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secure for Germany the diplomatic hegemony of Europe as she had gained military supremacy on " the stricken field." It must be acknowledged that the "honest broker" of Berlin received invaluable assistance in his complicated operations from the artlessness of foreign statesmen who, decade after decade, awed the Wilhelmstrasse to remain a sort of international karing-house, where cognisance was taken of practically all portant transactions between European Powers and commisson duly exacted. The system worked wonderfully from the German standpoint, but, simple as it was, it demanded genius, and the moment Bismarck received his congé it began to break down, though the momentum he had imparted to the machine of his own invention kept it going for some years longer. By war, or rumours of war, and poisonous falsehoods, Russia and France, whose alliance was equally urgent in the larger interests of Europe, as it was for their own safety, must be kept asunder, and so long as Bismarck controlled German policy the dreaded mbination was prevented. Equally necessary, according to the Bismarckian conception of international interests, was the estrangement of Great Britain and France, who were accordingly

ouraged to harass one another in Africa while Germany rified her European position. Then Russia and Great Britain ("the elephant and the whale") must, at all costs, be kept at loggerheads, and with the aid of the Crimean War and a Jewish Prime Minister with a racial prejudice against Russia, Barck's task was comparatively easy, and repeatedly the two Powers found themselves without quite knowing why on the ere of a war from which Germany alone stood to gain. As an stration, sceptics may be referred to the Penjdeh incident 1585, as described in the unprejudiced pages of the Life of Led Granville, by Lord Fitzmaurice, not long ago a member f the present Pacifist Government, with a presumable penchant wards Potsdam. The Russians were habitually represented by the Germans to the British as Asiatic barbarians, with whom

civilised community should have any dealings and whose career it was the duty of Western Europe to curb. At the same ime, Germany herself cultivated the most intimate relations with Russia, to whom we were represented as the enemies of Order-on account of our liberalising tendencies, which made any association with us perilous to Absolutism.

From Bismarck to Bülow

MUCH may be learnt of the astounding intrigues which for a generation made Germany the master of Europe, from the pages of Bismarck, Busch, and the Life of Lord Granville, all of which exhibit an unbelievable simplicity among the wise men of other countries. But we must bear in mind that foreign statesmen were severely handicapped, while Bismarck's schemes were materially promoted by the intimate personal relations of the Emperor William I. with various dynasties, notably those of Russia and England, which enabled the Iron Chancellor to get his view of any situation represented in the highest quarters abroad through the unsuspecting pen of his confiding Sovereign. Wilhelm II. followed in the footsteps of Bismarck and maintained the system after he had discharged its creator, but he was less fortunate than his grandfather in his servants, who were either too honest for such policies as "Reinsurance," like Count Caprivi, or too clever by half, like Prince Bülow, the personification of the faux bonhomme, who instinctively aroused distrust in every one with whom he came in contact. But peace be with him. He served his purpose, as the transparency of his tricks unwittingly helped to open the eyes of our purblind politicians to the true character of German diplomacy and the objects of German policy. Prince Bülow's attitude towards any foreign diplomat or journalist with whom he chanced to converse might be thus described: "I am about to make a fool of you," but so anxious are some of our public men to be fooled that Prince Bülow's methods would have been less of a fiasco but for the candid utterances of the German Emperor, who had so profound a contempt for the intelligence of the British-which is not to be wondered at considering how he was flattered and fawned upon by those he met as never for a moment to conceal the fact that he lived with one object, viz., to do by the British Navy what his grandfather had done by the French army. Indeed, the objective of his efforts and this is a point studiously ignored by our Potsdam Press-was obligingly set forth in the preamble of an Act of Parliament, namely, the Navy Act of 1900, and though preambles may be at a discount in this country, this particular, preamble has been the lodestar of the whole German naval

propaganda. We need not recall the flamboyant and picturesque

eches in which the German Emperor proclaimed his intention of grasping Neptune's trident. His Imperial Majesty has not fr a single second abandoned what we regard as his obsession but which he regards as a certainty.

Tertius
Gaudens

GERMANY, for the moment, deems it advisable to pretend to take a fresh tack, partly with the object of lulling Great Britain into that false sense of security in which Englishmen revel-which is the inevitable prelude of German attack-and partly in order to excite suspicions of British good faith in the minds of the two great nations with whom we have lately found ourselves in cordial and successful co-operation in preserving the peace of Europe. The Kaiser is Enderstood to have hinted to Herr Ballin, a German shipping magnate, to hint to Sir Ernest Cassel, a financial magnate, to hint that Lord Haldane should make a pilgrimage to Potsdam, and the latter tumbled headlong into the trap through his childish vanity and love of intrigue. To appreciate the episode we must glance at the other side of the account. The breakdown of Bismarckianism, and the exposure of the whole apparatus of the Wilhelmstrasse in the biographies of Bismarck, and the clumsy devices of Bismarck's successors to pursue a policy beyond their capacity, together with the inept execution of thoughtless projects and resounding oratory, itimately awakened other European Powers to the truth. They learnt that for many years they had been so many puppets dancing to the piping of Potsdam. The Fashoda incident, which rought France and this country to the brink of war, illuminated any dark places. Both Powers were exhorted by Germany not surrender to the intolerable pretensions of the other, and each was assured of German moral support-if not something morehould diplomacy prove unfortunately unable to cope with the rais. There were a dozen similar episodes in which the tertius gaudens invariably adopted the same attitude-“ Go it, you cripples." The South African War completed our education, Because hitherto British statesmen had insisted on treating Germany as a peculiarly friendly Power and had paid heavy pourboires, from Heligoland to Samoa, on the assumption that this friendship was mutual. But directly we were in serious

difficulties with the Boers Germany threw off her hypocritical mask, while the Kaiser" stumped the country " as an Anglophobe, knowing that he could only hope to float the great fleet of his dreams on a vast ocean of Anglophobia. Even the ordinary amenities were forgotten, and no attempt was made to stop the vilification of his British relatives in the German Press, including Queen Victoria, as every demonstration of hatred of England brought marks to the Imperial Exchequer. Englishmen took the hostility of France and Russia as a matter of course. We had been, thanks in a large measure to Germany, on the worst possible terms-short of actual war-with both Powers. Moreover, their attitude was infinitely less offensive, because it was not deliberately organised from the top with a specific political object, as was the case in Germany. It made no permanent impression here and was forgotten directly the war was over. Moreover, the conduct of the Russian Emperor was irreproachable. He was actually attacked by the German semi-official Press for declining to take advantage of our preoccupation in South Africa; while the French President (Monsieur Loubet), at a very critical moment substantially observed: "This experience teaches me the need of a strong England to the peace of Europe."

Anglo-
French

Agreement

HOWEVER much the French disliked or even detested us at that time they were not prepared to join a hostile combination which would make Germany autocrat of Europe. Sensible people in various capitals drew their own conclusions from the pregnant experiences of the South African War, and the moment it was over they set to work to review their respective policies. Among the first to compare notes over a long period of estrangement were Frenchmen and Englishmen, who tardily discovered the chief source of their constant misunderstandings and occasional crises, and resolved once and for all to eliminate the possibility of quarrelling for the benefit of third parties by clearing up all outstanding differences. The process did not take long. It began in 1903, after a British Government had once more burnt their fingers by Anglo-Germanising in South America and Asia Minor, and ended in April 1904 with the signature of the Anglo-French Agreement. Our readers are probably aware that this development caused

stupefaction in Berlin and Potsdam, owing to the usual misinformation of German ambassadors, who reported that the negotations were foredoomed to failure, as France and Great Britain erald not compose their differences. Nor would they but for the excessive zeal of Germany to keep them apart. Though nego Eated in Paris and London and signed by the responsible Ministers of the high contracting parties, this beneficent instrument was Rally" made in Germany," who forthwith hated her own handiwork because it was a powerful bulwark of peace, and PanGermanism can only materialise via war. At the moment Prince Bülow pronounced a perfunctory blessing, but the Kaiser resolved to rip it up at the earliest opportunity, which appeared to be provided by the Russo-Japanese War, in which the historian will record that Germany played her usual rôle of agent provocateur. The efforts to bully France into abandoning the Entente Cordiale scored a passing though sensational success in 1905, when Le was persuaded to part with the Foreign Minister (M. Delcassé) who had perpetrated the enormity of signing the Anglo-French Agreement. But Germany's triumph was short-lived, because the British Government realised that the temporary effacement of Russia as a European Power had perilously dislocated the balance of forces, and as, according to the familiar tag, peace is the greatest of British interests, it became our duty to take an active part in restoring the equilibrium by closely associating ourselves with France, and the Unionist Government loyally stood by her side when she was threatened with unprovoked aggression in 1905, as the Campbell- Bannerman Government did in the beginning of 1906, and the Asquith Government in the autumn ci 1908 and in the summer of 1911.

Anglo-
Russian
Agreement

BUT the international situation remained unsatisfactory, and the portion of France was fraught with difficulty, so long as her Russian ally and her British friend continued to pursue an obsolete and mischievous policy founded on mutual misunderstanding and carefully fomented suspicion. Radical sentimentalists, who profess to worship the memory of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, have forgotten that their idol was faithful to the old Gladstonian belief in a cordial understanding between Russia and Great Britain, and

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