It

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fo often denied him, of seeing with his own SEC T. Eyes, and judging by his own Reason. may poffibly appear ftrange to fome, why he should so extremely labour a Point fo plain. But in Juftice to his Lordship these Gentlemen must remember, or be informed, that in former Times, fome well-defigning Men among ourfelves, from a groundless Dread of an unlimited Freedom of the Prefs, attempted to make a most unnatural and cruel Separation between Truth and Liberty. Having fhaken off the Corruptions of Popery, and established what they thought a pure and perfect Syftem, they unhappily stopped fhort in their full Carrier of Glory; prepofterously attempting to deprive others of that common Privilege which they had fo nobly exercifed themselves. This miftaken Spirit feemed entirely fubdued by the excellent LOCKE, and others, about the Time of the Revolution: But at the Period when our noble Author wrote, it not only revived, but was heightened by a terrible Acceffion of Bitterness and Rancour. Hence thofe frequent Sallies of Invective, which he throws out against this intolerant Principle, which he justly stigmatizeth as equally impolitic, irrational, and unchriftian.

SECT.

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'Tis the Glory of our Days, that this accurfed Spirit of Perfecution is at least dying away. What Pity that we cannot add, it is wholly extinguished! It is true, we most of us profefs ourselves Friends to a Freedom of Inquiry, in the Main. But why, in the Main? Why that needlefs Circumstance of Hefitation? Would we embrace Error? Or do we think that Truth can fuffer by the most rigid Scrutiny? On the contrary, not only the Perfection, but the very Being of Knowledge depends on the Exercife of Freedom. For whatever fome may fear from an open and unlimited Enquiry, it feems evidently the only Means vouchfafed us for the Attainment of Truth. The Abuse of it may be hurtful, but the Want of it is fatal. Such, indeed, are the clear and undoubted Principles of our Religion: Neither fure can these Declarations furprize us. For if human and political Eftablishments had been facred or unviolable, where had been our Proteftantifm; nay, where our Chriftianity? Dare we then to defert or difcountenance a Principle, on which not only the Purity, but the very Exiftence of our Religion depends? Nor is this Principle lefs confonant with the ftricteft Reason. It

is

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is Falfehood only that loves and retires into SEC T. Darkness. Truth delights in the Day; and demands no more than a juft Light, to appear in perfect Beauty. A rigid Examination is its only Teft: For Experience hath taught us, that even Obftinacy and Error can endure the Fires of Perfecution: But it is genuine Truth, and that alone, which comes out pure and unchanged from the feverer Tortures of Debate.

IT will ever be our trueft Praise therefore, to join the noble Apologist in his Encomiums on Freedom; the only permanent Bafis on which Religion or Virtue can be eftablished. Nor can we lefs approve his frequent Recommendations of Politeness, Chearfulness, and Good-humour, in the Profecution of our most important Enquiries. The morofe, contemptuous, and furly Species of Compofition is generally an Appendage to Bigotry, as appears in Inftances innumerable, both among the mistaken Friends and Enemies of Religion. On the contrary, the amiable Qualities of Chearfulnefs and Good-humour, caft a Kind of Sunfhine over a Compofition, and naturally engage us in Favour of the Writer. They refemble that gentle Smile that often lights

I.

SECT. up the human Countenance, the neverfailing Indication of a humane Temper. How naturally then must we be difpofed to liften; how open our Minds to receive Conviction, when we perceive our Opponent's Intention is benevolent: When we perceive that his Aim is not Victory, but Information: that he means not to infult, but to inftruct us.

So far, out of an unfeigned Regard to Truth, it should be my Boaft to take Party with the noble Writer: On the fame Principle it will now be neceffary to depart from him. For, not content with establishing the free Exercise of Reason, and the Way of Chearfulness, in treating the Subjects of Religion and Morals; he revolts from the Principle on which the rational Advocates for Religion were willing to have joined him, and appeals to a new Teft, the Test of Ridicule. This, in his two firft Treatifes, he attempts to establish as a furer Method of Conviction: And that Ridicule, which had hitherto been employed in difgracing known Falfehood, he informs us, may be fuccessfully applied to the Investigation of unknown Truth.

HE

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He hath gained a numerous Train of SECT. Followers in this new Opinion: It may be therefore neceffary to examine its Foundations.

SECTION II.

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'TIS great Pity the noble Author hath SE C T. not condescended to a little more Precision in treating the Question now before us. He indulges the Gaiety of Spirit, the Freedom of Wit and Humour fo far, that a Reader, who feeks Information rather than Amusement, is often at a Lofs to know where his Argument, or even his Opinion, lies. This, no doubt, was in Part owing to a generous Abhorrence of Pedantry, which he takes all Occafions of expofing to Contempt. Yet a better Reafon may poffibly be alledged: For in recommending and enforcing the Ufe of Ridicule, what could be more natural and proper than the Power of Ridicule itself? To draw a ftriking Picture of demure Folly and folemn Imposture, was a Masterpiece of Prudence: But to have argued feriously, would have destroyed his Argument: It would have been a tacit Confeffion, that there is a deeper Foundation, on which Ridicule

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