The Evolution of Cooperation“For anyone involved in settling disputes” (Richard Dawkins), a famed political scientist offers a classic argument for how to achieve a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1979, he organized the famed Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the most effective strategy for the ubiquitous prisoner’s dilemma, a model of strategy problems in the nuclear age. The expectation had been that some complicated scheme of competition would win the day. Instead, a simple, cooperative program called Tit for Tat did. The effects of that victory continue to reverberate today, from college campuses to the Situation Room. A vital book for leaders and decision-makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy to political elections to family dynamics. |
Contents
| 3 | |
The Emergence of Cooperation | 25 |
The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tournaments | 27 |
The Chronology of Cooperation | 55 |
Cooperation Without Friendship or Foresight | 71 |
The LiveandLetLive System in Trench Warfare in World War I | 73 |
The Evolution of Cooperation in Biological Systems with William D Hamilton | 88 |
Advice for Participants and Reformers | 107 |
Conclusions | 143 |
The Social Structure of Cooperation | 145 |
The Robustness of Reciprocity | 169 |
TOURNAMENT RESULTS | 192 |
PROOFS OF THE THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS | 206 |
NOTES | 216 |
| 223 | |
| 231 | |
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Common terms and phrases
actually altruism analysis Anatol Rapoport average score bacterium based on reciprocity behavior best strategy better biological chapter choice collectively stable strategy computer chess Computer Prisoner's Dilemma Computer Tournament coop cooperation based decision rule developed discount parameter E. O. Wilson effective entries environment eration evolution of cooperation evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary example exploit forgiving future game theorists hypothetical tournaments important incentive interaction invade TIT iterated Prisoner's Dilemma JOSS less live-and-let-live system meanies ment mutant mutual cooperation mutual defection mutually rewarding neighbors never cooperate newcomer nice rules nice strategy NYDEGGER once other's outcome pattern payoff matrix player cooperates player defects points population possible previous move Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament problem programs promote cooperation proposition provocable punishment random relative reputation response restraint retaliation robust second round side situation submitted successful rules TAT players territorial system theory tion TIT FOR TAT tive tournament results tournament score trench warfare V(BIB