advantage, and we shall act on it, in our several places, to its improvement. If there is in the age much that is wrong, there is in it also much that is right: and he that is wise will not fail to extract good even from its folly and perverseness. 25. I quote a poet, whose stanza may be profitably meditated upon. "One part, one little part, we dimly scan Through the dark medium of life's feverish dream; Yet dare arraign the whole stupendous plan, If but that little part incongruous seem. For thou art but of dust; be humble, and be wise." CHAPTER III. REASONING. 1. We can reason, most undoubtedly, about Religion as about any other subject. Some persons may reason too little, and others may reason too much; as if religion were only a subject on which we are to speculate and debate. Not to use our reason is weakness; but to rely on reason only is folly and presumption. 2. Faith is the great principle in religion; but we wish to see faith and reason go together in the most friendly alliance. Faith is not to repudiate reason; and reason is not arrogantly to renounce faith. But whether we consider the discoveries of faith or the deductions of reason, we should remember that the circle of knowledge is small, and that our powers are very limited. 3. In reasoning on religious subjects we must be true to the religious element, as it is given us in Revelation. It is far better, we think, to transmute philosophy into religion, than to transmute religion into philosophy: but the best of all is, to treat religion as religion, and philosophy as philosophy. 4. Faith magnifies God: reason magnifies man. The tendency of reason is to discuss every thing in a human method, or on a human ground; as if we were competent to determine the Why and the How in every thing. Faith is always humble, submissive, satisfied, and joyful: Reason is often proud, arrogant, discontented, and perplexed. 5. Religion is a substantial, concrete, personal matter; that is, it deals with realities, facts, and persons. It speaks to us of the Lord God, of ourselves, of redemption, of sin and holiness, of judgment, of heaven and hell. These are not mere ideas to employ our reason and fancy, but they are realities to be grasped, felt, and acted upon. 6. Our reasoning ties us down to our logic: we draw deductions by certain mental processes, according to certain rules and methods. This is the legitimate use of our powers, as long as we keep to sound principles. But when we ascend to what we call abstractions, and weave with our attenuated threads of thought what may be termed the web of intellect, we have need to be careful that we do not mistake the shadowy creations of the mind for the substantial teachings of true wisdom. 7. It is very commonly observed, that man is the creature of extremes. Perhaps some of the humble, pious, and orthodox reason too little, and look upon the word "rational" with suspicion, or even with dislike. Perhaps, again, some of the philosophical reason too much, unduly subordinate faith, abridge its territory and province, and refuse their "Imprimatur" to any thing which is not in their estimation "rational." 8. Which of these two parties stand upon the best ground? We admit a fault in each party, but whose fault is most unseemly and prejudicial?-We ask the philosopher to defer more to faith, and to give to it in religion its rightful pre-eminence. We do not ask the orthodox to defer less to faith; but we admonish him not to be afraid of reason; not to be afraid to speak of it, to assert it, to use it: for faith is a loser by a neglect of it, and a great gainer by the proper use of it. 9. We do and must reason: but in ordinary minds the process is very short; a proposition, a conclusion, with few or no intermediate links. Of what more is the unreflecting and undisciplined mind capable? But a real reasoner casts about, and arrives at his conclusion through the medium of arguments, proofs, and illustrations. 10. But we must have a criterion of truth, a standard, to which we make our ultimate appeal. This, with regard to religion, we have in the Bible; there, and there only, and there, as to all great points, clearly, positively, immutably. However widely, deeply, and acutely we may reason, if our conclusion does not agree with the Holy Scriptures, we are compelled to lay it aside. 11. The humble peasant is safe in his faith without reasoning: for we may rest most securely in a scriptural conclusion without going through any elaborate train of ratiocination. But is the logical philosopher safe in his reasoning without faith? 12. There seems to be in our day a strong lean ing to what is called the "Philosophy of Religion." It may not be easy to determine precisely the meaning of the expression. 13. If it only express the right use of our reason in the examination of the Inspired Volume,-that we may ascertain its meaning, its character, its manifestation of the divine perfections, its adaptation to the nature and condition of man, and so on, we say not a word against it, though we might wish to have some other title to any book of such sort. 14. We must, however, remember, that it is one thing to make Religion, pre-eminent, and to bring onr reason or philosophy to examine it: and it is another thing to make Philosophy pre-eminent, and to bring religion before it, to be tried by its laws, and to be estimated, or even moulded, by them. We account this latter process to be as unphilosophical as it is presumptuous. 15. The tendency of much of our modern speculation is to elevate philosophy to the judgment-seat, and to make it arbiter of what is true or false. It comes forth with boldness, eloquence, acuteness; with declamation and sophistry; with high claims and specious pretensions; as if it were in its power to enlighten and renovate the world. 16. Here Reason forgets its province, and in fact is no longer reason, but a proud and audacious power that usurps the name of reason: for if God has given us a Revelation, that Revelation, being His |