Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-scale SocietiesJoseph Patrick Henrich What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments? Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social (non-selfish) preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced. The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project.-- |
Contents
1 Introduction and Guide to the Volume | 1 |
2 Overview and Synthesis | 8 |
A Guide for Social Scientists | 55 |
A Case from the Ecuadorian Amazon | 96 |
5 Comparative Experimental Evidence from Machiguenga Mapuche Huinca and American Populations | 125 |
The Hadza of Tanzania | 168 |
7 Does Market Exposure Affect Economic Game Behavior? The Ultimatum Game and the Public Goods Game among the Tsimane of Bolivia | 194 |
Results from a TwoVillage Ultimatum Game Experiment | 232 |
An Experimental Investigation | 305 |
The Sangu of Tanzania | 335 |
Evidence from Ultimatum Dictator and Public Goods Experiments in East Africa | 356 |
13 Economic Experiments to Examine Fairness and Cooperation among the Ache Indians of Paraguay | 382 |
14 The Ultimatum Game Fairness and Cooperation among Big Game Hunters | 413 |
Michael S AlvardAppendix | 436 |
439 | |
Results from Khovdiin Bulgan Sum Mongolia | 260 |
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Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic ... Joseph Patrick Henrich No preview available - 2004 |
Common terms and phrases
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