Page images
PDF
EPUB

cut many of them to pieces, pursued their retreat without farther interruption. Lower Egypt was completely in the hands of the French, and thus far the expedition of Buonaparte had been perfectly successful. But it was not the will of Heaven, that even the most fortunate of men should escape reverses, and a severe one awaited Napoleon.

CHAPTER XIII,

French Fleet.- Conflicting Statements of Buonaparte and Admiral Gantheaume.-BATTLE OF ABOUKIR on 1st August, 1798.—The French Admiral, Brueyes, killed, and his Ship, L'Orient, blown up.—The Victory complete.-Effects of this disaster.-Means by which Napoleon proposed to establish himself in Egypt.-His Administration in many respects praiseworthy—in others, his ·Conduct absurd.-He aspires to be regarded an Envoy of the Deity. His endeavours to propitiate the Porte.The Fort of El Arish falls into his hands.—Massacre of Jaffa-Admitted by Buonaparte himself-His Arguments in its defence-Replies to them-General Conclusions.Plague in the French Army.—Napoleon's humanity and courage upon this occasion.-Proceeds against Acre to attack Djezzar Pacha.-Sir Sidney Smith—His Character-Captures a French Convoy, and throws himself into Acre.-French arrive before Acre on 17th March, 1799, and effect a breach on the 28th, but are driven back.Assaulted by an Army of Moslems assembled without the Walls of Acre, whom they defeat and disperse.-Personal misunderstanding and hostility betwixt Napoleon and Sir Sidney Smith-explained.-Buonaparte is finally compelled to raise the Siege.

WHEN Buonaparte and his army were safely landed in Egypt, policy seemed to demand that the naval squadron, by which they had been escorted, should have been sent back to France as

soon as possible. The French leader accordingly repeatedly asserts, that he had positively commanded Admiral Brueyes, an excellent officer, for whom he himself entertained particular respect, 1 either to carry his squadron of men-of-war into the harbour of Alexandria, or, that being found impossible, instantly to set sail for Corfu. The harbour, by report of the Turkish pilots, was greatly too shallow to admit without danger vessels of such a deep draught of water; and it scarce can be questioned that Admiral Brueyes would have embraced the alternative of setting sail for Corfu, had such been in reality permitted by his orders. But the assertion of Buonaparte is pointedly contradicted by the report of Vice-Admiral Gantheaume, who was himself in the battle of Aboukir, escaped from the slaughter with difficulty, and was intrusted by Buonaparte with drawing up the account of the disaster, which he transmitted to the minister of war. -- "Perhaps it may be said," so the despatch bears, "that it would have been advisable to have quitted the coast as soon as the disembarkation had taken place. But considering the orders of the commander-in-chief, and the incalculable force afforded to the landarmy by the presence of the squadron, the admiral thought it was his duty not to quit these seas.'

"2

In a letter published in the Moniteur, No. 90, December 20, 1797, Buonaparte expresses the highest sense of Admiral Brueyes' firmness and talent, as well as of the high order in which he kept the squadron under his command; and concludes by saying, he had bestowed on him, in the name of the Directory, a spy-glass of the best construction which Italy afforded. [Intercepted letters, part i. p. 219.]

2

Looking at the matter more closely-considering the probability of Nelson's return, and the consequent danger of the fleet-considering, too, the especial interest which naval and military officers attach each to their peculiar service, and the relative disregard with which they contemplate the other, we can see several reasons why Buonaparte might have wished, even at some risk, to detain the fleet on the coast of Egypt, but not one which could induce Brueyes to continue there, not only without the consent of the commander-in-chief, but, as Napoleon afterwards alleged, against his express orders. It is one of the cases in which no degree of liberality can enable us to receive the testimony of Buonaparte, contradicted at once by circumstances, and by the positive testimony of Gantheaume.

We now approach one of the most brilliant actions of the English navy, achieved by the admiral whose exploits so indisputably asserted the right of Britain to the dominion of the ocean. Our limits require that we should state but briefly a tale, at which every heart in our islands will long glow; and we are the more willingly concise that our readers possess it at length in one of the best written popular histories in the English language.1

Although unable to enter the harbour of Alexandria, the French admiral believed his squadron safely moored in the celebrated bay of Aboukir. They formed a compact line of battle, of a semi

1 Mr Southey's "Life of Admiral Nelson; " in which one of the most distinguished men of genius and learning whom our age has produced, has recorded the actions of the greatest naval hero that ever existed.

circular form, anchored so close to the shoal-water and surf, that it was thought impossible to get between them and the land; and they concluded, therefore, that they could be brought to action on the starboard side only. On the 1st August the British fleet appeared; and Nelson had no sooner reconnoitred the French position than he resolved to force it at every risk. Where the French ships could ride, he argued with instantaneous decision, there must be room for English vessels to anchor between them and the shore. He made signal for the attack accordingly. As the vessels approached the French anchorage, they received a heavy and raking fire, to which they could make no return; but they kept their bows to the enemy, and continued to near their line. The squadrons were nearly of the same numerical strength. The French had thirteen ships of the line, and four frigates. The English, thirteen ships of the line, and one 50 gun ship. But the French had three 80 gun ships, and L'Orient, a superb vessel of 120 guns. All the British were seventy-fours. The van of the English fleet, six in number, rounded successively the French line, and dropping anchor betwixt them and the shore, opened a tremendous fire. Nelson himself, and his other vessels, ranged along the same French ships on the outer side, and thus placed them betwixt two fires; while the rest of the French line remained for a time unable to take a share in the combat. The battle commenced with the utmost fury, and lasted till, the sun having set and the night fallen, there was no light by which the combat could be continued, save

« PreviousContinue »