ing this contract, the Court must endeavor to arrive at the meaning of the parties, by looking to the motives that led to it, and the object intended to be effected by it. The motive was to become sole proprietor of all the stages on that road, and to shut out all opposition. To effect that object, the purchase of the defendant's interest in the stages was made. Davis v. Barney, 2 Gill & Johnson, 382.

7. The intention of the contract was, that the defendant should, in good faith, not only not become interested in any opposition, but that he would not in any manner aid or become instrumental in the setting up, or carrying on an opposition line. 1b. 8. The word indirect' was used for the special purpose of guarding against any kind of interference by the defendant, in aiding, or in any manner promoting the establishment of, or carrying on, any opposition. Ib.

9. A line of stages being established in opposition to the plaintiff's line, the Court held, that if the defendant furnished its owners with money, credit, or other means, for the purpose of enabling them to carry it on, and that the means so furnished did enable them to establish and carry it on, and that they could not have established or carried it on without such means, or that the defendant did furnish them with money, credit, horses, or any other means, for the purpose of enabling them the better to establish or carry it on, and that such means did so enable them, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for a breach of the said contract. lb.

Where against the policy of the law.

10. Deeds of gift or of release and acquittance, made by ward to guardian, or person who has borne the part of guardian, shortly after ward's attainment to full age, but before delivering of ward's estate, and without any settlement of accounts, are void on a principle of public policy, without proof of actual fraud; much more if circumstances of transaction evince actual fraud. Waller v. Armistead's adm'ors., 2 Leigh, 11.

11. No just distinction, in this respect, between deeds of gift and deeds of release and acquittance, by ward to guardian: both are equally condemned by equity. Ib.

Where made for an expectant interest, or price is inadequate. 12. Inadequacy of price, whether it be so gross as to be per se proof of fraud or not, if attended by circumstances evincing unconscientious advantage taken by the vendee of improvidence and distress of the vendor, will avoid the contract in equity, though it be a contract executed. McKinney v. Pinckard's ex'or., 2 Leigh, 149.

13. Quære, whether every vendor of an expectant interest is not to be regarded in equity as a young heir dealing for his expectancies?

lb.

14. But clear that very anxious protection is extended by equity to all persons selling expectant interests, whether they stand in relation of expectant heirs or not, and trivial circumstances, added to inadequacy of price, are sufficient to set aside such sales. Ib.

15. A contract for the benefit of a third person, made without his knowledge or authority, is a binding contract on the promiser; and if subsequently adopted by him for whose benefit it was made, it may be enforced by him. Bridge v. The Niagara

Ins. Co., 1 Hall, 247. CORPORATION.

1. A corporation may employ one of its members as an agent; and there is no incompetency in such member to be an agent for a purchaser, and make the memorandum required by the statute of frauds, at a sale of the property of such a corporation made by such member as its agent. Stoddert v. The Vestry of P. T. Parish, 2 Gill & Johnson, 227.

2. Where there has been a body corporate de facto for a considerable period of time, claiming at least to be such, and holding and enjoying property as a corporation, it will be presumed that every mere formal requisite to the due creation of the corporation has been complied with. All Saints Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall, 191.

3. Where a person undertakes to enter into a contract with a corporation, in their corporate name, and accepts an official appointment under them, he thereby admits them to be duly constituted a body politic and corporate under such name; and cannot afterwards set up, by way of defence, that no such corporation ever existed, but is concluded by his admission. 1b. 4. Where the trustees of a religious incorporation bring a suit colore officii, the defendant cannot object to their right of recovery, upon the ground that they are not trustees, without showing that proceedings have been instituted against them by the government, and carried on to a judgment of ouster. Ib. 5. Being trustees de facto, all their proceedings are valid, until they are ousted by a judgment at the suit of the people, and no advantage can be taken of any non-user or mis-user on the part of the corporation, by any defendant, in any collateral action. Ib.

6. What shall be considered as notice to a corporation is not set

tled; but under some circumstances, it seems that notice to a director ought to charge the corporation; as where the director acts as the agent of the corporation. Fulton Bank v. Benedict,

1 Hall, 480. COSTS.

1. Preliminary proofs, in an insurance cause, are not to be taxed in the plaintiff's bill of costs.

Co. 1 Hall, 153.

Barlow v. The Eagle Fire Ins.

2. A party cannot charge for drafting as many subpoenas as he has witnesses; but must prepare one draft, and from that engross the others.

1b.

COURT OF CHANCERY.

1. A feme covert, in consideration of a creditor of her husband giving him further time to pay his debts, executed a deed jointly with her husband, in form a mortgage, of real estate, to secure its payment. This deed was not acknowledged according to the Acts of Assembly in relation to conveyances of land by feme covert grantors, nor did it purport to be in execution of a power reserved to her, but being for property, in fact held in trust for her separate use, which she had a right to convey as a feme sole, was considered in equity as creating a specific lien, and enforced accordingly. Brundige v. Poor, 2 Gill & Johnson, 1. 2. T., who was indebted to A. and H., held a mortgage from W., upon which he made the following assignment, under his hand and seal. For value received, I hereby transfer, assign and make over to Messrs. A. and H., this mortgage and the debt so intended to be secured thereby, witness my hand and seal, this, &c.' About twelve months after, T. died. The mortgage and assignment were found uncancelled among his papers. To a bill filed by A. and H., against the mortgagor and T.'s administrator, to enforce the assignment for the payment of their debt, which alleged, that T. had promised to secure their debt by making the assignment in question, the answer of the administrator stated, 'that T. might have promised to secure the debt, and that the endorsement may have been written on the mortgage with a view to comply with such promise, but denied that there was a delivery of it in fact by T., or an acceptance thereof by the complainants.' Upon an appeal, it was held, that an assignment of T.'s interest in the mortgage, might be good and operative, without actual delivery, if connected with evidence to show he intended it to transfer his interest, in the thing assigned. That this assignment had all the forms and solemnities necessary to constitute a good contract, was in his hand-writ

ing, signed by him, and contained a full expression of his intention to transfer his interest in the mortgage. Aldridge v. Weems, 2 Gill & Johnson, 36.

3. The answer of an executor or administrator in his representative capacity, which asserts a fact that is not, and cannot be within his own knowledge, does not properly come within the general rule, that an answer asserting a fact responsive to the bill, can only be disproved or outweighed by the testimony of two witnesses, or one with pregnant circumstances. Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & Johnson, 208.

4. When an executor or administrator answering in his representative character, alleges facts of which he can have no personal knowledge, it can but amount to an assertion of his impressions, and his speaking positively cannot alter the character of his testimony, merely because it comes in the shape of an answer, but must be allowed its due weight only; and is not entitled to the full influence of the answer of a man, speaking of facts which may be within his own knowledge. Ib.

5. It is a settled principle that Chancery follows the law; and acting in obedience to the statute of limitations, the plea thereof is as available at equity as at law, in relation to the same subject matter. Watkins v. Harwood, 2 Gill & Johnson, 307. 6. The statute of limitations is no bar in equity to a widow's claim for dower, or the rents and profits thereof. Per Bland, Chan. Wells v. Beall, 2 Gill & Johnson, 468.

COVENANT.

1. Upon a sale of land by T. to B. the vendor covenants for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, to warrant the land to B., his heirs and assigns; B. is evicted and brings covenant for breach of this warranty: Held, that the proper measure of damages is the purchase money with interest from the date of the actual eviction, the costs incurred in defending the title, and such damages as the vendee may have paid, or may be shown to be clearly liable to pay, to the person who evicted him. Threlkeld's adm'or. v. Fitzhugh's ex'x., 2 Leigh, 451. 2. But though the purchase money, with interest, &c. was held to give the proper measure of damages in the particular case, the opinions of the judges leave it still questionable, whether the actual value of the land at the time of sale, if proved to be greater than the purchase money, with interest, &c. may not be justly demanded. lb.

3. In assigning breaches in an action of covenant, it is sufficient, in general, to follow and negative the words declared upon. Mc Geehan v. M'Laughlin, 1 Hall, 33.

4. Where the words of a lease provided that the lessee should pay 'for all necessary repairs put upon the premises,' during the term, and in declaring upon it, the breach assigned was, that the lessee' did not, nor would''during the said demise, and whilst she was possessed of the' 'premises,' ' pay, or cause to be paid to the plaintiff the repairs that'' were necessary,'' and were made upon the ''premises by the' 'plaintiff';' it was held to be well assigned; and a demurrer to the declaration was overruled.

lb.

5. The general rule is, that the breach will be sufficiently assigned, by negativing the words of the covenant; and the exception. is of cases where such general assignment does not necessarily amount to an averment of a breach of the covenant; but further averments are necessary, to show that the covenant has been broken; and in these cases the breach must be specially assigned. lb.

DEBT.

1. The defendant, on the 3d of January, 1815, executed a bond for $8,500, in favor of the plaintiffs, to secure the payment of $4,404 52. The condition of the bond recited, that to pay and satisfy the last mentioned sum, one John C. Hamilton had, by indenture, granted unto the plaintiffs an undivided interest in certain lands (which had been conveyed by Timothy Pickering to John B. Church and others in trust,) which were unproductive, and could not be divided for several years thereaf

ter.

The condition further stipulated that the defendant should pay to the plaintiffs, year by year, the sum of $308 21, the lawful interest on said sum of $4,404 52, until the said estate should be divided, and a clear and perfect title thereto, made to the plaintiffs.

In an action upon the bond to recover the amount of the annual

payments, from the year 1818 to 1828, the defendant contended, 1. That the plaintiffs were bound to show diligence in procuring a partition of the lands conveyed. 2. That they were barred, by the statute of limitations, from recovering any thing in arrear beyond six years, or that there was a presumption of payment from lapse of time. Held, however, that the statute of limitations did not apply to this case; that there was no presumption of payment, and that the plaintiffs were not bound to procure a partition of the estate. Held, also, that the annual payments were to be viewed in the light of interest on the principal sum, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to interest upon the annual payments. Henderson & Cairnes v. Hamilton, 1 Hall, 314.