Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 48
Page 5
... achieve rational results. In the introduction to a recently published book, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation ... achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group 5 Reflections on the commons ...
... achieve rational results. In the introduction to a recently published book, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation ... achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group 5 Reflections on the commons ...
Page 6
... achieve that objective. (Olson 1965, p.1) Olson challenged the presumption that the possibility of a benefit for a group would be sufficient to generate collective action to achieve that benefit. In the most frequently quoted passage of ...
... achieve that objective. (Olson 1965, p.1) Olson challenged the presumption that the possibility of a benefit for a group would be sufficient to generate collective action to achieve that benefit. In the most frequently quoted passage of ...
Page 7
... achieve an effective form of governing and managing their own commons. These puzzles are examined in Chapter 2. Much ... achieved little more than a metaphorical use of the models. When models are used as metaphors, an author usually ...
... achieve an effective form of governing and managing their own commons. These puzzles are examined in Chapter 2. Much ... achieved little more than a metaphorical use of the models. When models are used as metaphors, an author usually ...
Page 9
... achieve control over ecological problems. In a less draconian view, Ehrenfeld (1972, p. 322) suggested that if “private interests cannot be expected to protect the public domain then external regulation by public agencies, governments ...
... achieve control over ecological problems. In a less draconian view, Ehrenfeld (1972, p. 322) suggested that if “private interests cannot be expected to protect the public domain then external regulation by public agencies, governments ...
Page 10
... achieved by following the advice to centralize control, however, is based on assumptions concerning the accuracy of information, monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration. Without valid and ...
... achieved by following the advice to centralize control, however, is based on assumptions concerning the accuracy of information, monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration. Without valid and ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
References | 245 |
Index | 271 |
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 1990 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commitment commons complex continue costs court decisions dependent described developed discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules set of rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion types variables village West Basin yield zanjera