be stationed in the Pacific, and, in addition, one British Invincible must be despatched to the same ocean in accordance with the naval agreement of 1909 with the Dominions. Thus only twenty-nine British Dreadnoughts and Invincibles will be available for service in European waters, as against twenty-eight ips of the same type belonging to the Triple Alliance.

By the year 1915, the increase in the Austrian and Italian navies will zvive the necessity of placing a squadron of at least eight modern heavy ships the Mediterranean, thereby reducing our force in home waters to an approximate equality with the force of Germany. It may become necessary in addition keep a battle squadron on the China station. . . . These are the most ezentary considerations with which every student of affairs is acquainted. It need only be added that Ministers have paid no attention to this peremptory need of the near future. They are so busy dismembering our country and destroying its institutions that they are neglecting that naval predominance on which its very Estence depends. Here Admiral Mahan speaks with tremendous force, confirming the charges which Lord Charles has made. He accepts and endorses the statement of the Two-Power standard proposed in the National Review for July 1909.

The Two-Power standard must mean the maintenance of two fleets, the one perior in all arms to the foreign fleet next in order of strength, the other perior in all arms to the foreign fleet next again in order of strength. . . Taking present conditions in Europe and present naval programmes, the TwoPower standard requires that Great Britain have in home waters a fleet distinctly perior to that of Germany, and that she shall be able to place in the Mediterranean one equally superior to those of Austria and Italy combined. Now this, be it observed, is an even larger margin than Lord arles has required. It would demand a fleet of ten British. Dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean, and another fleet of at Past twenty-five or twenty-six ships of the same type in the North Sea, or a total of thirty-six Dreadnoughts available for Eropean service, against the twenty-nine we shall actually presess, disregarding altogether the pre-Dreadnoughts, the value

which must decline with every year. And Admiral Mahan sists that Austria has every reason for throwing her weight into the scale against Great Britain:

Austria is not now the enemy chiefly feared by Great Britain; but it will be Austria's interest to see Great Britain out of the Mediterranean, for Austria be great inducements to acquisition within it. Austria and Germany cannot

be said to have common objects; but they have a common interest in supporti one another, and their particular objects will be best furthered by co-operati with each other in world policies.

The peril in the Mediterranean is all the greater, becau Admiral Mahan thinks that the balance of power in Europe h broken down, owing to two causes, the rapid growth of Germaı in wealth and population and the equally rapid development her navy as contrasted with the regress of British armament Holding the central position in Europe with her ally, Austri she wields" a military power against which on the land no co bination in Europe can stand. The Balance of Power no long exists."

The important point to us here is the growing power of the German Empi in which the efficiency of the state as an organic body is so greatly superior that of Great Britain. . . The power to control Germany does not exist Europe except in the British Navy; and if social and political conditions Great Britain develop as they now promise, the British Navy will probab decline in relative strength so that it will not venture to withstand the Germ: on any broad lines of policy, but only in the sense of immediate British interes Even this condition may disappear, for it seems as if the national life of Gre Britain were waning at the same time that that of Germany is waxing. Two years ago, writing in the Daily Mail, Admiral Mahan di cerned a tendency on the part of the British nation to sacrific its navy for selfish ends and old age pensions. Now in a mo deliberate form he records his judgment that the nation wi falter before the vast demands that must be made of it, if it to retain its old position.

A second weakness on which Lord Charles lays strong emphasi is the absence of adequate dock provision for our new ships.

It is as wise to build ships without providing docks for them as it would to build a locomotive engine witnout providing tools for cleaning and repairin purposes. But in the case of the locomotive, the necessary equipment of too can quickly be made, whereas docks take longer to build than a shi Furthermore, what is not generally understood by the public is that dockin accommodation is more important to the fleet in respect of the periodic cleaning of ships than in respect of repairs. A foul bottom retards the spee of the vessel and involves increased coal consumption. In other words dock are more necessary before an action than after it.

Admiral Mahan is in absolute accord:

Among resources, he says, dry docks occupy the place first in importance (1) because to provide them requires the longest time; (2) because the

laciitate various kinds of repairs; (3) because by the capacity to clean and repair several vessels at once and so restore them with the least delay to the they maintain offensive energy.

Dry docks represent in a condensed form the three requirements of a rategic seaport. In position they should be as near the scene of war as ble. Strength is represented by numbers; the more numerous the docks, the greater the offensive strength of the port.

And again, "abundant coal and adequate docking are the two thef demands of a fleet during hostilities." Let us, then, turn ace more to Lord Charles Beresford, and observe how far the Government, Committee of Defence and Admiralty-for all three are responsible-have provided adequate docking for the British Lavy in the probable theatre of hostilities.

It is a dismal story. Before 1906 the necessity of a naval base on the East coast had been recognised by the Unionist Government. It procrastinated and delayed, but at last it made arrangements to begin work at Rosyth.

One of the first acts of the Liberal Government was to postpone the work. The Admiralty in this matter as in others was in collusion with the Government. Un July 2, 1909, there was published in the press an Admiralty document, of with twenty-five copies were printed, in which were described various economies faced at the request of the Government, among them being an item of £7,000,000 allocated for the construction of Rosyth.

Had a War Staff existed at the Admiralty, it is permissible to believe that sach a betrayal of the public trust would not have occurred. In Germany the Aciral Staff arranged that the construction of docks for the new heavy armoured vessels should proceed concurrently with the building of those

In 1909, in panic at the result of its negligence, the Admiralty to work to provide make-shifts in the shape of floating docks, ich are expensive and unsatisfactory; and only then did :begin the reconstruction of Portsmouth Dockyard," which has ng been unfit for modern requirements." To-day there is still Government dry dock and only one private dock (that too all for our newest ships) on the East coast" in which a heavy moured ship of the Dreadnought type can be accommodated, though there are thirty-one (thirty-two ?) such ships, built, building and projected." So that the British Navy is without ce of the most important elements of offensive naval force on that coast. There can be no disputing Lord Charles's con

In the event of an emergency, this condition of things must result in gr loss. In any event the country will sooner or later be compelled to pay imme sums for the tardy fulfilment of deferred obligations.

There must not only be docks, but also the bases in which the docks are situated must be adequately protected by fortificatio and land forces, Admiral Mahan tells us :

Let us avoid the extreme of the Blue Water school and bear in mind t a fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet by so far weakened for effect action-weakened both strategically and tactically.

Such a fleet will be "

in a false position."

clogged in its movement and is to some exte

An egregious instance at the present moment is the fear in Great Britain German invasion. This is due to the great inferiority of the army in the Brit Islands to that of Germany. The British Islands are inadequately garrisone they depend for defence on the fleet alone; and the fleet consequently is t to British waters.

A further point with regard to the disposition of naval bas which Admiral Mahan lays down is this:

That on every sea frontier there should be at least two secure po sufficiently fortified, and capable of making any and all repairs. In such ca pursuit may be baffled if the enemy can be dropped out of sight; but with port he knows to which you are bound.

The German Navy has at its disposal two distinct sets of bas linked together by an interior line of communication, the Nor Sea-Baltic Canal, and perfectly fortified. It can fall back Wilhelmshaven or on Kiel by the Skaw. The British Na in the North Sea has only one line of operations and retreat, p the Straits of Dover to inadequately equipped Portsmouth or distant Plymouth. Even when Rosyth is complete, our fle will have only one North Sea base, and that very indifferent fortified. On this question of fortifications for our home nav bases Lord Charles does not speak, though his private opinion pretty well known and is in substance that of Admiral Maha But with regard to our distant naval bases he points out that 1906-7

the mine-fields were all abolished, and the guns were dismantled or remov The mine-fields at home and at one or two other places abroad were shor afterwards replaced at a cost of thousands of pounds. At Rangoon, to whi

pare the oil, an invaluable prize, is conducted in pipes, the mines were removed. Incomalee, the most important naval base in Eastern waters, is left without a * ber and a gun.

With regard to the distribution of naval force, war plans and war training, the two admirals are in the closest possible word. Lord Charles Beresford points out that, in 1907, under Admiralty dispositions of 1906-7 :

The ships in home waters were distributed among three fleets: the Channel. actic and Home fleets. Each of these was stationed at a different place under parate command. . . The Admiralty did not think proper to combine the At for training purposes except upon one occasion (October 1907) when fifty s from the Home fleet out of 244 were sent on manœuvres.

He shows that for the success of any war plan, it is essential that the commander-in-chief should know what ships he has available and what is their condition, and that therefore "the whole of the et upon a station should be placed under one command." With force split up and dissipated in detachments under three separate murals it was impossible to carry out any plan-supposing one to have existed-or to train the fleet properly for war. Here Admiral Mahan tells us that the Naval War College in the United tes has paid its cost, if in no other way, by teaching naval 5ers" the folly of dividing the battle-fleet in peace or in war, kh was what the British Admiralty did in 1907. iple of concentration," he adds, "is the A B C .. entration sums up in itself all the other factors, the entire abet, of military efficiency in war." It was, by the way, this principle which our Admiralty journals pronounced to be Zaty" when the extraordinary scattering of the fleet in 1907 sharply criticised.

This

But was there a satisfactory war plan in 1907? Was there one in the Morocco crisis in 1911 ? Lord Charles Beresford that the naval dispositions in that crisis were altogether tisfactory. Because he has not dotted the i's, his indictment been challenged in the ostrich Press. It is therefore of Treme importance to examine these dispositions, the more so he German Government has by its inspired organs accused the Fish Navy of meditating and preparing a treacherous attack the German fleet in time of peace. No secrets will be dised in this article; the movements of ships and fleets shall