Villanies are to be placed to

the account of human Mifery,

and not

on as

fo call'd.

is no Election made amifs. (44.) Nor can any thing be faid to be done otherwise than it ought to be: for what could not poffibly be done otherwise, is certainly done as it ought; fince it is done according to the exigence and necessary order of things.

XIV. Thirdly, By the fame Principle all Evil wou'd be in the ftricteft fenfe Natural, for it would derive its Origin from natural and neceffary Causes. The diftinction then would be loft between natural and moral Evil, as commonly understood. There would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is reckon'd Moral by the common confent of Manlook'd up- kind, of which the Man himself is properly the Crimes, Caufe; but no body looks upon himself as properproperly ly the Caufe of a thing which he could not avoid, or to which he was neceffitated by natural Causes, and fuch as were antecedent to the Will. For every one blames himself only on this account, because he was of himself neceffarily the Caufe of Evil to himself or others. Those Inconveniences which come by Neceffity, he looks upon as Miferies, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay the Hatred of God himself, and whatever we esteem bafe in Villanies (as well as the difgrace and punifhment attending them) must be placed to the account of human Mifery and Unhappiness, but by

NOTES.

no

(44) Leibnitz declares it to be his fettled Opinion +, "That whenever we refolve or will contrary to an evident Reason, we are carried by fome other Reafon ftronger in appearance". If this be always the Cafe, we certainly can never will amifs or unreafonably, fince that Reafon which appears to be the ftrongest must and ought always to determine us.

+ Remarques fur le Livre de l'Origine du Mal. p. 483.

no means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of God, to his Justice, Purity or Goodness, than Heat or Cold.

XV. Fourthly, When therefore we blame a A MaleThief, Adulterer, Murderer, or perjur'd Perfon, factor is reprov'd, when these Crimes are arraign'd as fcandalous; this not beis not done because they have deferv'd it, or be- cause he cause these things are in themfelves really fhameful deferv'd or culpable; but because that Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Perfons or others proof may from the like Elections. And this is the only Rea- drive him fon why we reproach a Thief, &c. and not a fick fromEvil. Perfon, with Infamy; because Reproach may cure

a Thief, &c. but can do no Good to a fick Perfon.

it, but be

cause re

ments are

are Laws

XVI. Fifthly, Malefactors are punish'd not because they deserve Punishment, but because it is Punishexpedient, and Laws are made ufe of to reftrain apply'd as Vices, as Medicines to expel Diseases; Men fin Medicines therefore after the fame manner as they die, viz. totheSick; because an effectual Remedy was not apply'd. And neither yet Laws are not entirely ufelefs, fince they pre- useless, vent fome Vices, as Medicines protract the Deaths fince they of fome difeafed Perfons: and a Perfon infected prevent with the Plague may be as juftly cut off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of avoiding the Contagion. (†)

NOTES.

XVII.

[+] All this, and a great deal more to the fame purpose, is exprefly afferted (as indeed 'tis a neceffary confequence of their Hypothefis) by Hobbs and by the Author of the Philofophical Engary, p. 91, &c. and much the fame by Bayle, Critical Ditionary, p. 2609, &c. The bare recital of fuch Principles is a fufficient refutation of them.

See his Treatife on Human Liberty, or Bp. Bramhall's Works, P. 6-8.

Vice.

We are

Benefit.

XVII. Sixthly; We are oblig'd to repay good

oblig'd to Offices, fince by being thankful we may excite the be grateful Benefactor to continue or increase his Benevolence, only in profpect and alfo induce others to do us Service. And hence of a future it comes to pafs, that we are oblig'd to be grateful towards God and Men, but not to the Sun or a Horse, namely, because God and Men may be excited by thanks to fome farther Beneficence, whereas the Sun or a Horfe cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit receiv'd, but only to one that may be receiv'd; nor are we obliged to be grateful towards a moft generous Benefactor for what is paft, but only for the profpect of what is to come. All fenfe of Gratitude then, as commonly understood, is deftroy'd, for the Vulgar reckon him a cunning, not a grateful Perfon, who returns one favour merely out of hopes of another.

fible, fince

upon

things

not in our

XVIII. Seventhly, If this Opinion be true, we Accord muft defpair of human Felicity, for it will not in ing to this the leaft be in our own Power, but entirely depend Opinion, human on external Objects. Our Happiness (if there be Happiness any) muft, according to them, be conceiv'd to ais impof- rife from the perfect fruition of those things which it depends are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the contrary to these are prefent, or the agreeable ones abfent, we must neceffarily be uneafy, and while we which are Aruggle with Anxieties we cannot be happy. AcPower. cording to this Hypothefis therefore it follows, that our Happiness neceffarily requires fuch an Enjoyment as we have fpoken of, and that this is at the fame time impoffible. For who can hope that all external things (with which he has to do) fhould be fo temper'd as in every refpect to answer his Wishes, fo as never to want what he defires, or be forced to endure any thing contrary to his natural Appetites? If Happiness arifes from the Enjoyment of those things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which can move Defire by their in

nate

nate, or at least apparent Goodness; if alfo the Will is neceffarily determin'd to thefe, according to the Judgment of the Understanding, or Importunity of Appetites, every Man muft neceffarily want a great many things which he has chofen, and bear a great many which he would not, than which nothing is more inconfiftent with Felicity. For we cannot poffibly conceive any State of Life wherein all things anfwer to the natural Appetites. In vain then do we hope for Happiness, "if it depend upon external Objects, (N.)

Vol. II.

R

NOTES.

XIX.

(N.) Against the Argument here urged 'tis objected that it is lame in all its Feet; Ift, there is no confequence in it. zdly, the Conclufion may be granted; and 3dly, the Argument may be retorted against the Author.

To begin with the laft; It is alledged that Men are never the happier, or more independent of the accidents of Fortune, by having a power to choose without Reafon.

To which I reply, that the Author has no occafion to affert

any fuch power; all that he pleads for is that the will ought

not to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Understanding concerning things antecedently agreeable or difagreeable to our natural Appetites, because all the good of a Man does not lie in them: If it did, here would be no need of a will at all, but we ought to be abfolutely determin'd by them. But the will is a faculty that by choosing a thing can make it agreeable, tho' it had no Agreement with any natural Appetite, nay, were. contrary to them all; and for the will to choose a thing in order to please itself in the choice, is no more to choose without reafon, than to build a House in order to preferve one from the inclemency of the Weather, is to act without reafon.

But 2dly, 'Tis ask'd, will Men be any happier, or less dependent on the accidents of Fortune by having fuch a Faculty? Yes, fure a great deal; for no accident of Fortune can take this Liberty from them, or hinder their being pleased with their choice, and in the midst of fickness, pain and torment, if they have this faculty, they will find pleasure and fatisfaction in it, and make the most adverse Fortune eafy to them, as we fee wife men frequently do, at leaft, more eafy than fuch circumftances would be without it.

Its confequences hard, and tho' the

XIX. This, and a great deal more that might

be added, muft feem hard and repugnant to the

common

Argument from confequences be generally a bad one, yet these bring fome prejudice againft an Opinion which feems attended with them, efpecially if they be acknowledged.

NOTES.

3dly, 'Tis cbjected, that it must be impoffible to give agree bleness to a thing which has none antecedently to the Will. For to do fo we must have a power either to change our taft of things, or the things themfelves; but that wou'd almoft be the fame as to fay to a piece of Lead be thou Gold, or to a Flint be thou a Diamond, or at least produce the fame effect on me. To which the answer is eafy; Good is not an absolute thing, but relative, and confifts in the agreeableness of one thing to another, as fuppofe between the Appetite and Object; if then these be difagreeable to one another, the one is Evil to the other, and to make them agreeable, one of them muft of neceffity be changed, and the change of either will cause it. Altho' therefore I cannot change Lead into Gold by any act of my Free-will, yet I can contemn Gold as much as if it were Lead, and be as well content with a leaden Cup as if it were Gold. Thoufands makes this ufe of Free-will, and arife to this pitch of Happiness by the help of it: It is an old Rule Si res haberi non poteft deme aliquid de cupiditatibus. If you can't have Wealth or Honour refolve, that is choose, to be fatisfed without it, and experience will teach you that fuch a Choice is much to your Eafe and Happiness. To fay that this is impoffible, is to give the Lie to all who treat of Morals and Divinity Of fo great moment is fuch a power of making things good by choice, that in truth all moral Advices fuppofe us to have it, or else they are not fenfe.

But 4thly, 'Tis objected, That if the will can make a thing agreeable by choofing, fuch a power wou'd be infinite, and might make a Man happy in all circumftances, even in Hell. For if it can give fix degrees of Pleasure to an Object, it may as well give infinite, fince it is without reafon that it gives thefe Six. I answer, all created Powers and Pleasures are limited, and no fubject is capable of more than such a certain Degree, therefore there is likewise a limitation of the pleasure arifing from the ufe of Free-will, as well as from the use of feeing or hearing, or any other Faculty or Appetite, and as the Will is an Appetite, fo the Pleafure of it bears fome proportion to the Pleasure arifing from the fatisfaction of other Appetites, but in what degree we cannot precifely determine, any more

than