LIFE OF NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE. CHAPTER III. The Alps.-Feelings and Views of Buonaparte on being appointed to the Command of the Army of Italy-General Account of his new Principles of Warfare- Mountainous Countries peculiarly favourable to them.—Retrospect of Military Proceedings since October 1795.Hostility of the French Government to the Pope.-Massacre of the French Envoy Basseville, at Rome.—Austrian Army under Beaulieu.—Napoleon's Plan for entering Italy—Battle of Montenotte, and Buonaparte's first Victory-Again defeats the Austrians at Millesimo-and again under Colli— Takes possession of Cherasco-King of Sardinia requests an Armistice, which leads to a Peace, concluded on very severe Terms.- Close of the Piedmon tese Campaign.-Napoleon's Character at this period. NAPOLEON has himself observed, that no country in the world is more distinctly marked out by its natural boundaries than Italy.1 The Alps seem a barrier erected by Nature herself, on VOL. X. [Napoleon, Memoirs, t. iii. p. 91.] A which she has inscribed in gigantic characters, "Here let ambition be staid." Yet this tremendous circumvallation of mountains, as it could not prevent the ancient Romans from breaking out to desolate the world, so it has been in like manner found, ever since the days of Hannibal, unequal to protect Italy herself from invasion. The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorize them to claim all which lay on the western side of these mountains, as naturally pertaining to their dominions; but they never deigned to respect them as such, when the question respected their invading, on their own part, the territories of other states, which lay on or beyond the formidable frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unchallengeable rule when it made in favour of France, but never allowed it to be quoted against her interest. During the Revolutionary War, the general fortune of battle had varied from time to time in the neighbourhood of these mighty boundaries. The King of Sardinia' possessed almost all the fortresses which command the passes on these mountains, and had therefore been said to wear the keys of the Alps at his girdle. He had indeed lost his Dukedom of Savoy, and the County of Nice, in the late campaigns; but he still maintained a very considerable army, and was supported by his powerful ally the Emperor of Austria, [Victor Amadeus III. He was born in 1726, and died in 1796.] always vigilant regarding that rich and beautiful portion of his dominions which lies in the north of Italy. The frontiers of Piedmont were therefore covered by a strong Austro-Sardinian army, opposed to the French, of which Napoleon had been just named commander-in-chief. A strong Neapolitan force was also to be added, so that in general numbers their opponents were much superior to the French; but a great part of this force was cooped up in garrisons which could not be abandoned. It may be imagined with what delight the general, scarce aged twenty-six, advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest, confident in his own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the country, which he had acquired when by his scientific plans of the campaign, he had enabled General Dumerbion to drive the Austrians back, and obtain possession of the Col di Tende, Saorgio, and the gorges of the higher Alps.2 Buonaparte's achievements had hitherto been under the auspices of others. He made the dispositions before Toulon, but it was Dugommier who had the credit of taking the place. Dumerbion, as we have just said, obtained the merit of the advantages in Piedmont. Even in the civil turmoil of the 13th Vendemaire, his actual services had been overshadowed by the official dignity of Barras as commander-in-chief. But if he reaped honour in Italy, the success would 1 ["The Neapolitan army was 60,000 strong; the cavalry was excellent."-NAPOLEON, Memoirs, t. iii. p. 134.] 2 [Viz. in April 1794. See Napoleon, Memoirs, t. ii. p. be exclusively his own; and that proud heart must have throbbed to meet danger upon such terms; that keen spirit have toiled to discover the means of success. For victory, he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale. It may not be unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the principles which he now called into action. Nations in the savage state, being constantly engaged in war, always form for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the country they inhabit, and to the mode in which they are armed. The North-American Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharpshooter, lays ambuscades in his pathless forests, and practices all the arts of irregular war. The Arab, or Scythian, manœuvres his clouds of cavalry, so as to envelope and destroy his enemy in his deserts by sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpected rallies; desolating the country around, cutting off his antagonist's supplies, and practising, in short, the species of war proper to a people superior in light cavalry. The first stage of civilisation is less favourable to success in war. As a nation advances in the peaceful arts, and the character of the soldier begins to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this system of natural tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign invasion, or civil broils, call the inhabitants to arms, they have no idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing |