with good reason) his improvement for any thing. So that when a second edition lesseneth the price of the first, he very naturally thinks himself tricked of his money.

Another ground of prejudice, is the unfair advantage made of the author's property, by booksellers: which, if true, would be just as good a reason for refusing him the public protection, as it would be to turn all those estates. upon the common, which one of your Peter Walters bas out at nurse. For why should it be expected of an author, and of no one else, to become sage before he be entrusted with his own? Let him but share in the common security, and he will soon learn the value of property, and how to use it like his neighbours. As it is, we need not wonder, he should be disposed to part with that, for little, which he is unable to preserve but at great hazard and expence.

A third ground of prejudice is the odious sound of the word MONOPOLY. But this is taking the thing in question for granted, viz. that an author hath no right of property for a monopoly is an exclusive privilege by grant of doing that, which all men have a claim to do; not an exclusive right by nature of enjoying what no one else has a claim to. So that to make this a monopoly, is making a proprietor and a monopolist the same.

A fourth ground of prejudice is the favourite sound of LIBERTY, in these times commonly used for LICENTIOUSNESS; and apparently so on this occasion. For liberty signifies the power of doing what one will with one's own; which is the right we here contend for: and licentiousness the doing what we will with another man's; which is the wrong we seek to redress. So that, as sure as licentiousness destroys liberty, so certain is it, that the protection of the right in question adds strength and vigour to it.

But it is not my design to defend the use men make of property; but to vindicate the right they have in it. For were it not for these prejudices, could we easily think that a printseller or engraver should be able to obtain that for his baubles, which LEARNING hath so long sued for in vain? I shall therefore go to the bottom of them; and, as they all support themselves on the DD 4

false

false logic here detected, the taking the thing in question for granted, I shall shew, that an author has an. undoubted right of property in his works.

Things susceptible of PROPERTY must have these two essential, conditions; that they be useful to mankind; and that they be capable of having their possessione ascertained. Without the first, society will not be obliged to take the right under its protection; and, without the second, it will never venture upon the trouble.

Of these, some are movable, as goods; some immovable, as lands; and they become property either by first occupancy, or by improvement.

Of morables, some are things natural; others, things artificial, Property in the first is gained by occupancy; in the latter, by improvement.

Movable property, arising from improvement, is of two sorts; the product of the hand, and of the mind; as an utensil made; a book composed. For that the product of the mind is as well capable of becoming property, as that of the hand, is evident from hence, that it hath in it those two essential conditions, which, by the allow ance of all writers of laws, make things susceptible of property; namely, coinmon utility, and a capacity of having its possession ascertained.

Eoth these sort of things, therefore, being capable of property, we are next to consider, as they are so different in their natures, whether there be not as great a difference in the extension of their rights.

In the first case, then, it is agreed, that property in the product of the hand, as in an utensil, is confined to the individual thing made; which, if the proprietor thinks not fit to hide, others may make the like in imitation of it; and thereby acquire the same property in their manual work, which he hath done in his.

Eut, in the other case of property in the product of the mind, as in a book composed, it is not confined to the original MS. but extends to the doctrine contained in it; which is, indeed, the true and peculiar property in a book. The necessary consequence of which is, that the owner hath an exclusive right of transcribing or printing it for gain or profit,

This difference, in these two sorts of property, arises from an equal difference in the things as will appear by considering the different nature of the works; and the different views of the operators.

With regard to the nature of the work: an utensil; and a book only considered as a composition of paper, and ink drawn out in artificial characters, are both works of the hand; and, as such, the property is confined to the individual thing. But a book considered merely in this light, is considered inadequately and unjustly; the complete idea of a book being such a composition as is here spoken of, together with a doctrine contained. But under this idea it assumes another nature, and becomes a work of the mind. We have proved a work of the mind to be susceptible of property, like that of the hand. Now if the property in a book be confined to the individual volume, here is a work of the mind executed without any property annexed: the property in the individual volume, arising from its being merely the work of the hand. A doctrine absurd in speculation; as it is making manual and mental operation one and the same, which are two distinct and different things: and unjust in practice, as it depriveth the owner of a right annexed by nature to his labour. Again, in the utensil made, the principal expense is in the materials employed; which, whoever furnisheth, reasonably acquires a property. in the thing made, though made by imitation. On the contrary, in a book composed, the principal expence is in the form given: which as the original maker only can supply, it is but reasonable, how greatly soever the copies of his work may be multiplied, that they be multiplied to his own exclusive profit.

Let us next consider it, with regard to the different views of the operators. He who makes an utensil, in imitation of another he sees made, must necessarily work with the same ideas the original operator had, and so fitly acquires a property in the work of his own hands. But the most learned book in the world may be copied by one who hath no ideas at all. What pretence, then, hath such a one to property, in a work of the mind, who bath employed, in copying it, only the labour of the

hand;

hand; and which tends but to make his theft the more impudent, as he steals what he doth not understand? Again, in an utensil made, the framer of it hath plainly. no regard to any one's benefit but his own: and he must finish it before it can be fitted for his use. Hisend, then, being obtained in that individual piece of work, it is but reasonable his property should there terminate. In a mental work. the thing turns the other way. Here the contriver may himself enjoy all the fruits of his discoveries without drawing them out scholastically in forth. When he doth this, it is but candid to suppose that it is done for the benefit of others. Can any thing, therefore, be more just than that he should be owned and protected in a property, which he hath not merely acquired to himself, but which is generously objective to the benefit of others?

In a word, to insist once again upon what hath been said. If an author have only a property in his individual manuscript, he hath, truly speaking, no property, in his book, at all; that is, as his book is a work of the mind; which, in this case, still lics in common. The conse quence is, (as appears from the explanation of property given above) that no property ariseth from a thing susceptible of property: nay, which is still more absurd, from a thing actually become property; as being attended with all those essential conditions from whence property ariseth. To deny an author, therefore, or his assigns, an exclusive privilege to print and vend his own work, scemeth to be a violation of one of the most fundamental rights of civil society.

But here let it be observed, that, in our division of artificial movables, into the two sorts, of manual and mental, we purposely omitted a third, of a complicated

ature, which holds of both the other in common; as reserving it for this place, to support and illustrate what hath been said above of the two more simple kinds: and that is, of mechanic engines. Now these partaking so essentially of the nature of manual works, the maker hath no perfect right of property in the invention Tur, like a common utensil, it must be finished before it tah 'be of use to himself; like that, its materials are its pal expence; and like that, a successful imitator

must

must work with the ideas of the first inventor: which are all reasons why the property should terminate in the individual machine. Yet because the operation of the mind is so intimately concerned in the construction of these works, their powers being effected and regulated by the right application of geometric science, all states have concurred in giving the inventors of them a licence of monopoly, for a term of years, as on a claim of right. Now the reason of this, we say, can be explained only on the principles here advanced, that the constructor of a piece of mechanisin hath his property confined to the individual thing made; and the composer of a scholasticwork hath his, extended to the ideal discourse itself. And a mathematical machine holding of the nature of both, but more essentially of the former, there was no way of adjusting and satisfying an imperfect right but by such a grant as is here mentioned.

But it is no unfrequent practice for the claimants of a perfect right to apply to the magistrate, or Legislature, for the better security of an acquired property, in the same manner that claimants of an imperfect right do to acquire property: sometimes, to the one for a licence; and sometimes, to the other for an Act of Parliament. Yet from thence to conclude, that the claimants of a perfect right have, by such application, waved or given up their claim; or that the magistrate or Legislature have, by their licences or acts of exclusive privilege for a certain time, either abridged or superseded that claim, appears, to me, the highest absurdity; as it will, I am persuaded, to others, on reflecting upon the plain and obvious reasons why the petitioners seek this additional security, for the enjoyment of a natural right; and why the magistratė and Legislature grant it only for a certain term of years. In the common administration of justice, the way, in use, to restrain the invasion of property, is to oblige the offender to repair the damages sustained. Now such is the nature of the property in question, that it may be long invaded before the sufferer can discover the offender so that such a one having a fair chance not to be detected; and if detected, a certainty of refunding only what he hath unjustly gained; bad men will have but too great encouragement to invade their neighbours'

property.

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