receive 100,000 francs. In addition to these salaries the expenses of all are paid by the Saar taxpayers.

The point of international interest is the apparent failure of the League of Nations to provide a sane and impartial government for the Ruhr district. In replying to the German criticisms of the peace terms in 1919, the Allied and Associated Powers assured the German representatives at Paris that 'the Governing Commission . . . will be responsible to the League of Nations and not to the French Government. The arrangement made will afford an ample guaranty against the misuse of the power which is entrusted to it.'

Gilbert Murray, one of the most prominent League champions in Great Britain, condemns the Saar situation unsparingly. He says in an article in The Nation and the Athenæum:

The League was entrusted, as an impartial body, with the government of the Saar Valley, by means of a Commission which was intended to be absolutely impartial also, and on paper seems to be so. But the French Government, having succeeded from the outset in packing the Saar Commission with French puppets, has lately proceeded to use it as a sort of auxiliary force for supporting the disguised war in the Ruhr; and the Council of the League has thus allowed itself to be drawn into the position of a mere tool of French policy. This is, quite simply, disastrous.

Professor Murray sees no remedy for the present situation so long as France and Great Britain are the only Powers of first rank represented in the League of Nations Council. At present the smaller Powers are practically without weight in that body's decisions. The remedy is to reform the League. 'Germany must, obviously, be there; she must be there, not as a prisoner at the bar, but as an equal member of the Conference. And the difficulties would be greatly lightened if the American

Government chose, without of course in any way joining or committing itself to the League, to coöperate with its old Allies and the leading neutrals in treating this particular problem.'

Mr. Asquith characterized the decree as 'by far the greatest blow that has been struck at the moral authority of the League of Nations since it was established,' and added, 'one may search the annals of despotism in the worst days of Russia without finding a more monstrous specimen of despotic legislation.'

On the other hand, Angel Marvaud, writing in the Revue Bleue, stresses the historical claims of France to the Ruhr. 'In 1935 the people will be called upon to vote for one of three solutions: return to Germany, union with France, or continuance of the present Government. Fifteen years! When in spite of a century's control our enemies have not completely Germanized the district!'

He points out that the ordinance so bitterly criticized was merely the law enacted by the German Government to protect itself and its officers after the assassination of Rathenau, and adds:

The President of the Saar Commission is not necessarily a Frenchman. M. Rault could not have held his position except for the unanimous confidence of his colleagues and of the League. . . . What would happen, however, if the Presidency of the Commission should pass to a friend of Germany, or even an Englishman?

CRITICIZING PARLIAMENTS

APROPOS of our Spanish article describing the disillusionment with parliamentary institutions that is now so common in Europe, it may interest our readers to know that an organization exists in France which calls itself 'The National Committee for Convening the States-General,' for the object of securing a return to the old system of

representative government that existed long before the Revolution. This society publishes a review called Les Cahiers des Etats-Généraux. Several large industrialists, who have no Royalist sympathies, are supporting its propaganda.

The superiority of the States-General over the present parliament is assumed to be that representation in the former was by classes, trades, and professions. The idea is to abolish or minimize party politics and to substitute for the motives of the professional politician the economic interests of different industrial and labor groups.

ENGLAND'S GERMAN BRYCE

A TWO-VOLUME work has just appeared that aspires to do for England what the late Lord Bryce's American Commonwealth did for the United States. The author is Wilhelm Dibelius, Professor of English Philology at Bonn University. But while the scope and method of this work resemble not remotely those of the American Commonwealth, its inspiration is entirely dif ferent many will say characteristically German. The idea of writing it occurred to the author during the war, when he was appalled to find his country fighting an enemy that it did not know:

Germany's fortunes were guided by a chancellor who believed it possible to avoid a war with England even though we marched through Belgium, who almost to the end of his chancellorship refused to credit the deadly earnestness of the English in the war. Our armies were commanded by officers who up to the battle of the Somme refused to believe that England would adopt compulsory service. And our starving German populace cursed their own farmers and food commissioners, unwilling to recognize the fundamental fact of the war the English blockade. . . . The Prussian schoolmaster - above all the schoolmaster

in the secondary school and university lost the war, for he did not inculcate into the generation that followed 1870 the political qualities necessary in a nation that is to play a great part in the world.

This lack the present book proposes in part to supply. It contains a comprehensive discussion of almost every aspect of England's national life; her historical background, the geographical and industrial bases of her power, national character, political institutions, press, church, and education. It is weighed down with a vast but useful bibliographical apparatus, and lacks the easy inspiration and classical simplicity that characterize some chapters of De Tocqueville and Bryce. None the less, it contains many fascinating and stimulating paragraphs. The author believes that the imperialist and materialist civilization of the AngloSaxons is saved from becoming a force for evil by two influences for evil by two influences - its 'gentleman-tradition and the power of its ethico-religious ideals.'

MINOR NOTES

Heraldo de Madrid, as conservative in its news standards as it is liberal in politics, reports a remarkable case of abnormal vision in the Spanish capital. A young nobleman, the son of Marquis de Santacasa, apparently possesses the faculty of seeing through opaque objects. Several leading physicians and engineers of the city have experimented with him. At a test given at the Museo de Ingenieros, the young man read the headlines of newspapers -selected at random- placed by members of the society in a metal cigar-box. At another test, held at the Madrid Academy of Sciences, which was very largely attended, the results were not as satisfactory, though the young man successfully read the time indicated by a closed watch.

EVEN if the occupation of the Ruhr proves a failure, it can always be said in its defense that it was an honest effort to solve the monstrous problem of Franco-German relations. France is accused of seeking other objects than Reparations there, but if we look at her action from the standpoint of European peace I think she should be praised rather than blamed for cherishing such ulterior designs.

The Versailles Treaty contains two fatal weaknesses: it pretends to base Germany's obligations to her conquerors upon a recognition of moral delinquency; and it represents all the demands that the victors make of the vanquished as reparations for injury sustained.

Frenchmen have an intense aversion for fanciful political theories, and never tire of ridiculing President Wilson as their champion. How does it happen that they have never bethought themselves to denounce the fanciful theories that have wrecked the Treaty of Versailles and rendered its execution impossible?

When the war ended, nations - and therefore individuals had indulged for four years in a veritable debauch of

intellectual, moral, and physical injustice. The world was strewn with ruins. Men everywhere were possessed of a single idea: to leave principles to take care of themselves, and to recover as speedily as possible the wealth they had stupidly destroyed. In a word, to get Reparations.

Obviously Germany must pay the bill. But instead of justifying this by her defeat, what was done? We tried to make her acknowledge not only her defeat but her guilt. We tried to enforce an impossible moral reform before taking up the tremendous question of physical restitution. We endeavored to overwhelm Germany with a remorse, a grief, a discontent with herself that was utterly absurd, that did not exist, that could not possibly exist in the hearts of the masses of the German people.

It was on a cloud bank like this that we built the Versailles Treaty. Instead of trying to find out how Germany really felt when the war was over, and profiting by that state of mind in a practical way, we hit upon the fanciful idea of creating a state of mind in our adversary, or rather of assuming such a state of mind offhand and

making it the motive and justification for her labor and sacrifice in our behalf.

This was one of the craziest ideas that the misguided fancy of mankind ever conceived. People seriously imagined in their own minds a German pondering how criminal his Government had been five years before, when it made war upon the Entente, and so overwhelmed by remorse as to go down into his stocking and empty his savings into the lap of his recent adversaries for the purpose of rebuilding the devastated regions. Of course the authors of the Treaty, feeling that this state of mind might be rather hypothetical, saw the wisdom of reënforcing it with certain sanctions. But the fact remains that they appealed to only two sentiments-repentance or fear.

The first sentiment never existed anywhere as a social phenomenon. Only individuals are conscious of personal guilt for which they feel themselves individually responsible. At the most one can merely produce a feeling of national shame, and that will not be strong except among a small moral élite.

I have always felt that the only way to make Germany help rebuild France is to make her see that this is necessary for her own recovery. Viewed from a certain angle, paradoxical as it may appear, the occupation of the Ruhr is a step in that direction. It is a rather brutal but definite way of inviting Germany to collaborate with us.

Properly understood, our victory should have proved to Germany, not her guilt, but her temporary dependence on us. Since we have not thus utilized our success, it is logical enough to seize her property in order to impress this truth upon her.

Unhappily our new course, postponed until after four years of pre

tended peace, inevitably meets obstacles that would not have existed at an earlier date. The sentiments of Germany have changed. In the demoralization and depression that seized her in 1918, an offer of economic cooperation might have been welcomed with an enthusiasm and a good will that we did not foresee. To-day the moral and judicial ideas that we have made current, to which we have constantly appealed, are turned against ourselves.

Justice is invoked to condemn our action, and we in turn figure as disturbers of the peace. We no longer have back of us the public opinion of the world, which is distraught, uncomprehending, or indignant. Germany feels that things are slowly swinging her way. Her moral self-confidence is returning. Consequently she. adopts passive resistance.

Still other factors make our policy dangerous. First of all, our purpose is not clear. Do we know precisely why we are in the Ruhr?

Let it be repeated, we have no right to be there except to take coal and other Reparations material. It is obvious that we have adopted the most expensive, complicated, and dangerous way imaginable to do this. Our action seems to me much more easily justified if we say bluntly that we have seized a pledge with the determination to force an economic alliance with Germany. The empty question of Reparations should be frankly discarded. We are facing an entirely different problem from the reconstruction of houses and factories, from restoring what is past and gone. We are dealing with a question of the future.

Unhappily our statesmen are not clear in their own minds. They have had the courage to put the issue on a new basis; but they are still haunted by the spectres of their past errors.

They do not dare to forget at once the devastated regions. Their old French prejudices, superstitiously attached to physical wealth, still hold them in bond.

Far too exigent when it comes to the question of demanding billions of ready money, they are not exigent enough when facing the magnificent possibility of hitching our star to the mighty tractor of German industry.

Germany was determined to ignore us. Our statesmen have again won her attention. But they do not know how to bend her will. Their proposals to her lack definiteness. They continue to threaten her after they have her in their power. Their language toward her may be harsh; but it is so vague as to be futile. At a time when we should be bargaining and agreeing, we pose as policemen and dictators.

Other errors destroy the effectiveness of our gesture. First of all there is the old idea that politics take precedence. Last March Poincaré told the Financial Commission: "The great industrialists of the Ruhr are still the backbone of German resistance. They have tried on several occasions to start direct negotiations with the French Government. But the latter would consider only official proposals coming from the Government of Germany." One asks at once the reason for making such a condition. Why not negotiate directly with the German industrialists if they have anything to suggest, and if they are the only ones who can propose something practical, something that counts?

So Poincaré has 'a principle.' That principle is that only politicians can guide the destinies of a country. But that is a principle that no longer accords with the facts, least of all in Germany. Is it not a dangerous and illogical policy to try to apply it just when we have convinced ourselves that

these industrialists are the true wielders of power in Germany?

So, at the very time when we seem to display a maximum of energy and boldness, we do not know our own minds. We are not clear-sighted enough to demand what we need most of all, the only thing that is worth our time and trouble, the only thing that will benefit the world and will be approved by the world if it wishes peace: I mean an industrial treaty with Germany, analogous to our treaties of commerce. Only from such a treaty can an honest guaranty against aggression spring.

Our ideas of peace to-day are either those of a lawyer or of a soldier. We imagine that peace will be given us by some miracle if we are resolute, steadfast, and indifferent to the wishes of the enemy. We do not try to understand his wishes or to discover if they may not be harmonized with our own. All we think of is crushing him. Undoubtedly pressure was necessary, but merely as a means to an end. We should be ready to reap its fruits as soon as they are ripe. We should not be impatient; but neither should we be overpatient. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that the duration of such an expedition as we have undertaken in the Ruhr is unimportant.

It is likely to arouse against us in Germany and in the rest of the world indignation and hatred, before which we shall find ourselves some day trembling and helpless.

Poincaré is by nature such a headstrong man that he deceives himself. He thinks he has accomplished something when he has merely stuck to his guns. He is never satisfied except when he feels that he has rigidly carried out his purpose, whether right or wrong. He regards a political policy as he would building a railway- and let us add that he insists on digging a tunnel