developments of that faculty, may be readily illustrated. A portion of a congregation, for example, who have been listening to a certain speaker, have fallen into a state of slumber. The speaker suddenly stops, and immediately all are aroused. Now, if the audience had not, in some form, heard the voice which broke upon their ears, why were they aroused? Yet, if inquired of, in respect to what had been spoken to them, they would, for the obvious and exclusive reason, that they had not attended to it, be wholly unable to answer. How often do we hear the remark, I gained no distinct conception of that part of a discourse. My attention happened, at the time, to be directed to something else.

The attention may, in some instances, be so fixed upon some object in one direction, that the Sensibility and Intelligence both may be almost, if not quite, totally isolated from what would otherwise deeply affect us in another direction. A gentleman, for example, who was employed about the machinery in a factory, had one of his fingers entirely cut off, by the sudden and unexpected starting of a portion of that machinery which carried, with great velocity, a circular saw. So intensely did his attention instantly become occupied with the prevention of the destruction of the whole machinery, that he was not aware of the injury done to his own person, nor was he sensible of the least pain from it, till the accident was pointed out to him by another who stood by. As soon, however, as the injury was discovered, the pain from it became intense.

The basis of attention is the spontaneous action of the Sensibility and Intelligence-action which always occurs, when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and when the mind is not isolated from objects in other directions, by its intense action upon some object, (as in the case above cited) in some specific direction.

Mental process in Perception.

The process of the mind, in the perception of external objects, is doubtless originally something like this. An im

pression is made on the Sensibility, or a sensation is excited, by the action of some object on the physical organization. In Consciousness, the mind not only apprehends the impression, but itself, as its subject, and not as its cause. For this reason, the mind is led to seek for the cause of the sensation out of itself. Hence the spontaneous apprehension of the object, and the direction of the organ of perception towards it. Thus it is, that we originally find ourselves and all things else, in Consciousness. If the phenomena of our minds were not originally given us, as objects of Consciousness, we could never know ourselves as the subjects of these phenomena. And if, when we know ourselves, as subjects of phenomena produced by external objects, we could not know that every phenomenon must have a cause, and that the cause of the particular phenomenon given, is not within ourselves, how could we be led to seek, and recognize that cause without ourselves?

Organs of Sense, and the knowledge conveyed by each.

In regard to the particular organs of Sense, of which five are commonly reckoned, to wit, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, organs through which a knowledge of the particular qualities of material substances are conveyed to the mind, but little need be said. One remark, however, may be deemed of some importance. It is this. Each organ pertains exclusively to the particular quality or qualities which are the objects of that particular organ. The peculiar qualities given by sight, for example, are given by no other sense. The relation of objects, such as distance, which is a mere relation, and not a quality at all, we learn, by experience, to determine by various senses, as sight, touch, hearing, and smelling even in some instances. But the existence and

qualities of such objects are given, as causes and objects of particular sensations and perceptions in us, by each of the senses alike, each sense, or each organ of the general faculty giving the quality, or qualities, which are the objects of that particular organ.

Error of Dr. Brown.

Here a very palpable error of Dr. Brown deserves a passing observation. According to him, we derive a knowledge of external substances from one sense only, that of touch, or rather muscular action. "But for our previous belief of the

existence of a permanent and independent system of external things, acquired from other sources, we should have classed," he says, "the greater number of the feelings, which we now refer to Sense, among those which arise spontaneously in the Mind, without any cause external to the Mind itself." Thus, unless the muscular system had fortunately or unfortunately come in contact with some external or resisting cause, the Mind might have had a consciousness of the sensations of smell, taste, hearing, sight, and touch, without the idea of any cause whatever, without itself. Of one fact the Mind could not have been ignorant, to wit, that these phenomena must have been produced by some cause. Consciousness would have forbidden the supposition that the Mind itself was both the subject and cause of such phenomena. The only other supposition possible is the certain knowledge of a cause external to the Mind-a cause, the nature of which corresponds with the character of the phenomena of which the Mind is conscious. Further, the sensation produced by resistance is first given in Consciousness, as a simple phenomenon of which the Mind knows itself, not as the cause, but as the subject. If, while the Mind knows itself as the subject of that phenomenon, it could not know that it is not both subject and cause, it would never seek for the cause of this or of any other phenomenon out of itself.

Objects of Perception.

The objects of perception (external perception) are the qualities of material substances. The qualities perceived are resistance, extension, form, color, taste, smell, sound, &c. Such qualities are to us the index, and the only index we have, of their respective subjects. In the consciousness of thought, feeling, and mental determinations, we know ourselves as thinking, feeling, and acting beings. So in the experience of sensations and perceptions produced in us by external material substances, we know them as the powers which produce these perceptions and sensations; in other words, we know them as substances possessed of the qualities of resistance, extension, form, color, &c.

Common and Philosophic Doubts in respect to the comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Consciousness. While the mass of mankind appear to exercise more confidence, theoretically, in the testimony of Sense than in that

of Consciousness, the case seems, in many instances, to be reversed in respect to philosophers. The testimony of Consciousness the latter appear to regard as valid in respect to subjective, while that of Sense is not, in their estimation, equally so in respect to objective phenomena. Now the reason of the presence of these philosophic doubts, as Coleridge would call them, in the latter instance, and of their absence in the former, arises, as I suppose, from the fact that philosophers have attempted to explain the quo modo of external perception, and not that of internal. This is the very reason for the doubts under consideration, assigned by Coleridge himself. "As this," he says [to wit, the belief that there exist things without us], "on the one hand, originates neither in grounds nor arguments, and yet, on the other hand, remains proof against all attempts to remove it by grounds or arguments (natura furca expellas tamen usque redebit); on the one hand, lays claim to IMMEDIATE certainty as a position at once indemonstrable and irresistible; and yet, on the other hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves, leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of our immediate Consciousness (in other words, how that which is ex hypothesi continues intrinsic and alien to our being); the philsopher, therefore, compels himself to treat this faith as nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and connatural, but still a prejudice." Now why does this philosopher compel himself to treat as a groundless prejudice and an untruth that which himself acknowledges to be an innate, connatural belief, an irresistible affirmation of his own and of the universal Intelligence? Simply because he cannot explain the quo modo of external perception-cannot see how an object not ourselves, and wholly unlike ourselves, as matter is universally conceived to be, should be to us an object of knowledge. If that is a reason why we should compel ourselves to treat as false what we know to be true, it should certainly induce us to treat his theory as equally false. For how can we explain the manner in which that which is intrinsic and a part of ourselves, should be presented to us, by our Intelligence, as wholly extrinsic and foreign, and even opposed to ourselves-how it can present that which is exclusively subjective, as wholly objective-that which is purely spiritual, as wholly material-that, in short, which is "without form and void," as possessed of a definite