Let us fuppofe then that the Understanding has determin'd it to be good to exert fome certain Action and evil to fufpend it; while this Judgment continues, if the Will can fufpend its Act, it chooses Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll fay, it can command the Understanding to change its Judgment; let it be fo. But it is evident, that the Man fufpends his Action before he can command the Understanding to change its Judgment, i. e. he fufpends the Action while the Judgment determines that it is Evil to fufpend; and of confequence chooses that directly which his Reason judges to be Evil; which feems to overthrow their whole Hypothefis. (48.)

S4

NOTES.

X. I

(48.) Farther, if the Mind can fufpend the Satisfaction of any urgent defire (which Mr. Locke allows [r.] and therein places all its Liberty) then it can as easily quite ftop, or run counter to any natural Appetite, fince no greater Power seems to be requifite for the one than for the other. If we can hinder the Will from being determin'd by any defire of abfent Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other Side, which might raise an oppofite defireable to counterballance it, as our Author has fhewn that we can; then we shall be equally able to prevent its following the ultimate determination of the Judgment, even without any reason for fo doing; after any Determination of the Judgment, it will be ftill as undeter min'd, and indifferent towards Volition, as Mr. Locke fuppofes the operative Powers to be in regard to Action [.] and confequently good, whether abfolute or comparative, is neither the adequate efficient Caufe, nor a neceffary Means to the determination of the Will. This act of Sufpenfion therefore muft either be folely founded in the felf-moving Power of the Mind, and of confequence be naturally independent on all Motives, Reafons, &c. and an inftance of the Mind's abfolute Freedom from any external Determination; which is a contradiction to Mr. Locke's general Hypothesis; or else itfelf must be determin'd

[r] Book 2. C. 21. Sett. 47. and 50. [] See Note 49.

Answers offer'd to

X. I confess, they offer fome Solutions here, There are but fuch as are fo fubtle, fo obfcure, and fo much above the comprehenfions of the Vulgar, that most Perfons have taken a distaste to them, given up the caufe of Liberty as defperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one will undertake either

thefe difficulties, but they

are far

from be

ing clear. On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion.

L

NOTES.

to

min'd by fome Motive or external Caufe, and then it will be difficult to make it free in any sense. Let us obferve how Mr. Locke endeavours to reconcile these two Notions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded in a general abfolute Inclination of the Mind to Happiness, which obliges us to fufpend the Gratification of our Defire in particular cafes, till we fee whether it be not inconfiftent with the general Good. "The ftronger Ties, fays he, Sect. 51. we have to an unal"terable pursuit of Happiness in general, which is our grea"teft Good, and which, as fuch, our Defires always follow, "the more are we free from any neceffary determination of our "Will to any particular Action, and from a neceffary compliance with our Defire fet upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examin'd whe"ther it has a tendency to, or be inconfiftent with our real "Happiness". And again, Sect. 52. "Whatever Neceffity "determines to the purfuit of real Blifs, the fame neceffity, "with the fame force, eftablishes Sufpenfe, Deliberation and

66

Scrutiny of each fucceffive defire, whether the fatisfaction of "it does not interfere with our true Happiness, and mislead us "from it. If by the Word Neceffity he means abfolute phyfical Neceffity (which it must be, if it be any thing to the present purpose) he has difcover'd a pretty odd foundation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us towards Happiness in general, be abfolute and irrefiftible, as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and confequently prove as bad a ground for Sufpenfion as for Liberty. But in truth this Sufpenfion is neither founded in any Neceffity of pursuing Happiness in general, nor is itself an original Power of the Mind diftinct from that of Volition, but only one particular exercise or Modification of it. "Tis willing (as the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry rightly "obferves)

to give a more clear and full Explication of the common Opinion, or bring Solutions of thofe Difficulties which occur in it, he will find me fo far from being his Adverfary, that he may expect my affent, encouragement and affiftance. This indeed were very much to be wifh'd, but in the mean time I fhall endeavour to fee whether these things cannot be explain'd more clearly in another man

ner.

NOTES.

"obferves) to defer willing about the matter proposed", and is no way different from the common cafes of willing and choofing except that it is the most evident demonftration of the Mind's perfect Liberty in willing, and fo obvious that Mr. Locke could not get over it, and therefore ftiles it the fource of all our Liberty, and that wherein confifts Free-will. Sect. 47. Tho' he foon explains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his System. That this Power of Sufpenfion is not fufficient to denominate a Man Free See Impartial Enquiry, P. 44.

SUBSECT.

The Ap petites and Powers attain

their proper End,

by exercife, which is

the grea

teft per

fection of

them, and their best Estate.

SUB SEC T. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election propofed.

I.

I Nood, we muk

N order to make my meaning better understood, we muft obferve, in the first place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and Appetites implainted in us by Nature, which are defigned for Action; and when these exert their proper Actions about Objects they produce a grateful and pleasant Senfation in us. The exercise of them therefore pleases us; and from hence probably all our Pleasure and Delight arifes; confequently our Happiness, if we have any, feems to confist in the proper execife of thofe Powers and Faculties which Nature has bestow'd upon us for they appear to be implanted in us for no other end, but that by the use and exercise of them thofe things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at reft, or enjoy themselves any otherwise than as thofe things are produced by, or in them, for the production or reception of which they are defign'd by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the profecution of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exercise, which must be esteem'd the greatest Perfection, and moft happy State of any Being. For that is a State of Happiness, if any fuch can be conceiv'd, wherein every thing is done which pleases, and every thing abfent which displeases; neither does it feem poffible to imagine a more happy one.

II. Secondly,

*See Scott's Chriftian Life, Vol. 1. pag. 8, 9.

greement

petites,

II. Secondly, It is to be obferv'd, that among There is a our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, fome are de- certain atermin'd to their Operations by Objects peculiar to xt by Nathem. For upon the prefence of their Objects they ture beneceffarily exert their Actions, if rightly difpos'd, tween and ceafe from Operation upon their abfence, and fome Aphave no tendency towards any other Objects but and their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but their ObLight, Colours, &c. and, upon the Removal of jects, thefe, its Action +. ceases. The Understanding whereby they act itfelf diftinguishes thofe Objects which are com- upon the municated to it by the Senfes, or perceiv'd by re- prefence. flection from one another, difpofes and repofits of them, them in the Memory; but yet has certain bounds from Ac. which it cannot exceed and fo of the reft. There tion upon is therefore a certain natural Fitnefs, a fixt con their Reformity between these Powers and their Objects, moval on which account they exert their Actions upon the presence of the Objects, and delight themselves in Exercise but are uneafy at the prefence of those things which hinder it. If then there be any natural force in any Object to promote or hinder the exercise of any Power or Faculty, that Object in regard to it is to be efteem'd Good or Evil.

and cease

Aç.

of differ

III. Those Objects which thus promote or im- Liberty pede the Action, are fufficiently diftinguifh'd from would be each other by the Power or Faculty itfelf; thofe vice to an that are absent or future, are judg'd of by the Un- Agent enderstanding, and what the Mind determines to be dow'd the best in them, that we are oblig'd to purfue. He with fuch

NOTES.

Appetites, that as

(t) It may be obferv'd here once for all, that our Author feldom ufes this Word Action in a firict Philofophical Senfe (according to which these should rather be call'd Paffions) but generally takes the vulgar expreffions, when they will ferve to explain his meaning,

these on

ly.