Speedy Trial.-"Speedy" does not mean immediate, but without undue delay, by which is not meant the delay necessarily incident to proceedings conducted according to prescribed forms, but unnecessary delay in taking the successive steps in such proceedings. Brown v. Epps, 91 Va. 726. The legislative interpretation of what is meant by a speedy trial is shown by the statute providing that a prisoner charged with a felony, who, without legal cause, has been denied a trial for three regular terms of the circuit, or four of the county, corporation or hustings court, shall be forever discharged; and this interpretation has several times received the sanction of the Supreme Court of Appeals. The rule is subject to the exceptions enumerated in the statute and to others of similar nature. Adcock's Case, 8 Gratt. 661; Brown v. Epps, supra; Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 941; and Wadley v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. S. C. Rep. 197. In Benton v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 328, it was held that when the prisoner was ready and demanded trial, a continuance against his objection from the February to the March term following, to await the discharge of a witness for the Commonwealth who was then in jail and incompetent to testify, was a denial of the right to a speedy trial, and the judgment of the lower court was therefore reversed, Lewis, P., and Lacy, J., dissenting. A reversal for this cause does not discharge the prisoner; it merely gives him the right to a new trial. Benton v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 782. Benton's case was three times before the Court of Appeals.

Self-Incriminating Evidence. The object of the provision that no man shall be "compelled to give evidence against himself," is to prevent inquisitorial proceedings to establish guilt. It applies not only when the person called on to testify is himself on trial, but in all other cases; and he may refuse to testify, notwithstanding it is provided by statute that no statement made by him shall be used in any prosecution against him. Cullen's Case, 24 Gratt. 624. Nor can he be required to waive his right by any suggestion or promise that he shall not be prosecuted; nor is his right affected by the fact that he has previously testified before the grand jury. Temple's Case, 75 Va. 892. But in Kendrick's

Case, 78 Va. 490, it was decided by a divided court, Lacy and Richardson, JJ., dissenting, that where complete immunity is given by statute, a witness may be compelled to testify, although his evidence, but for the statute, would tend to incriminate him.

11. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

"Punishment" was substituted by the framers of the present Constitution for "punishments," which was the original form, and had been retained at all previous revisions. In its original form this section was an exact copy of Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights, 1689. See also Amendment VIII. U. S. Constitution.

The imposition and regulation of fines is within the discretion of the legislature, and its discretion will not be questioned by the courts except where the minimum penalty is so excessive as to shock the sense of mankind. The fact that no maximum is fixed does not make an act providing for a fine unconstitutional. So. Express Co. v. Walker, 92 Va. 59.

12. That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.

13. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.

The words "of twelve men," inserted at the revision of 1851 and retained at the revision of 1864, were stricken out by the framers of the present Constitution and the original form restored.

The right of courts of equity to settle matters in controversy, which were within their jurisdiction, as established when the Constitution was adopted, is not in conflict with this section. Pillow v. Southwest &c. Co., 92 Va. 144; Williams v. Newman, 93 Va. 719.

14. That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments, and any citizen may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.

All of this section after "governments was inserted by the framers of the present Constitution.

A tax imposed on the business of publishing a newspaper is not an abridgment of the freedom of the press. Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Co., 95 Va. 564. An act making it unlawful for office-holders to participate actively in politics by making political speeches, or otherwise, abridges freedom of speech, and is void. Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196. Lewis, P., dissented, and Hinton, J., reserved his opinion.

15. That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty, and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.

16. That the people have a right to uniform government; and, therefore, that no government separate from, or independent of, the government of Virginia ought to be erected or established within the limits thereof.

17. That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.

The word "frugality," which in the original followed immediately after "temperance," was omitted by the framers of the present Constitution.

18. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other.

19. That neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as lawful imprisonment may constitute such, shall exist within this state.

This and the two sections following were inserted by the Convention which framed the present Constitution.

This section is modelled on Amendment XIII. U. S. Constitution, which is as follows: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

20. That all citizens of the state are hereby declared to possess equal civil and political rights.

See note on foregoing section.

Compare Amendments XIV. and XV., U. S. Const.; but it should be noted that when the present Constitution was framed these Amendments had not been adopted.

This provision applies to office-holders as well as to private citizens, and in Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196, an act forbidding certain State officers to participate actively in politics was held to be in conflict with it, Lewis, P., dissenting, and Hinton, J., reserving his opinion. In Black v. Trower, 79 Va. 123, an act prescribing that members of electoral boards should be freeholders was held to be invalid on the ground that it violated this provision by discriminating in favor of one class of citizens against other classes. Hinton, J., dissented.

21. The rights enumerated in this bill of rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not therein expressed.

The declaration of the political rights and privileges of the inhabitants of this state is hereby declared to be a part of the constitution of this commonwealth, and shall not be violated on any pretence whatever.

See note on section 19.

The Bill of Rights, though incorporated into and made a part of the present Constitution, has the same force and authority which it has always had, neither more nor less, as containing the recognized fundamental principles of a well-regulated government. Ruffin's Case, 21 Gratt. 790.

ARTICLE II.

DIVISION OF POWERS.

The legislative, executive and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the power of more than one of them at the same time, except as hereinafter provided.

This Article to the word "except" is the same in all the Constitutions. In the first two Constitutions the exception was "that the justices of the county courts shall be eligible to either House of the Assembly;" and in the Constitutions of 1851 and 1864, "that the justices of the peace shall be eligible to either House of the Assembly:" A much more useful and important exception is made by the present Constitution in the provision for an executive veto on legislation.

In General.—The division of powers provided for by this Article and by section 7 of the Bill of Rights extends to the local governments by the counties and corporate bodies as well as to the general State government. Burch v. Hardwicke, 23 Gratt. 51. It operates to restrain each of the departments from the exercise of powers properly belonging to either of the others, and secures to each its independence and integrity as a separate coördinate department. The division of powers is maintained, and each department restricted to its appropriate sphere by the restraint which each may exercise on the action of the others.

The Legislature and the Other Departments.-The legislature can do no act of a judicial nature, such, for example, as empowering courts to review decisions of other courts in cases not covered by the general law; or authorizing a new trial to be granted—Martin v. South Salem Land Co., 94 Va. 28; or granting a right of appeal where it has been lost by lapse of time. The proviso of the Enabling Act of March 5, 1870, authorizing the Court of Appeals, when it was first organized under the present Constitution, to rehear and affirm or reverse decrees made by the judges of the Military Court of Appeals at the term commencing January 11, 1870, was an act of this character-Griffin v. Cunningham, 20 Gratt. 31; and so was the act of March 25, 1873, amending the act of March 3, 1866, in so far as it authorized the courts to reopen judgments, and scale the amount according to the depreciation of Confederate money—Ratcliffe v. Carter, 31 Gratt. 105; Marpole v. Cather, 78 Va. 239; and Marshall v. Cheatham, 88 Va. 31. See also Roberts v. Cocke, 28 Gratt. 207; Cecil v. Deyerle, Id. 775; Kent v. Kent, Id. 840; and Pretlow v. Bailey, 29 Gratt. 212.

Nor can the legislature take away from the courts any of the powers essential to courts, or materially impair those powers under the guise of regulating them. Among these essential powers is the power of self-defence and self-preservation by punishment for contempt, and the courts created by the Constitution have the right to exercise this power for themselves, without the intervention of a jury. This power is inherent in such courts, being con