sion merely to join an organization is not objectionable. Lathrop further establishes that, before the Court will consider the Constitutional question properly framed for decision, it will require a strong factual showing that the association is using the unwilling member's dues in a manner which he disapproves (and in particular for "political" purposes which he disapproves).

In the case of the National Rifle Association, it appears that the association places no restrictions on a member's expression of personal views contrary to those of the association. It also appears, without a detailed examination of its records, that the NRA uses a small percentage (less than 5%) of its revenues for the purpose of expressing positions on public matters and influencing Federal and state legislation.

Assuming, arguendo, that "political" expenditure of the unwilling member's dues would be Constitutionally objectionable, whether these NRA activities would fall within the proscribed political sphere depends on one's definition of "political." The term may be variously defined as applying only to partisan activities, only to activities on behalf of candidates for office, only to election-oriented rather than issue-oriented activities, only to "private interest group" rather than "public service" activities, or only to activities of which a particular definitionmaker disapproves. In the absence of a Supreme Court decision holding that any such expenditures are Constitutionally prohibited, the Department of the Army should not determine that the NRA's allegedly political activities render the program of sales to its members at cost unconstitutional.

The second major element-the nature and degree of compulsion-has not been discussed at length in the cited decisions, but in those cases the compulsion to join was very strong indeed. In both the union shop and the integrated bar situation, the consequence of refusing to join the union or the bar association is an inability to work in one's chosen profession or to earn one's livelihood. In the Hanson case, in fact, the Supreme Court speaks of the "right to work" as part of the "liberty" the due process clause is designed to protect, and indicates that to condition such a substantial right on joining a labor union is a compulsion equivalent to a direct Government order to join. 351 U.S. at 234.

Compared to the strong coercive forces in these cases, the compulsion involved in the requirement to join the National Rifle Association in order to purchase weapons at cost seems inconsequential. Putting an individual to the choice of joining a private association or foregoing slightly advantageous prices on weapons and ammunition cannot fairly be described as "compelling" him to join the organization. Such compulsion in my opinion does not infringe any Constitutionally protected rights.

III. Conclusion. Although the requirement of NRA membership for participation in the civilian marksmanship sales program raises questions of both Constitutional law and policy, in my opinion the Constitutional objections to this requirement are not sufficient to overcome the presumption of Constitutionality which Acts of Congress enjoy.

ROBERT E. JORDAN, III.
Acting General Counsel.

Senator KENNEDY. Now, has there been a review by your Department of the DCM program as to its effectiveness? Have you had any review of that program?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Well, we made what I suppose you could call a review at the time we examined the recommendations of the Arthur D. Little study.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us what brought about the Arthur D. Little study?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I am afraid that is before my time, Senator. I believe, but because it was before my time I am not absolutely sure, that it was in response to criticisms that had been directed at the program and the discovery which the Arthur D. Little people emphasized in their report, that the factual information on the program not only is not very widely disseminated, but, at least at that time was internally in many ways lacking in volume so that it was, to some extent, difficult to analyze the program appropriately.

82-646-67- -50

Now, as I say, I am not positive that that is the genesis of the report. Senator KENNEDY. Now, as I understand, the summary of that report has been released?

Mr. McGIFFERT. That is correct.

Senator KENNEDY. Was there any place in the Arthur D. Little report where there was a cost effectiveness study of the civilian marksmanship program?

Mr. McGIFFERT. No. In fact, the conclusion of the Arthur D. Little report was that there was not sufficient data on which to make a cost effectiveness study.

Senator KENNEDY. Has the Defense Department done a cost effectiveness study?

Mr. McGIFFERT. No, we have not; we are just starting on a study of the program-indeed, not only in the Army but also the other military departments. In the course of that study, we will try to bring to bear cost effectiveness analyses but I think you recognize that in this sort of a situation, the effectiveness side of the question is not a very easy one to quantify.

Senator KENNEDY. Even, as a matter of fact, the Arthur D. Little had some real problems in evaluation, did they not?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Yes, they certainly did.

Senator KENNEDY. One of the things that interested me about the Little study, particularly because it so often is quoted as a justification of the civilian marksmanship program was the reliance on scores in marksmanship tests during basic training. I am wondering, particularly with regard to this aspect of it, are you familiar with an Army memorandum called "The Accuracy of M-1 Rifle Scores Obtained on a Known Distance Range"? It is a research memorandum dated the 4th of January of 1954, where they did a study about the effectiveness and the accuracy of reporting marksmanship scores, whether it really was helpful to have these scores, and to use the scores for research purposes. As I understand, in that Army report, of the several conclusions reached by the authors, one of them was: "Errors introduced in firing line scores are sufficient to make such scores unusable for research purposes.

In looking through the Arthur D. Little report, I see where they ssemed to rely on these scores themselves in reaching their conclusions. I would be interested in any comment that you might have on it.

Mr. McGIFFERT. Well, I am afraid I really cannot comment without studying the paper you have referred to.

Senator KENNEDY. I think one of the things which was brought out, as I understand it, is that people are marking the scores at the firing line; in many instances they were found to be getting their own scores raised, and it was the conclusion of the Army memorandum that the use of scores taken at the firing line in the presence of the trainee should not be used for research purposes. Is it your understanding, as far as the scores themselves on rifle ranges are concerned. that they are kept by the trainees or by others with them at the firing line?

Mr. McGIFFERT. In the Army training centers they are not kept by the person who does the firing.

Colonel BERRY. Mr. Kennedy, if I might.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Colonel BERRY. I cannot address myself to the training center, but in units I have had where I have had marksmanship, I have had scores kept in the pits, as it were, away from the shooter himself, not on one occasion, on several. So I think it depends on what basis this study was made. I mean the commander concerned in many cases would describe where this score is set.

Senator KENNEDY. So it depends on how they are kept. But when I was in the service, you would have someone who would be down range, and he would raise a flag or he would put up a certain object. But nonetheless, the trainee marked it down right where he was. Someone would raise a white flag, which was a miss, as I remember, or a red one, which was bull's-eye. Then you would write down yourself on your little card how you do.

Is that the procedure that routinely is followed in the training sessions today, do you know?

Colonel BERRY. In competitive shooting, no.

Senator KENNEDY. We have a different situation. We are talking about scores in training. Because the Little report talks about the 3 percent of the trainees who have gone through the civilian marksmanship programs as scoring higher on these routine marksmanship tests. Colonel BERRY. Right.

Senator KENNEDY. I would think part of our information would be to find out how they are helping the general marksmanship of those who are serving, but if the test scores are inaccurate, we have no basis for judgment.

Colonel BERRY. One thing that has occurred since the time of that report, I am sure, is the switch to train fire, in which a man fires and a target pops down, so you are not relying on an individual in a pit to decide what the score is.

Senator KENNEDY. Now, one of the things that is also brought out in the Little report is the fact that a rather limited amount-it was 3 percent of those in basic training had been through the civilian marksmanship training program. I am wondering whether you also have access to the information with regard to the proficiency of those trainees who have had experience in handling weapons, either through hunting or other shooting through their own private efforts, but who have not participated in the civilian marksmanship program.

Mr. McGIFFERT. In the statistical backup for the report, there is information with respect to the performance of people who have done a lot of hunting, people who had done a lot of trapshooting, people who had done other kinds of activities with rifles. I do not, offhand, remember exactly what the import of those statistics is. I would be perfectly happy to put them in the record, since you would like them, to the extent you would like them.

Senator KENNEDY. The point I would be interested in is really whether there is any indication that those who have gone through the civilian marksmanship program do significantly better than those who have just had experience with weapons in some other way.

Mr. McGIFFERT. My recollection is, Senator Kennedy, but I would like to check it, and then correct what I say for the record, if I am wrong, is that the backup statistics, if they show anything in this regard, show that it is experience with a rifle in some manner which is the most significant contributor to better marksmanship performance

subsequently. I would like to review those backup statistics and see if they support that conclusion.

Senator KENNEDY. That would certainly appear to be, I think, an obvious conclusion.

If we could get back to Camp Perry just rather briefly, you have given us the figures that you have estimated that this was going to cost. As I understand your response to other questions, there has not been any real cost effectiveness evaluation of that particular program. that is being undertaken?

Mr. McGIFFERT. That is right.

Senator KENNEDY. And the other military services as well? Mr. McGIFFERT. That is correct.

Senator KENNEDY. So we would have, I imagine, available to us not only what would be considered to be the out-of-pocket costs to the various Army materiel commands and the Department of the Army for the service and the other groups, but we would also have what would be figured in the cost effectiveness study, which would be the comprehensive costs to the Defense Department?

Mr. McGIFFERT. That is correct.

Chairman DODD. Senator Burdick.

Senator BURDICK. I am sorry I did not hear your testimony. I had other conflicts.

I am interested in this Camp Perry program myself, because some 40 years ago, I was eligible for 3 consecutive years in the National Guard. Has the program changed any in the last 40 years?

Colonel BERRY. Unfortunately, the earliest I was there was in the early 1950's.

Senator BURDICK. But is this the same program?

Colonel BERRY. Similar competitions are held, yes, sir, and a Small Arms Firing School is held, and competitions, both sponsored by the Army, known as national trophy competitions, and those sponsored by the NRA are conducted in conjunction with the national matches. Senator BURDICK. As far as you know, from your own information. the program is conducted now as it has been in the past?

Colonel BERRY, I think the matches may have increased in size. I have no figures for what they were 30 years ago prior to World War II. But it incorporates generally the same spectrum of people.

Senator BURDICK. That is all. Thank you very much.

Chairman DODD. Senator Hruska?

Senator HRUSKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, could you indicate what kinds of weapons have been distributed under the civilian marksmanship program?

Mr. McGIFFERT. There are two parts to the program in this connertion, Senator. The first is the equipment loaned to our clubs. We have about 38,000 weapons on loan to our clubs. The three categories of weapons that make up most of that 38,000 are the .30 caliber M-1 rifle, the .22 caliber Remington rifle, and the .45 caliber pistol.

Senator HRUSKA. Have any destructive devices ever been distributes under this program?

Mr. McGIFFERT. None.

Senator HRUSKA. Any cannon?

Mr. McGIFFERT. None.

Senator HRUSKA. So if anybody referred to distribution of cannon or destructive devices under this program, he would be in error!

Mr. McGIFFERT. That is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. Is not a major cost item of the Civilian Marksmanship Program the book value of obsolete ammunition? Is that the way it is set up in your analysis?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Well, ammunition is certainly a major cost.

Senator HRUSKA. Let me put it this way: Large quantities of obsolete ammunition are made available to this program. When a cost is attributed to that type ammunition it is put on the basis of original cost; is it not?

Mr. McGIFFERT. That is correct. It is put on the basis of cost.

Senator HRUSKA. What would happen to this ammunition if it were not distributed in this fashion?

Mr. McGIFFERT. To the extent it is obsolete it would presumably be destroyed.

Senator HRUSKA. Junked. That means dumped to the bottom of the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, or some other similar disposition? Mr. McGIFFERT. That is correct.

Senator HRUSKA. How many members of the National Rifle Association were given commissions during World War II to serve as training instructors?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I am sorry, I do not know the answer to that.

Senator HRUSKA. We have had testimony here that some 5,000 members of the NRA were given commissions, and assisted in the training of some 1.7 million recruits. Would you care to supply a comment on that statistic after consulting with those who might have some information from your military records?

Mr. McGIFFERT. I would be happy to.

Senator HRUSKA. Thank you.

(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 92" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 92

These figures apparently are based on an NRA survey of its membership following World War II, and include all services. They cannot be substantiated from Army records, since such records do not indicate whether a particular marksmanship instructor was or was not a member of the NRA.

Senator HRUSKA. Do you see any value in maintaining the proficiency of trained instructors?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Yes, I think it important that we have a significant number of trained instructors.

Senator HRUSKA. Does the Army favor retention of this civilian marksmanship program?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Yes, it does.

Senator HRUSKA. On page 4 of your statement, you have cited figures of the number of clubs and memberships. Some are junior members and some are senior members. Have you a breakdown in those two broad categories in statistics?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Yes.

Chairman DODD. I think he has already testified 50-50. Am I right about that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. McGIFFERT. Yes; it is about 50-50. I can give you the precise breakdown or put it in the record here.

Senator HRUSKA. If you would supply it for the record, that would be helpful.