Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of MindreadingPeople are "minded" creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we are "meta-minded" creatures: we ascribe mental states to ourselves and to others. How do we manage this without instruction in formal psychology? Alvin Goldman explores this question with the tools of philosophy, developmental and social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. His specific approach is the simulation theory, which elaborates the intuitive idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental "shoes." An early developer of this approach, Goldman shows how to render it philosophically respectable and how recent empirical results in psychology and neuroscience support the hypothesis that the mind literally creates (or attempts to create) surrogates of other people's mental states in the process of mindreading. Goldman unveils a refined, hybrid version of simulationism that posits two distinct levels of simulative processing: low-level and high-level. From the discovery of mirror neurons to the study of imagery and imagination, the author finds that the mind engages in intensive "replicative" activity. Reading an emotion in someone's face activates the same emotion in the observer. Looking at someone else being touched activates tactile empathy in the observer's brain. Includes information on autism, child-scientist theory, egocentric bias, emotion, empathy, enactment imagination, face-based emotion recognition, false belief tasks, first-person mindreading, folk psychological laws, imagination, mimicry, mirroring, modularity theory, projection, introspection, , etc. |
Contents
Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Mentalizing | 3 |
Conceptualizing Simulation Theory | 23 |
The Rationality Theory | 53 |
The ChildScientist Theory | 69 |
The Modularity Theory | 95 |
Simulation in LowLevel Mindreading | 113 |
HighLevel Simulational Mindreading | 147 |
Ontogeny Autism Empathy and Evolution | 192 |
SelfAttribution | 223 |
Concepts of Mental States | 258 |
The Fabric of Social Life Mimicry Fantasy Fiction and Morality | 276 |
References | 305 |
Author Index | 341 |
353 | |
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3-year-olds action activity amygdala approach attributor autism Baron-Cohen behavior belief brain Cambridge causal chapter child child-scientist Cognitive Neuroscience cognitive science cortex deficit desire disgust domain E-imagination emotion empathy empathy gaps evidence example experience facial expressions false-belief tasks fear first-person folk psychology functional Gallese Goldman Gopnik high-level hypothesis imagery imagination impaired impute infants inference inhibitory control input intentional intentional stance interpretation introspection involves knowledge Leslie low-level mechanism Meltzoff mental concepts mental simulation mental-state concepts mindreading mirror neurons modularity module motor motor imagery naıve neural Neuroscience Nichols and Stich object observed one’s Oxford people’s perception person perspective taking phenomenal philosophers philosophy of mind predict pretend problem properties propositional attitudes psychology question rationality reasoning recognition representations role similar simulation heuristic simulation theory simulationist social story subjects target theoretical theory of mind theory-theorist third-person mindreading token ToMM University Press visual