to an advancement except by the agreement of the parties thereto.

There is an example of an attempt of that kind in Harris' Appeal, 2 Grant's Cases, 304. There was in that case originally a debt due from a child to his parent. The debt became barred by the statute of limitations. The father then undertook to convert the debt into an advancement by making declarations to that effect, without the consent of the child to the attempted mutation. It was decided that he could not thus change the transaction to an advancement. The same doctrine was held by the court in Leving v. Rittenhouse, 4 Wharton, 130.

Under this rule, promissory notes are evidence of debts, not of advancements. To convert them into advancements, when made by a child to his parent, requires a new arrangement, whereby the parent delivers up or surrenders the notes. as an advancement. At least, there must be a new arrangement, wherein the parent agrees to treat the notes as an advancement. Vaden v. Hance, 1 Head. 300, is a case of that character. In that case, the intestate held several notes against a deceased son. There was no evidence to show that they were intended as advancements. There was no evidence in the case, except the notes themselves. The court, in deciding the case, used this language: "In the absence of proof to that effect, we have been unable to find any authority that these notes are to be regarded as advancements. We think that, prima facie, they must be treated as debts."

In West v. Bolton, 23 Geo. 531, promissory notes made by the son to the father were held, after the decease of the father, to be evidence of a loan, and not of an advancement. But this presumption in favor of a loan was decided to be liable to be repelled by other evidence; and that whether the transaction between the father and the son was really an advancement or a loan, must depend upon the intention of the parties to it, and was a proper question for a jury. A like decision was had in Indiana, in Shaw v. Kent, 11 Ind. 80. The transaction in that case consisted of a deed

of conveyance of land in fee made by the father to the son There was no evidence showing clearly what the conveyance was, in that respect; whether it was a conveyance by way of sale, or by way of advancement. The evidence left that question in doubt. It was held to be a proper question for a jury.

There is a case, in Pennsylvania, where the father took bonds of his son for money furnished him. The bonds were held to be evidence of a debt, and not of an advance ment.

High's Appeal, 21 Penn. 283.

The presumption of a debt was held to be strengthened, by the fact that no bond or other evidence of debt was taken for farming utensils furnished to the son by the father at the same time.

In Porter v. Porter, 51 Maine, 376, the action was brought by the father upon a promissory note made by the son. The son set up, as defense, that the note was intended as an advancement. The court rejected parol evidence, offered to show that the transaction was intended as an advancement ; holding, that, as there was no ambiguity in the phraseology of the note, it was not subject to explanation by parol evidence.

That decision was due to a statute of that State more, perhaps, than to any general rule of evidence. The statute provided, that "gifts and grants of real and personal estate to a child, or grandchild, are deemed an advancement where so expressed therein, or charged as such by the intestate, or acknowledged in writing to be such."

A like decision was made in Massachusetts, under a similar statute, in Barton v. Rice, 22 Pick. 508. The Massachusetts statute provided, "that all gifts and grants shall be deemed to have been an advancement if they are expressed in the gift or grant to be so made, or if charged in writing by the intestate, as an advancement, or acknowledged in writing as such by the child or other descendant."

It was said: "The statute does not expressly declare that an advancement shall not be proved in any other manner; but that, undoubtedly, is the meaning of the statute."

There is a difference between proving that a promissory note was made in consideration of money advanced, and that no indebtedness was intended, and proving that a note was surrendered and the indebtedness canceled by way of making an advancement. The one contradicts the evidence. which the note bears on its face, and the other merely cancels the note by a new contract or arrangement.

Blanc v. Bertrant, 16 La. An. 294, is a case of surrender of notes by way of advancement.

In that case, money had been loaned by the parent to the child, and the child gave notes therefor. Subsequently the notes were surrendered to the child, and the surrender or remittance was held to be evidence of an advancement. There were two transactions. One was a loan and the other an advancement.

There seems to be no dispute or conflict of authorities, that a transaction which creates an indebtedness of the child to the parent is wholly a different matter from a transaction which makes an advancement to the child from the parent. Both transactions are founded in contract, but the character and effect of the contract in the one case is widely different from the character and effect in the other.

Money loaned is not an advancement. Nor is any other demand an advancement, which has been incurred as a debt or which is proved by the evidence used to prove a debt

The case of Ashley, appellant, etc., 4 Pick. 21, illustrates this point. That was an appeal by one of the heirs at law of John Ashley, from a decree of the judge of probate, determining that the sum of $1,175.82 was charged to the appellant as an advancement.

The evidence, upon which the probate judge based his decree, was in form of a book account, wherein the appellant was charged as follows:

SHEFFIELD, May 1, 1807.

Henry Ashley, Dr.

To five hundred dollars cash....

To ten dollars to Parks....

$500 00 10 00

And so on in the same manner with ten more items, amounting in all to $1,175.82, the sum in question.

This charge was made in the book of the decedent, wherein he kept his account with various individuals.

The court reversed the decree of the probate judge. The ground of the decision was, that the evidence proved a debt against the appellant, and not an advancement.

The court distinguished that case from Bulkley v. Noble, 2 Pick. 337, on the ground that the form of the book and the form of the charge made therein were "wholly dissimilar."

In that case the entry was found in a memorandum book, wherein other charges were made expressly as advancements to other children; and the entry itself was headed "articles that I let my daughter, Nancy Porter (wife of Gurdon Bulkley), have in Albany."

This entry was held to be sufficient evidence of an advancement, and to distinguish the case from the case before the court.

The same principle was held to control in Barton v. Riee, 22 Pick. 508. The only evidence of the alleged advancement in that case was a promissory note made by the son to the father. It was held that the note was 66 dence of a debt."

clearly evi

These cases in Massachusetts were made to turn upon the construction of statutes in that State relating to advancements. But there seems to be no good ground to claim that the statutes in question were any thing more than declaratory of the rule as it exists in the States generally.

SECTION III.

HOW AN ADVANCEMENT MAY BE PROVED; THE DIFFERENT RULES APPLICABLE THERETO.

FIRST. A DEED FROM A PARENT TO A CHILD, IN CONSIDERATION OF LOVE AND
AFFECTION, IS EVIDENCE OF AN ADVANCEMENT.
WHEN THAT CONSIDERATION

IS SO EXPRESSED IN THE DEED, THE DEED ITSELF IS PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE
OF AN ADVANCEMENT. IF EXPRESSED TO HAVE BEEN FOR A PECUNIARY CON-
SIDERATION, IT MAY BE SHOWN BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, PAROL OR OTHER-
WISE, THAT THERE WAS NO PECUNIARY CONSIDERATION. WHEN THE CON-

VEYANCE WILL BE PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE OF AN ADVANCEMENT.

SECOND. WHEN A PARENT PURCHASES LAND AND PAYS FOR IT, AND TAKES THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE IN THE NAME OF A CHILD, THE PRESUMPTION IS OF AN ADVANORMENT TO THE CHILD. AND THAT PRESUMPTION IS CONCLUSIVE, UNLESS IT BE REPELLED BY OTHER EVIDENCE.

THIRD, HOW THE INTENTION TO MAKE AN ADVANCEMENT MAY BE PROVED BY AN ENTRY IN BOOK, OR OTHERWISE, BY THE PARENT.

It should be borne in mind that what are, or are not advancements must always depend upon the intention of the parties at the time of the donation; and where there is no express declaration of intention, much may be learned, upon that point, from the condition in life of the parties and the circumstances which surround them.

Youngblood v. Nestor, 1 Strobh. Eq. 122.

There was a point in this case, whether the intestate had the right to fix the valuations of advancements. The court prefaced their consideration of this subject as follows: "The valuation of advancements has a material influence in the distribution of the property remaining in the hands of the intestate at the time of his death; because the proportion in which the respective distributees are to participate in the latter must depend on the higher or lower value to be put on the former."

They then dispose of that point and say: "The question, then, is, whether a mere direction by the intestate, as to the valuation of his advancements, can take the property, of