Wettbewerbsrechtliche Schranken für staatliche Massnahmen nach europäischem GemeinschaftsrechtOriginally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Eberhard-Karls-Universit'at T'ubingen, 1991. |
Contents
73 | 8 |
An Economic Analysis of the New Institutional Economics | 351 |
Thoughts on the Theory of the Firm A Tribute to Eirik | 365 |
Copyright | |
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action actors agent ALCHIAN approach assume assumption behavior bounded rationality c₂ Cambridge Coase Coase Theorem COLEMAN competition contract law custom d₁ d₂ Douglass North economic theory economists effects efficiency empirical equilibrium example FERC firm function game theory gas prices gesamte Staatswissenschaft important incentive increase individual Institutional and Theoretical Institutional Economics interest issues Journal of Economic Journal of Institutional Journal of Law Law and Economics legislators marital gain marriage maximization moral hazard Nash equilibrium neoclassical nomic norms Oliver Williamson optimal organization organizational output paper parameters permits pipelines pollution Posner problem production Professor profit property rights r₁ rational choice rational choice theory refers regulation result role Ronald Coase rule obedience SCHLICHT second best social optimum solution specific structure tenant Theoretical Economics tion transaction cost economics University Press utility variables WEINGAST welfare WILLIAMSON Zeitschrift