Sirach to the writings of Paul and John.)-But even some orthodox theologians were induced, by idealistic and poetical tendencies, to give the preference to the Old Testament. Thus Herder is manifestly more supernaturalistic in respect to the Old Testament, than to the New. De Wette, too, was inclined to concede to the Old Test. (so far as religion must assume an æsthetic form) on account of its sacred poetry, a higher rank than to the New (see his Religion und Theologie, 212). Umbreit also has this tendency in a special degree. On the other hand, some rationalists attached greater importance to the New Testament. Comp. Wegscheider, T. i. c. 1. § 32. Schleiermacher, in harmony with his entire theological system, ascribed normative authority to the New Testament alone, asserting that the Old Testament has only historical significance; Glaubenslehre, ii. § 132. The advocates of modern supernaturalism have again attached special importance to the Old Testament, and written elaborate expositions upon its christology and eschatology (e. g. Hengstenberg, Hävernick, Auberlen, Hofmann, Kurtz, Delitzsch, Baumgarten). On the other hand, a more critical and historical point of view has been taken by Bleek, Hitzig, Vatke, Knobel, Stähelin, and others; while Ewald represents a peculiar tendency.

SECOND DIVISION.

THEOLOGY PROPER. CREATION AND PROVIDENCE. THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING ANGELS

AND DEVILS.

§ 293.

DEISM. THEISM. PANTHEISM.

[George Weissenborn, Vorlesungen über Pantheismus und Theismus, Marburg., 1859. Edward Böhmer, De Pantheismi Nominis Origine et Usu et Notione, Halæ Saxonum, 1851.]

The contrast between Rationalism and the earlier Supernaturalism manifested itself less distinctly in the doctrine concerning God, and the relation in which he stands to the world. The adherents of both systems retained the theistic distinction between God and the world, though they often degenerated into a dead and mechanical deism. There was, however, this difference, that the supernaturalist admitted occasional acts of interference on the part of God in the workings of the machine, which otherwise ran on of itself in its regular course,' while this was denied by the more strict Rationalists. Of greater importance is the distinction between this theistico-deistic theory and the pantheistic system. The latter in some cases has shown itself partly as pure pantheism (atheistic in fact), sometimes as theism, which has the appearance of pantheism only as contrasted with the dead deism referred to.3

1

1 Thus in the case of answers granted to prayer, and of miracles. Compare the mechanical theory of miracles propounded by Reinhard, p. 230, ss.

* Pantheism has been very differently defined. According to Wegscheider, p. 250, Pantheism is: Ea sententia, qua naturam divinam mundo supponunt et Deum ac mundum unum idemque esse statuunt. Both rationalists and supernaturalists have on moral grounds combated this kind of pantheism, even the mere appearance of it; the adherents of the speculative philosophy, however, rejected this definition: see Hegel, Encyclopædie, 2d edit., p. 521. [Böhmer, De Pantheismi Nom. etc., ubi supra, says, that the word pantheism was first used in the title to one of Toland's books, 1705

(Socinianisme truly stated.... to which is prefixed Indifference in Disputes recommended by a Pantheist to an Orthodox Friend); also in his Pantheisticum, s. Formula celebranda Societatis Socraticæ, 1720. It is not alluded to by Bentley or Bayle.- Weissenborn, ubi supra, defines pantheism as the system which identifies God and the all of things, or the unity of things. There have been six forms: 1. Mechanical, or materialistic-God the mechanical unity of existence. 2. Ontological (abstract unity) pantheism—the one substance in all; Spinoza. 3. Dynamic pantheism. 4. Psychical pantheism-God is the soul of the World. 5. Ethical pantheism-God is the universal moral order; Fichte. 6. Logical pantheism: Hegel.]

3 Thus Herder said concerning Spinoza: he was an archtheist before all theists (Dogmatik, p. 129, comp. his discourses, especially that on God.) A controversy was carried on respecting the Pantheism of Schleiermacher (as seen particularly in his: Reden über die Religion); he was charged with holding pantheistic principles by Röhr, but defended by Karsten (Rostock, 1835). Henke pronounced a more favorable opinion respecting the theistico-pantheistic tendency:-Lineam. § xxvi: Summa autem injuria omnes illi Atheorum numero accensentur, qui summum Numen ab hoc universo secretum ac disparatum cogitare nesciunt, maluntque Deum rerum omnium causam immanentem quam transeuntem dici, nec tamen id, quod perpetuo est, commiscent cum illo, quod perpetuo fit. Quorum error, profecto magis fanaticus quam impius, Pantheismus et Spinozismus vocatur, si modo error est Numinis, omnibus rebus præsentissimi cogitatio, a qua neque ipse Paulus admodum abhorruisse videtur (Act. xvii. 27-29) et quæ amice satis conciliari potest cum Numinis moribus intelligentium naturarum providentis. notione. Comp. Hase, Dogmatik, p. 150.-Modern orthodox theologians. and philosophers are laboring so to represent the doctrine of a personal God, that we may apprehend him neither (in the manner of the deists) as existing without and separate from the world; nor (in the manner of the pantheists) as existing merely in and wholly connected with the world; but (in the manner of the theists) as a being that exists at the same time in and above the world, and yet distinctly separated from it. Atheism comes out, naked and unveiled in Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity, p. 20: "The divine essence is nothing but the human essence, or, better still, the nature of man purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, and viewed objectively, i. e. contemplated and reverenced as another nature, distinguished from man. All determinations (definitions) of the divine nature are therefore human determinations."*

* The materialism represented by Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner, and others, lies of course outside of the history of doctrines. [The chief work of Moleschott is his Kreislauf des Lebens, 1852. Rudolf Wagner, against materialism in his Menschenschöpfung und Sectensubstanz, 1824, and, Ueber Wissen und Glauben, 1854. Vogt replied in his Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft, 4te. Aufl., 1856. L. Büchner, Kraft und Stoff, 2te. Aufl., 1858: and, Natur und Geist, 1857. H. Czolbe, Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus, 1855. In reply to the materialists: Schaller, Leib und Scele, 3te. Ausg., 1858; F. Fabri, Briefe gegen des Materialismus, 1856: R. Wagner, Kampf um die Seele, 1857: Frauenstädt, Der Materialismus (against Büchner); Ulrici in Zeitschrift f. d. Philosophie, 1860.-On the recent English atheism, "Secularism," (Holyoake, Holdreth), see Christ. Exam., Nov., 1859: on Hennel, see Isaac Taylor, in North British, Nov., 1860.]

§ 294.

THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

2

Up to the time of Kant, theologians continued to prove the existence of God much in the same way as had been done in former periods, some laying greater stress upon one mode of argumentation, others endeavoring to demonstrate the superiority of another.' But after Kant showed that the usual arguments do not establish what they are intended to prove, and had substituted the moral argument,' these proofs gradually disappeared from the German scientific works on the subject. The physico-theological proof, however, was retained, because of its adaptation to the wants of the people and the young.* Schleiermacher returned to man's original consciousness of God, which is antecedent to all proofs, and most modern theologians followed his example; while the adherents of the speculative philosophy again pointed out the more profound significance of the former arguments. The same may be said in reference to the divine attributes,' which Schleiermacher regarded as subjective, i. e. as the reflex of the consciousness of God in man. On the other hand, the speculative philosophers ascribed to them reality, though in a different sense from that commonly attached to this expression."

5

8

1 Fénélon, Démonstration de l'Existence de Dieu, Par., 1712. The Ontological argument was propounded by Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, Berlin, 1785, and others; the cosmological by Baumgarten, Glaubenslehre, i. (Appendix to § 13, p. 923); the physico-theological by Derham, Physico-theology, or a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from his Works, Lond., 1714; Sander, Bonnet, and many others.

2 In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, iii. 3, p. 611, ss. (3d edit. Riga, 1790). In his opinion the existence of God can be proved on speculative grounds only in a threefold manner; either by the physico-theological, or the cosmological, or the ontological argument. These are the only modes of argumentation, nor is it possible that there should be more.-The ontological proof is not admissible, because its advocates confound a logical predicate with a real. "A hundred real dollars do not contain anything more than a hundred possible....But in reference to my property a hundred real dollars are more than the mere idea of that sum (i. e. of its possibility.")...."The idea of a supreme being is in many respects a very profitable idea; but because it is a mere idea, it cannot by itself enlarge our knowledge of that which exists;" for a "man might as well increase his knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant augment his property by adding some ciphers to the sum total on his books." (Comp. Gaunilo against Anselm; ante, vol. i., p. 434.) In opposition to the cosmological proof, he urged that "its advocates commit an Ignoratio elenchi, i. e. they promise to show us a new way, but

bring us back to the old (ontological) proof, because their argument is also founded on a dialectic fiction." In reference to the physico-theological proof, he said: "This argument is always deserving of our respect. It is the earliest, clearest, and most adapted to common sense. It enlivens the study of nature, from which also it derives its existence, and through which it obtains new vigor. It shows to us an object and designs where we should not have discovered these by independent observation, and enlarges our knowledge of nature by making us acquainted with a special unity whose principle is above nature. But this knowledge exerts a reacting influence upon its cause-viz. the idea from which it derives its origin; and thus it confirms the belief in a supreme creator, so that it becomes an irresistible conviction.-Nevertheless this argument cannot secure apodictical certainty: at the utmost it might prove the existence of a builder of the world, but not of a creator of the world."

3

* Comp. Raymund of Sabunde, vol. i., p. 437. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 832 ss.; Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 233 ss. Morality, and a degree of happiness befitting it, are the two elements constituting the supreme good. But the virtuous do not always attain it. There must, therefore, be a compensation in the world to come. (Thus the same argument is used to prove the immortality of the soul.) At the same time there must. be a being that possesses both the requisite intelligence and the will to bring about this compensation. Hence the existence of God is a postulate of prac tical reason.

4

Especially in England; see W. Paley, Natural Theology, or Evidences. of the existence and attributes of the Deity, 16th edit., 1817; translated into German, Manh., 1823; with additions by Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell, translated into German by Hauff, Stuttg., 1837. The Bridgewater Treatises, 1836 ss., comp. W. Müller, Kritik des physico-theologischen Beweises in Röhr's Magazin, vol. iv., part 1, 1831, p. 1–35.

6

Glaubenslehre, i., § 32 ss.

Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes; Appendix to the second volume of his Philosophy of Religion. Strauss, Dogmatik, i., p. 400: "The cosmological argument proves God to be the being existing in all beings; the physico-theological shows him to be the life existing in all that lives; the historical and moral arguments prove that he is the moral governor of the world; and lastly, the ontological shows that he is the Spirit existing in all spirits, the Thought in all thinking beings." Comp. Weisse, Phil. Dogmatik, i., § 296–366.

* Reinhard, Dogmatik, p. 90 ss., divided the attributes of God into quiescent and active attributes, etc. Bruch attempted a new revision of the theory of the attributes in his Lehre von den göttlichen Eigenschaften, Hamb., 1842. For further statements see Nitzsch, in the article God, in Herzog's Realencyclop., v. 261 sq. [On the immutability of God, see particularly Dorner, in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, 1859-60.]

8

• Glaubenslehre, i., § 50.

9

Hegel, Encyclopædie, i., § 36, p. 73 (see Strauss, Dogmatik, i., p. 542.) Comp. J. P. Lange, ii. 60 sq.; Ebrard, i. 219; Weisse, § 482-537.