LORD CURZON, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, characterized in the House of Lords the French campaign in the Ruhr as a 'dragonnade.' This characterization of the French programme is so clear-cut that there is nothing further to be said about it from the German side. We all remember with what horror we read, in our history classes at school, of the method by which the Huguenots were maltreated immediately before and after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In the whole civilized world nobody has ever had an idea that methods of that kind would be possible in modern times. In those days dragoons were quartered upon the families of Huguenots in order to hurry along their conversion. These booted missionaries did what they liked with the possessions of their hosts. In the open street Huguenots were held up by dragoons, and their money taken away 'for sanction.' In a very few weeks the savings of many years were spent by the pitiless soldiers. Innocent men and women became victims of most insulting treatment. Large numbers were thrown into prison in chains.

In spite of this sharp characterization of French methods by the British Foreign Minister, he gave voice to the following somewhat mild remarks: 'In any case it is very difficult to carry out dragonnades throughout a whole land, very difficult to overcome an obstinate passive resistance on the part of a whole country.'

After all, we should feel some degree of satisfaction with the fact that, according to the declaration to-day of the British Premier, no intervention by

England can be expected. As the British Government is not in a position to put a stop to the French dragonnades, any negotiations that might follow would only be to our disadvantage, and could by no possibility do us any good. We have already expressed it as our opinion that so far as Germany is concerned the League of Nations, which has been several times mentioned in the British Parliament as the probable intermediary means, cannot be made use of either at this time or in the future. It is just as well to insist upon this German standpoint very energetically, in view of certain foreign intrigues. Bonar Law declared to-day that the British Government had learned that any suggestion of interference by the League of Nations would be regarded as unfriendly by the French Government at this time.

Therefore if, one of these fine days as several carefully worded phrases in the French newspapers lead us to believe the authority of the League of Nations should suddenly be acknowlledged by France, it is evident that this could only happen on the supposition, either that France has become aware of the impasse in which she has caught herself, or that she has become convinced, before moving in the matter, that the judgment of the League would be in her favor.

Furthermore, it is evident from the speeches of Bonar Law and Lord Curzon that, according to British official opinion, the procedure in the Ruhr is not a matter that necessitates a decision of the League of Nations, but is capable of a natural solution. If later the possibility of referring the Ruhr

question to the League should be brought up by some neutral Power, this would be considered as a vexatious embarrassment, brought forward by the Power in question in order to escape personal responsibility in cases of violation of the law; and mediation in these cases would tend in the direction of the least resistance.

At the same time it must be remembered that the League of Nations claims the right to hale nonmembers before its tribunal, while nonmembers have no right whatever to demand of the League a satisfaction of their claims. According to its practice up to to-day, the League of Nations has never acted except when the rights of its members have been challenged. On this account both France and Belgium were in a position to refuse intervention at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the League at Paris. And Bonar Law himself has declared that the League would not be invoked except with the express consent of France. If, therefore, the League of Nations should be invoked to solve the so-called Ruhr problem, which for Germany is no problem at all, nor can be, it is clear it is clear that Germany would be justified in demanding the same consideration. But in the decision itself Germany would have no part. This would be made, as before, by Germany's enemies and France's friends-in other words, more or less according to the wishes and will of France. No guaranty for the impartiality of any tribunal appointed by the League of Nations is at all to be expected. We have had our fill of its judgments to date.

What, it is fair to ask, is Germany's opinion as to a possible method of unraveling the situation in the Ruhr, supposing the League of Nations to be entirely eliminated?

In case any mediation takes place, or any tribunal is appointed, it is Germany's view that all the important Powers must have a hand in the business, and particularly the United States. But the coöperation of the United States may be considered as good as impossible, even in the future, in case the League of Nations is invoked. At the present time, however, it is difficult for us in Germany to see how America how America-politically a horse that will not gallop and is even very hard to get started hard to get started - can be persuaded to take steps against the French action in the Ruhr. Bonar Law himself has emphasized the fact that there is no probability of American inclination to intervene in the quarrels of Europe.

Therefore, to-day as well as yesterday, there remains for us Germans only one programme: namely, to fight our battles alone. And we shall have every reason to rejoice if the French, for their own edification, get a good taste of the deadly backlash of their devastating methods in the Ruhr and in Baden. If the French Government should be able to protect the standard of life in France from the contamination of a still more aggressive campaign, we should probably run the danger of yet greater abuses of power on their part, which even those elements in France naturally opposed to such a course so dangerous to our very existence

would be unable to prevent.

VOL. 317- NO. 4110

SCARCELY ever before in her history has England stood in greater need, than at this moment, of a strong Government to defend her vital interests; and scarcely ever, we suppose, has she had a weaker one. We can take no exception to Mr. Bonar Law's personal view of the Franco-German struggle; but the burden of responsibility seems to be greater than he can bear. He should have said either less or more than he has said. If he believed that the present policy of the French Government was right, or at any rate that it was not very wrong, or that it could do no vital injury to this country, or that it was legal, or that it might succeed, or indeed that it could lead to anything but disaster for all Europe, then indeed he might pursue a policy of inaction without sacrificing the prestige and influence of Great Britain.

But he believes none of these things and with his usual candor he has uttered what is in his mind. In view of what he has said, the inaction of his Government amounts to a confession of humiliating impotence such as no previous British Government has ever made. 'It is a disaster,' he wails, 'but what can I do?' The answer is that either he should pretend that it is not a disaster or else he should make up his mind to act. His present policy, if he continues to pursue it, can end only in the destruction and disappearance of all British influence in Europe.

We do not wish to be unfair to Mr. Bonar Law. It is not he, but his predecessor, who is to blame for the terrible situation which he has to face. We have no desire either to blame him or to weaken in any way his authority

as the fully accredited spokesman of Great Britain. But if he is to retain that authority he must speak, and speak not in an apologetic whisper, but in the tones which Europe is accustomed to hear from British Prime Ministers when vital issues are at stake. He is not, by nature, a great man or a great leader, but the present is an occasion to which even the most mediocre of statesmen should be able to rise.

In the present crisis Great Britain has something to say and it is the plain duty of Mr. Bonar Law to say it. We are sure that he knows perfectly well how to say it, and that he would say it if he were willing to lead instead of to follow. It is not only this country, but all the rest of Europe, outside France, that is waiting for the lead which no one save he who occupies the position of Prime Minister of Great Britain can give.

His hesitancy is all the more inexplicable in that he is notoriously lacking in personal ambition. He could afford to take a risk, if any risk were involved. But he should know that there is no risk and that whenever he decides to speak out he will have the whole country behind him as it was behind Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey in 1914. Is it Lord Rothermere whom he fears? A strong lead would make our Rothermeres change their tune in a night.

The facts are not in dispute. The leaders of all parties, and an overwhelming majority of the House of Commons, are in agreement upon the main issues. We suppose that for practical purposes the following series of propositions may be regarded as beyond serious

dispute among thoughtful and responsible people of all parties in this country:

(1) That the French occupation of the Ruhr will not increase but certainly diminish the amount which can be extracted from Germany by way of Reparations during the next few years.

(2) That the main object of the French Government in occupying the Ruhr is to gain not money, but 'security,' by a permanent occupation of the Rhine frontier, by the destruction, if possible, of German industry, and by the definite disintegration, political and economic, of the German Republic.

(3) That this policy, if successful, would give France the complete hegemony of the Continent of Europe.

(4) That such a policy cannot conceivably be successful, and that if it could Great Britain would be bound to oppose it by every means in her power. (5) That such a policy, successful or unsuccessful, leads logically, not merely to the destruction of all the hopes of civilized Europe for an era of peaceful reconstruction, but to the definite prospect of another Great War.

(6) That in such a war Great Britain could not be on the side of France.

(7) That the interests of Great Britain and of the whole world require the immediate evacuation of the Ruhr and the complete abandonment of all plans for the industrial ruin of Germany.

There may be, even in the House of Commons, men who would dissent from some of these propositions, but that they represent with general accuracy the sober views of Lancashire and of London, of the Universities and of the Trade Unions, of the City and of Whitehall-in short, of Great Britain - there is no doubt whatever.

Doubt can arise only over the question of whether the moment for action

has yet arrived. We are definitely of opinion that it has arrived. The situation in the Ruhr is becoming rapidly more dangerous. Each day sees the French Government plunging deeper and deeper into a bog from which already it is powerless to escape.

If there were any prospect of France coming to her senses and abandoning, next week or next month, or even in three months' time, the policy to which she is at present committed, it might be wise to await her conversion. But there are no signs of any such possibility. All the signs, indeed, point in exactly the opposite direction. French public opinion is being prepared for a prolonged struggle. The Paris newspapers give us to understand that the French Government is prepared to maintain a state of war vis-à-vis Germany for a decade or more if the Germans do not surrender at discretion and pay sums which everyone knows they are utterly incapable of paying.

In the meantime steps are being taken by the French military governor of the Ruhr, which cannot be retraced except at the cost of an utter destruction of French prestige. Three months or six months hence, if Great Britain does not act, the situation will quite inevitably be not better but far worse. If, therefore, we are to act at all—and upon the eventual necessity for that everyone seems to be agreed the sooner we act the better. There is very much to be lost by delay and nothing at all to be gained except perhaps the coöperation of America. But can we afford to wait even for that? And will it ever come if we make no move?

The date on which the French advance into the Ruhr began was one of the decisive dates of modern European history. It marked the final breach between France and the Anglo-Saxon world. What is now within our power is not to heal that breach but to prevent

There can be no possible doubt as to what will eventually be the attitude of the British people, and of any British Government, toward such a programme - we will pay any price to defeat it. But the longer we wait the heavier that price is likely to be. Some people in England have not yet realized what M. Poincaré's policy means, but we cannot afford to wait for the laggards; they will follow.

The present inaction of Mr. Bonar Law is in reality nothing more than hesitation to take a plunge which sooner or later, as he himself recognizes, will have to be taken. Such hesitation is explicable, but we cannot think that history will regard it as excusable; for time is of the essence of the question which is whether British influence is to be exerted before it is too late.

What we want is a definite public declaration of the uncompromising hostility of Great Britain, not merely to the French occupation of the Ruhr, but to all the aims and motives which lie behind and have inspired that enterprise.

The obvious first step is to address a formal request to the French Government to state precisely the terms upon which it will consent to cease hostilities and withdraw its troops from the Ruhr. If these terms are practicable, there

will at once be material for negotiation and we can throw all our influence into the scale to oblige the German Government to negotiate. If, on the other hand, they are manifestly impractica ble, then we shall know where France stands and must follow our declaration of disapproval by steps designed to hinder in every possible way a policy which will thus have been shown to be purely predatory and destructive.

Certain steps which might be taken in the Cologne area are obvious enough. There are others which might be taken with reference to the increasingly serious plight of unoccupied Germany. The well-known American review, the New Republic, has suggested that there should be a joint communication from Great Britain and the United States announcing the suspension of all diplomatic relations with France pending her evacuation of the Ruhr. It may come to that; but until the preparatory steps have been taken it is unnecessary to discuss the precise forms which later action will take.

What is immediately necessary is for the public to grasp the issue: which is not whether Great Britain should or should not take strong action to avert the disaster with which French policy is threatening Europe - for quite cer tainly she will presently be forced to do that unless she is to deny all her most vital interests and contradict all the lessons of her own history — but whether she should act promptly and firmly, or in the alternative should nervelessly postpone the evil day. Can any single sound reason for procrastination be found?