conviction, it seems to us, to any unbiased mind, of the guilt of this defendant. He knew the negro man Watson had been in the penitentiary. He was himself without means or business, and, meeting Watson, saw the ring in his possession, and upon Watson's offer to sell, bought it at one fourth or one fifth of its value. No questions were asked or inquiries made as to where or how Watson procured it, or as to its value. Nor does it appear that any price other than that paid was asked, or that its value was talked of between the purchaser and seller. The ring was purchased for ten dollars by defendant, seven dollars of which was paid on the night of the purchase, by Mary Stoner, and the rest was to be paid when the defendant got it. A few days afterward, the three dollars was paid by the defendant, and the witness Stevens testifies it was for the balance on a diamond ring sold by Watson to the defendant. The defendant then, as he says, gave the ring to Mary Stoner, and that subsequently he took it and pawned it to Em Smith for $1.75, and testifies that he never saw it afterwards. However, about the first day of January, 1890, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the defendant and his mother, and to prevent the mother's arrest, who, the defendant said, knew nothing about the ring, he produced the ring and surrendered it to the officers. It is true, he testifies that he got it of Mary Stoner; but if that was so, the fact remains that he knew where it was, and produced it. Mary Stoner was upon the witness-stand, but was not asked to corroborate his statement.

About the 1st of December, 1889, suspicion having attached to the defendant, Joseph W. Franks went to him, and told the defendant he understood he had some rings. The defendant thereupon showed some rings, but not the one in question. This witness testifies: "Then I explained to him what kind of a ring I wanted. It was a diamond ring with one set, solid gold ring, and run down square on the bottom. I explained to him what kind of a ring it was," and that it was stolen from Mr. John. The witness then testifies: "We talked, and he said he did n't know anything about such a ring." The officer then asked him to see if he could find out about it, and he promised to do so. On the next evening he met Franks, and told him he had not had time to see any one he wanted to see. Franks told him to see his parties, and they met again on the following evening. He then said he had tried, but could n't hear anything about such a ring. A few days

chase, he would ascertain the value of the article bought, the means for which were readily at hand. The character of the person from whom he purchased would ordinarily put any one upon inquiry as to how he came into possession of such property. Moreover, when asked about the ring, and had it particularly described, and was informed of the larceny, he denied knowing anything about such a ring. Upon being requested to look it up, he pretended to do so, and when pressed upon the subject, pretended that the absent Smith, whose whereabouts the subsequent search failed to disclose, had it; that he had pawned it to her for a trifling sum, and she had agreed to keep it for him until he redeemed it, and subsequently admitted that his mother had furnished the money to redeem it from Smith. When no longer able to baffle the officers, he boldly admits he can produce the ring, but refuses to do so unless paid twenty dollars, and when finally arrested at the house of Watson, he produces and surrenders the ring. We are of opinion that the evidence fully warranted the jury in believing, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the ring was stolen, as alleged, and that the defendant did buy it for his own gain, knowing it had been so obtained.

The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. If a person receives stolen goods, knowing them to be such, for the purpose of aiding the thief in making away with them, he is guilty of the crime of knowingly receiving stolen goods: State v. Rushing, 69 N. C. 29; 12 Am. Rep. 641; 5 Yerg. 154; 26 Am. Dec. 258, and note; People v. Weldon, 111 N. Y. 569. An innocent purchaser of stolen goods is liable to the owner therefor: McDaniel v. Adams, 87 Tenn. 756. The crime of larceny may be committed by the finder of lost goods who fraudulently appropriates them to his use: Kennedy v. Woodrow, 6 Houst. 46. The sale of property alleged to have been stolen may authorize a conviction for larceny: Graff v. People, 134 Ill. 380. Receivers of stolen goods, knowing them to be such, are punishable as principals: State v. Weston, 9 Conn. 527; 26 Am. Dec. 46, and note. An indictment for fraudulently receiving stolen goods need not allege the name of the person from whom the goods were received: State v. Hazard, 2 R. I. 474; 60 Am. Dec. 96, and note.

POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN GOODS is prima facie evidence of theft, authorizing a presumption of guilt: Stockman v. State, 24 Tex. App. 387; 5 Am. St. Rep. 894, and note; Boyd v. State, 24 Tex. App. 570; 5 Am. St. Rep. 908, and note; Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 209; 82 Am. Dec. 605, and note; State v. Weston, 9 Conn. 527; 25 Am. Dec. 46; State v. Moore, 101 Mo. 316. Possession of stolen goods, even though considerable time has elapsed, is a circumstance tending to criminate the accused: State v. Miller, 45 Minn.

521.

who was plaintiff in the circuit court, is the owner of lands included in said district, and was assessed eight hundred dollars for draining said lands, and after the payment by him of such assessment, the defendant, without his knowledge or consent, enlarged the boundaries of said district, by taking in a large area of territory, including the greater part of the city of Mason City, which territory had a natural drainage for the water falling thereon, in a direction opposite to the lands of appellant, and defendant, by a system of drainage, collected the water falling on said area, and discharged all said water into the ditches on the lands of appellant, which were too small to carry off the additional water without enlarging the same, and also performed the work so carelessly and negligently as to overflow and submerge appellant's lands with the water from the territory so added to the district and precipitated upon his lands. He thereby lost the crops planted thereon, and the use of the lands; and having called the attention of the commissioners to the condition of his lands, without avail, he brought this action in case against the corporation.

The declaration contained three counts, charging substantially the above facts, and negligence on the part of the defendant in the construction of the drains, and in connecting the drains and ditches of the added territory with the drains running through appellant's lands, and negligence in failing to enlarge and give sufficient fall to the drains on appellant's lands, so as to carry off, without damage, the increased volume of water so discharged thereon. A general demurrer was interposed to the declaration and sustained, and appellant abiding by his declaration, a final judgment was rendered against him for costs. The judgment was affirmed in the appellate court, on the ground that the corporation is not liable in an action for the damages claimed in the declaration. The record has been brought here by appeal, and the assignments of error question the propriety of the judgment of affirmance entered in the appellate court.

That a private corporation formed by voluntary agreement, for private purposes, is held to respond in a civil action for its negligence or tort, goes without saying; and yet, in deciding the mooted question at issue in this case, it seems convenient to restate that proposition. So, also, it is admitted law that municipal corporations proper, such as villages, towns, and cities, which are incorporated by special charters or volun