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41. It is observed above, p. 381, that there can be no such thing as a general idea; that all our perceptions are of particular objects, and that our secondary perceptions or ideas must be equally so. Precisely, for the same reason, there can be no such thing as an abstract idea. We cannot form an idea of a part without taking in the whole; nor of motion, colour, figure, independent of a body. No man will say that he can form any idea of beauty, till he think of a person endued with that quality; nor that he can form an idea of weight, till he takes under consideration a body that is weighty. And when he takes under consideration a body endued with one or other of the properties mentioned, the idea he forms is not an abstract or general idea, but the idea of a particular body with its properties. But though a part and the whole, a subject and its attributes, an effect and its cause, are so intimately connected, as that an idea cannot be formed of the one independent of the other; yet we can reason upon the one abstracting from the other.

This is done by words signifying the thing to which the reasoning is confined; and such words are denominated abstract terms. The meaning and use of an abstract term is well understood, though of itself, unless other particulars be taken in, it raises no image nor idea in the mind. In language it serves excellent purpose; by it different figures, different colours, can be compared, without the trouble of conceiving them as belonging to any particular subject; and they contribute with words significant to raise images or ideas in the mind.

42. The power of abstraction is bestowed on man, for the purpose solely of reasoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as clearness of any process of reasoning, that laying aside every other VOL. II. 50α

' circumstance, we can confine our attention to the single property we desire to investigate.

43. Abstract terms may be separated into three different kinds, all equally subservient to the reasoning faculty. Individuals appear to have no end; and did we not possess the faculty of distributing them into classes, the mind would be lost in an endless maze, and no progress be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty of abstraction that we distribute beings into genera and species: finding a number of individuals connected by certain qualities common to all, we give a name to these individuals considered as thus connected, which name, by gathering them together into one class, serves to express the whole of these individuals as distinct from others. Thus the word animal serves to denote every being that can move voluntarily; and the words man, horse, lion, &c. answer similar purposes. This is the first and most common sort of abstraction; and it is of the most extensive use, by enabling us to comprehend in our reasoning whole kinds and sorts, instead of individuals without end. The next sort of abstract terms comprehends a number of individual objects, considered as connected by some occasional relation. A great number of persons collected in one place, without any other relation but merely that of contiguity, are denominated a crowd: in forming this term, we abstract from sex, from age, from condition, from dress, &c. A number of persons connected by the same laws and by the same government, are termed a nation and a number of men under the same military command, are termed an army. A third sort of abstraction is, where a single property or part, which may be common to many individuals, is selected to be the subject of our contemplation; for example, whiteness, heat, beauty, length roundness, head, arm.

44. Abstract terms are a happy invention: it is by their means chiefly, that the particulars which make the subject of our reasoning, are brought into close union, and separated from all others however naturally connected. Without the aid of such terms, the mind could never be kept steady to its proper subject, but be perpetually in hazard of assuming foreign circumstances, or neglecting what are essential. We can without the aid of language, compare real objects by intuition, when these objects are present; and when absent, we can compare them in idea. But when we advance farther, and attempt to make inferences and draw conclusions, we always employ abstract terms, even in thinking it would be as difficult to reason without them, as to perform operations in algebra without signs; for there is scarce any reasoning without some degree of abstraction, and we cannot easily abstract without using abstract terms. Hence it follows, that without language man would scarce be a rational being.

45. The same thing, in different respects, has different names. With respect to certain qualities, it is termed a substance; with respect to other qualities, a body; and with respect to qualities of all sorts, a subject. It is termed a passive subject with respect to an action exerted upon it: an object with respect to a percipient: a cause with respect to the effect it produces and an effect with respect to its

cause.

THE END.

INDEX.

[The volumes are denoted by numeral letters, the pages by
figures.]

ABSTRACTION, power of, ii. 394. Its use, ii. 394.

Abstract terms, ought to be avoided in poetry, i. 203. ii. 258. Cannot be
compared but by being personified, ii. 138. Personified, ii. 173. Defined,
ii. 393. The use of abstract terms, ii. 394.

Accents, defined, ii. 78. The musical accents that are necessary in an hex.
ameter line, ii. 87. A low word must not be accented, ii. 108. Rules for
accenting English heroic verse, ii. 107. How far affected by the pause, ii.
111. Accent and pause have a mutual influence, ii. 112.
Action, what feelings are raised by human actions, i. 45, 46. 190. 290. We
are impelled to action by desire, i. 50. Some actions are instinctive, some
intended as means to a certain end, i. 52. Actions great and elevated,
low and grovelling, i. 191. Slowness and quickness in acting, to what
causes owing, i. 253. 262. Emotions occasioned by propriety of action, i.
281. Occasioned by impropriety of action, i. 282. Human actions con-
sidered with respect to dignity and meanness, i. 294. Actions the inter-
preters of the heart, i. 353. Action is the fundamental part of epic and
dramatic compositions, ii. 282. Unity of action, ii. 298. We are con-
scious of internal action as in the head, ii. 375. Internal action may pro-
ceed without our being conscious of it, ii. 376.

Action and reaction betwixt a passion and its object, i. 111.

Actor, bombast actor, i. 209. The chief talents of an actor, i. 349. An ac-
tor should feel the passion he represents, i. 368. Difference as to pronun-
ciation betwixt the French and English actors, i. 371. note.
Admiration, i. 110. 218.

Eneid. See Virgil-

Affectation, i. 280.

Affection to children accounted for, i. 72. To blood relations, i. 72. Affec-
tion for what belongs to us, i. 72. Social affections more refined than
selfish, i. 104. Affection, in what manner inflamed into a passion, i. 110.
Opposed to propensity, i. 113. Affection to children endures longer than
any other affection, i. 113. Opinion and belief influenced by affection, i.
145. Affection defined, i. 329. ii. 388.

Agamemnon, of Seneca censured, i. 391.

Agreeable emotions and passions, i. 98, &c. Things neither agreeable nor
disagreeable. See Object.

Alcestes, of Euripides censured, i. 409. ii. 312.

Alexandre, of Racine censured, i. 381.

Alexandrine line, ii. 89.

Allegory, defined, ii. 202. More difficult in painting than in poetry, ii. 213
In an historical poem, ii. 288.

All for love, of Dryden censured, i. 397.

Alto Relievo, ii. 349.

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