accepted the ordinance which sought to make the old company liable
for such street improvement. Western Paving etc. Co. v. Citizens' R'y
Co., 462.

35. STREET-RAILWAY COMPANY NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY VALIDITY OF
STREET ASSESSMENT WHEN. -A street-railway company whose prop-
erty is not subject to assessment for street improvements is not estopped
to deny its liability for the assessment, because it stands by without
objection until the improvements are completed, where the city has the
right to make the improvements and the company has no right to object.
Western Paving etc. Co. v. Citizens' etc. R'y Co., 462.

36. WHEN A STREET-RAILWAY CORPORATION IS IN CUSTODY OF THE COURT
through its RECEIVER, and another like corporation has a right to use
a portion of the former on paying an equal portion for the construction
of the track and appliances, such court may, on petition, fix the amount
to be paid by the petitioning corporation to acquire the right to use
such track. Pacific R'y Co. v. Wade, 201.

See CARRIERS; NEGLIGENCE

RAPE.

EVIDENCE OF THE GENERAL REPUTATION OF THE ACCUSED AS THAT OF A
PEACEABLE AND LAW-ABIDING MAN is admissible in his favor when he
is on trial charged with rape committed by assault and force. Lince-
cum v. State, 727.

See ASSAULT.

RATIFICATION.

See CORPORATIONS, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 12

REASONABLE DOUBT.

See HOMICIDE, 8; TRIAL, 7.

RECEIVERS.

1. RECEIVER OF A CORPORATION MAY, WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE COURT,
DO ANYTHING which the corporation might lawfully have done to make
the most out of its assets. Pacific R'y Co. v. Wade, 201.

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2. RECEIVER Of Corporation — AMOUNT TO BE PAID TO OR BY, HOW MAY BB
FIXED JURY TRIAL When there is a claim for damages or compen.
sation in favor of a corporation whose property is in the hands of a re-
ceiver, it may be adjusted upon a petition to the court in which the
receiver is acting, which may proceed to determine the issues involved
in the petition without the aid of a jury. Pacific R'y Co. v. Wade, 201.

See CREDITORS' SUITS; LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 7, 8.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

1. CONVICTION OF THIEF NOT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN PROSECUTION FOR
BUYING STOLEN PROPERTY FOR GAIN. - Under the Illinois statute, the
offense of receiving, or buying, or aiding in concealing stolen property
for gain, or to prevent the owner from repossessing himself thereof, with
knowledge that it has been stolen, is made a substantive crime, subject
to punishment, without reference to the trial or conviction of the per
son committing the larceny. Huggins v. People, 357.

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2 BUYING STOLEN PROPERTY FOR GAIN - EVIDENCE OF. To convict of
buying stolen property for gain, when the buying is admitted, the state

must prove the guilty knowledge of the accused that the property was
stolen at the time of the purchase. This may be shown by proof of at
tending facts and circumstances, from which, by the common under
standing and experience of men, the inference of the fact arises; as
that the purchase was for much less than the real value; that the ac
cased denied that the property was in his possession, or concealed it;
his failure to make reasonable explanation; the evil reputation of the
person from whom purchased or received, or the like. Huggins v. Peo-
ple, 357.

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& BUYING STOLEN PROPERTY FOR GAIN. TO CONVICT of buying stolen
property for gain, the guilty knowledge of the accused of the theft at
the time of purchase is the gist of the offense, and must be alleged,
proved, and found by the jury as a fact; but in finding such fact the
jury will be justified in presuming that the accused acted rationally,
and that whatever would convey knowledge or induce belief in the
mind of a reasonable person, would, in the absence of countervailing
evidence, be sufficient to apprise the accused of the like fact, or induce
in his mind the like impression and belief. Huggins v. People, 357.
▲ BUYING STOLEN PROPERTY FOR GAIN. To secure conviction for buying
stolen property for gain, the name of the thief, or of the person from
whom the defendant received or bought the stolen property, not being
matter necessary to the identification of the offense, need not be alleged
or proved; but where the pleader unnecessarily alleges the commission
of the larceny by a particular person, or that the property was bought
or received of a particular person, the allegation becomes matter of de.
scription, and must be proved as laid. Huggins v. People, 357.
& BUYING STOLEN PROPERTY FOR GAIN GUILTY KNOWLEDGE. To
convict of buying stolen property for gain, the guilty knowledge of the
theft possessed by the accused at the time of the purchase need not be
that actual or positive knowledge which one acquires by personal ob
servation of the fact. It is sufficient if the circumstances were such,
accompanying the transaction, as to make the accused believe that the
goods had been stolen. Huggins v. People, 357.

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6. EVIDENCE-Judgment. - ON THE TRIAL OF AN INDICTMENT FOR RE-
CEIVING PROPERTY knowing it to have been stolen, a judgment con-
victing and sentencing another person for stealing the same property,
together with the indictment on which it was found, is admissible in
evidence against the accused for the purpose of showing that such prop-
erty had been stolen by such other person. Cooper v. State, 712.

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7. EVIDENCE. THE DECLARATION OF ONE WHO HAS BEEN CONVICTED of
stealing property, that another person indicted for receiving it, knowing
it to have been stolen, had no connection with the theft, and had bought
the property in good faith and for value, is not admissible in favor of
the latter. Cooper v. State, 712.

REGISTRATION.

See CORPORATIONS, 14.

REPLEVIN.

1. WRIT OF REPLEVIN, SERVICE OF. It is not material whether a writ of
replevin is served by a constable or the sheriff. Smith v. Eals, 486.

2 REPLEVIN IS A PROPER REMEDY FOR THE RECOVERY OF DRAFTs exe-
cuted by the plaintiff, and which have become void by reason of their

subsequent fraudulent alteration. Smith v. Eals, 486.

3. REPLEVIN AGAINST OFFICER.

·Replevin will lie in any state court of
competent jurisdiction against an officer, in favor of the owner of goods
seized by such officer, upon a writ against a third person, in an attach-
ment suit pending in any other of the courts of the state. Carpenter v.
Innes, 255.

4. PROCESS, WHEN NO PROTECTION TO OFFICER. Where the evidence in
an action of replevin against an officer shows that he has taken prop-
perty which did not belong to the party against whom the process ran,
the taking is wrongful, and the process affords him no protection. Car.
penter v. Innes, 255.

5. FORM OF VERDICT IN ACTIONS OF CLAIM AND DELIVERY. — A verdict
stating that the jury find for the defendant and fix the value of the
property at fifteen hundred dollars is sufficient to support a judgment
in favor of the defendant for the return of the property to him, or for
the value thereof in case the delivery cannot be had. Etchepare v.
Aguirre, 180.

6. JUDGMENT, FORM OF, IN ACTIONS OF CLAIM and Delivery. — A judg-
ment that the defendant recover of the plaintiff a sum of money, or the
return of the property described in the complaint and his costs, is not
authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure of California, which declares
that such judgment shall be "for the return of the property, or the
value thereof in case the return cannot be had." Etchepare v. Aguirre,
180.

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7. EXECUTION, DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN SERVING. Where the service of
an execution has been delayed by a suit in replevin, the defendant in re-
plevin is entitled, as damages for the delay, to statutory interest on the
value of the goods owned by the execution defendant. Burton v. Ken-
nedy, 769.

SALES.

1. SALES ARE PRESUMED TO BE FOR CASH on delivery, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. Cleveland v. Pearl, 748.

3. CHANGE OF POSSESSION.

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2 IMPLIED PROMISE TO PAY FOR GOODS transferred from one person to
another will not arise from the mere fact of their being received and
used, when it was understood by the parties at the time that the goods
were not to be paid for. Lyndon Mill Co. v. Lyndon L. & B. Inst., 783.
While it is possible for a vendee of chattels to
employ the vendor and yet make such a change of possession as will
support a sale, yet if the vendor is left in entire charge of the property
which he has sold, or so apparently in charge that there is no visible
change in its possession, and nothing to indicate that any change has
taken place in the title or possession, then there is no such actual change
of possession as is required by law. Etchepare v. Aguirre, 180.

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4. CHANGE OF POSSESSION. The fact that chattels are so situated that the
vendee is entitled to and can lawfully take possession at his pleasure is
not equivalent to the actual change of possession required by the stat
ute. Etchepare v. Aguirre, 180.

5. EVIDENCE OF WHAT A VENDOR DID AND SAID AFTER A SALE of chattels is
admissible against his vendee, if it is pertinent to the issue whether or
not the sale had been accompanied by an immediate delivery and fol
lowed by an actual and continued change of possession. Etchepare v.
Aguirre, 180.

6. STATUTE OF FRAUDS - MEMORANDUM OF SALE cannot satisfy the statute
of frauds, unless it either names the vendors, or describes them so that
they can be identified by other evidence. Where the sale is at public
auction, and the advertisement of sale states that it is to be made "to
settle the estate of John Higgins," a memorandum of the sale, made by
the auctioneer, neither naming the vendors nor describing them, except
to designate them as the "sellers," is fatally defective, though the par
ties for whom the sale was made were either the devisees of John Hig-
gins or grantees from such devisees. McGovern v. Hern, 632.

See AGENCY, 4.

SAVINGS BANKS.

See BANKS AND BANKING, 3-7; BILLS AND NOTES, 1.

SCIRE FACIAS.

See ATTACHMENT, 4.

SEDUCTION.

1. SEDUCTION BY MEANS OF A PROMISE TO MARRY is committed if the man
has carnal intercourse to which the woman's assent was obtained by a
promise of marriage, made by the man at the time, and to which, with-
out such promise, she would not have yielded. Putnam v. State, 738.
2. TO SEDUCE means, when used with reference to the conduct of a man
towards a female, an enticement of her on his part to surrender her
chastity by means of some art, influence, promise, or deception calcu
lated to accomplish that object, and to include the yielding of her per-
son to him as much as if it was expressly stated. Putnam v. State, 738.
3. INSTRUCTIONS. - A conviction for seduction will be reversed if the judge
did not fully instruct the jury concerning the meaning of the word
"seduction" as used in the statute. Putnam v. State, 738.

SEISIN.

See COVENANTS, 1, 2

SELF-DEFENSE.

See HOMICIDE, 1-3.

SERVITUDES.

See EASEMENTS.

SET-OFF.

EXEMPTIONS-WAGES EXEMPTED NOT LIABLE TO SET-OFF WHEN. -La-
borers' wages to the amount of thirty dollars are exempt by the statute,
and cannot be subjected to a set-off by a claim in no way springing out
of the contract relations between the parties, but arising out of a dis-
tinct and independent transaction. Collier v. Murphy, 698.

See INSURANCE, 19.

SLANDER.

1. MALICE IS THE FOUNDATION of the action of slander, and is ordinarily
implied; but there may be justification from the occasion, and when
this appears, the words must be proved to be malicious as well as false.
Fresh v. Cutter, 575.

2 ACTIONABLE WORDS - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. — In an action for
slander based on a voluntary communication made by a former mas-
ter to an existing or prospective employer of the former's discharged
servant, that the latter "stole as good as two hundred dollars from me,
and I want my money," if the proof shows that the communication was
made in good faith, under an honest belief of its truth, and a convic-
tion of duty to disclose it, it is privileged, and not actionable; but if it
was false, and was maliciously communicated, without any duty to dis-
close it, it is not privileged, and is actionable. Fresh v. Cutter, 575.
2. JUSTIFICATION FROM OCCASION, in actions for slander, arises when an ac-
tionable communication is made bona fide upon any subject-matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which
he has a duty, legal, moral, or social, if made to a party having a cor-
responding interest or duty. Fresh v. Cutter, 575.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES - ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. — In an action for
slander based on a voluntary communication claimed by the defense to
be privileged, it is reversible error to instruct the jury that they may
award the plaintiff punitive damages, without requiring them to find
the existence of actual malice, and to consider the facts in evidence in
regard to the occasion of the communication, the motive which inspired
it, the honesty, good faith, and belief in its truth in uttering it. Fresh
v. Cutter, 575.

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CHARACTER OF SERVANT-PRESUMPTION

TION.

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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA-
When a master gives a character to a servant, and is sued there-
for in slander, it is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that the character was given without malice; and to support the action it
must be proved that the character was both falsely and maliciously given;
and though as given it is untrue in fact, the master will be justified by
the occasion, unless it is shown that he was actuated by malice, and
knowingly stated what was false and injurious. In such case, the state-