in order to sieze the bodies or goods of the subjects of the offending state, until satisfaction be made, wherever they happen to be found. And indeed this custom of reprisal seems dictated by nature herself.

Upon exactly the same reason stands the prerogative of granting safe conducts, without which, by the law of nations, no member of one society has a right to intrude into another.

In domestic affairs the king has many prerogatives. He is a constitutional part of the legislative power, and has the power of rejecting such provisions of parliament as he deems improper; is generalissimo of the military forces; has the power to appoint ports and havens; to erect beacons, light-houses, and sea-marks, to prohibit the exportation of arms, and to confine his subjects within the realm or to recall them from beyond the seas.

THE FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE.

III. Another capacity, in which the king is considered in domestic affairs, is as the fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace of the kingdom. By the fountain of justice, the law does not mean the author or original, but only the distributor. Justice is not derived from the king, as from his free gift, but he is the steward of the public, to dispense it to whom it is due. He is not the spring, but the reservoir, from whence right and equity are conducted by a thousand channels to every individual. The original power of judicature, by the fundamental principles of society, is lodged in the society at large; but, as it would be impracticable to render complete justice to every individual, by the people in their collective capacity, therefore every nation has committed that power to certain select magistrates, who with more ease and expedition can hear and determine complaints: and in England this authority has immemorially been exercised by the king or his substitutes. He, therefore, has alone the right of erecting courts of judicature; for, though the constitution of the kingdom hath intrusted him with the whole executive power of the laws, it is impossible, as well as improper, that he should personally carry into execution this great and extensive trust; it is consequently necessary that courts should be erected to assist him in executing this power; and equally necessary that, if erected, they should be erected by his authority. And hence it is that all jurisdictions of courts are either mediately or immediately derived from the crown, their proceedings run generally in the king's name, they pass under his seal, and are executed by his officers.

It is probable, and almost certain, that in very early times, before our constitution arrived at its full perfection, our kings in person often heard and determined causes between party and party. But at present, by the long and uniform usage of many ages, our kings have delegated their whole judicial power to the judges of their several courts; which are the grand depositories of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and stated jurisdiction, regulated by certain established

rules, which the crown itself cannot now alter but by act of parliament. And, in order to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges in the superior courts, it is enacted by the statute 13 W. III. c. 2, that their commissions shall be made (not as formerly, durante bene placito, but quamdiu bene se gesserint) and their salaries ascertained and established; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the address of both houses of parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that law, in statute of 1 George III c. 23, enacted at the earnest recommendation of the king himself from the throne, the judges are continued in their offices during their good behavior, notwithstanding any demise of the crown (which was formerly held immediately to vacate their seats), and their full salaries are absolutely secured to them during the continuance of their commissions; his majesty having been pleased to declare, that "he looked upon the independence and uprightness of the judges as essential to the impartial administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of his subjects; and as most conducive to the honour of the crown."

In criminal proceedings, or prosecutions for offences, it would still be a higher absurdity if the king personally sat in judgment; because in regard to these, he appears in another capacity; that of prosecutor. All offences are either against the king's peace, or his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every indictment. For though in their consequences they generally seem (except in the case of treason, and a very few others) to be rather offences against the kingdom than the king, yet as the public, which is an invisible body, has delegated all its power and rights, with regard to the execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate, all affronts to that power, and breaches of those rights, are immediately offences against him to whom they are so delegated by the public. He is therefore the proper person to prosecute for all public offences and breaches of the peace, being the person injured in the eye of the law.

In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one main preservative of the public liberty, which cannot subsist long in any state unless the administration of common justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative and also from the executive power.

THE KING'S LEGAL UBIQUITY.

A consequence of this prerogative is the legal ubiquity of the king. His majesty, in the eye of the law, is always present in all his courts, though he cannot personally distribute justice. And from this ubiquity it follows that the king can never be nonsuit; for a nonsuit is the desertion of a suit or action by the non-appearance of the plaintiff in court. For the same reason, also, in the forms of legal proceedings, the king is not said to appear by his attorney, as other men do; for in contemplation of law he is always present in court.

THE ISSUING OF PROCLAMATIONS.

From the same original, of the king's being the fountain of justice, we may also deduce the prerogative of issuing proclamations, which is vested in the king alone. These proclamations have then a binding force, when (as Sir Edward Coke observes) they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm. For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part the legislative branch, of the soverign power, yet the manner, time, and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate. And therefore his constitutions or edicts concerning these points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the subject, where they do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being, in such manner as the king shall judge necessary. Thus the established law is, that the king may prohibit any of his subjects from leaving the realm; a proclamation therefore forbidding this in general for three weeks, by laying an embargo on all shipping in time of war, will be equally binding as an act of parliament, because founded upon a prior law.

Further, the king is the fountain of honor, office and privilege, and possesses the right of converting aliens into citizens, and of erecting corporations.

ARBITER OF COMMERCE.

Another light, in which the laws of England consider the king with regard to domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of commerce. By commerce I at present mean domestic commerce only. The affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of their own, called the law merchant, or lex mercatoria, which all nations agree in and take notice of. And in particular it is held to be part of the laws of England, which decides the causes of merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial countries; and that often even in matters relating to domestic trade, as, for instance, with regard to the drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer of inland bills of exchange.

With us in England, the king's prerogative, so far as it relates to mere domestic commerce, will fall principally under the following articles:

First, the establishment of public marts or places of buying and selling, such as markets and fairs, with the tolls thereunto belonging. These can only be set up by virtue of the king's grant, or by long and immemorial usage and prescription, which presupposes such a grant. The limitation of these public resorts to such time and place as may be most convenient, for the neighborhood, forms a part of economics, or domestic polity, which, considering the kingdom as a large family, and the king as the master of it, he clearly has a right to dispose and order as he pleases.

Secondly, the regulation of weights and measures. These for the advantage of the public, ought to be universally the same throughout the

kingdom; being the general criterions which reduce all things to the same or an equivalent value. But, as weight and measure are things in their nature arbitrary and uncertain, it is therefore expedient that they be reduced to some fixed rule or standard; which standard it is impossible to fix by any written law or oral proclamation; for no man can, by words only, give another an adequate idea of a foot-rule, or a pound-weight. It is therefore necessary to have recourse to some visible, palpable, material standard; by forming a comparison with which all weights and measures may be reduced to one uniform size; and the prerogative of fixing this standard our ancient law vested in the crown, as in Normandy it belonged to the duke.

Thirdly, as money is the medium of commerce, it is the king's prerogative, as the arbiter of domestic commerce, to give it authority or make it current.

HEAD OF THE CHURCH.

The king is, lastly, considered by the laws of England as the head and supreme governor of the national church.

From this prerogative also, of being the head of the church, arises the king's right of nomination to vacant bishoprics, and certain other ecclesiastical preferments.

As head of the church, the king is likewise the dernier resort in all ecclesiastical causes: an appeal lying ultimately to him in chancery from the sentence of every ecclesiastical judge.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE KING'S REVENUE.

281-338.

This chapter treats in great detail of the revenue of the king. This revenue is either ordinary or extraordinary. The following are termed the ordinary:

1. The custody of the temporalities of bishops.

2. Corodies.

3. Tithes arising in extra parochial places.

4. The first fruits and tenths of all spiritual preferments in the Kingdom.

5. The rents and profits of the Crown demesne lands.

Profits of the military tenures.

6.

These sources of ordinary revenue formerly so large have been largely cut off or circumscribed and methods to supply the deficiency in the king's revenue subsequent. ly grew up and are known as the king's extraordinary revenue. These are called aids, subsidies or supplies, and are granted by parliament.

Taxes are either annual or perpetual.

The usual annual taxes are those upon land and malt. The perpetual taxes are the customs, the excise duty, duty on salt, postoffice duties, stamp duties, duties upon houses and windows, tax upon servants, licenses upon coaches and chairs, duties upon offices and pensions.

WRECKS.

Another maritime revenue, is that of shipwrecks. Wreck, by the ancient common law, was where any ship was lost at sea, and the goods or cargo were thrown upon the land; in which case these goods so wrecked were adjudged to belong to the king; for it was held, that by the loss of the ship all property was gone out of the original owner. But this was undoubtedly adding sorrow to sorrow, and was consonant neither to reason nor humanity. The statute of Westminster the first, enacts, that if a man, a dog, or a cat escape alive the vessel shall not be judged a wreck. These animals as in Bracton, are only put for examples; for it is now held that not only if any live thing escape, but if proof can be made of the property of any of the goods or lading which came to shore, they shall not be forfeited as wreck. The statute further ordains that the sheriff of the county shall be bound to keep the goods a year and a day, that if any man can prove a property in them, either in his own right or by right of representation, they shall be restored to him without delay; but if no such prop- ▾ erty be proved within that time, they then shall be the king's. If the goods are of a perishable nature, the sheriff may sell them, and the money shall be liable in their stead. This revenue of wrecks is frequently granted out to lords of manors as a royal franchise; and if any one be thus entitled to wrecks in his own land, and the king's goods are wrecked thereon, the king may claim them any time, even after the year and day. JETSAM, FLOTSAM, LIGAN, SALVAGE.

Learn Definition of

It is to be observed, that in order to constitute a Tegal wreck the goods must come to land. If they continue at sea, the law distinguishes them by the barbarous and uncouth appellations of jetsam, flotsam, and ligan. Jetsam is where goods are cast into the sea, and there sink and remain under water; flotsam is where they continue swimming on the surface. of the waves; ligan is where they are sunk in the sea, but tied to a cork or buoy in order to be found again. These are also the king's, if no owner appears to claim them; but if any owner appears he is entitled to recover the possession. For, even if they be cast overboard without any mark or

Liga