Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
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Page ii
... located in one nation, whose lives depend on a common pool of renewable resources... Governing the Commons has been the intellectual field guide.” – Whole Earth GOVERNING THE COMMONS The evolution of institutions for collective action.
... located in one nation, whose lives depend on a common pool of renewable resources... Governing the Commons has been the intellectual field guide.” – Whole Earth GOVERNING THE COMMONS The evolution of institutions for collective action.
Page viii
... field settings 55 CHAPTER 3 ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF – GOVERNED CPRS 58 Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests 61 Törbel, Switzerland 61 Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan 65 Huerta ...
... field settings 55 CHAPTER 3 ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF – GOVERNED CPRS 58 Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests 61 Törbel, Switzerland 61 Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan 65 Huerta ...
Page xii
... field researchers. The authors were all asked to organize their papers using a framework prepared by Ronald Oakerson (1986). That meant that all of the papers would address not only the physical properties of the resource systems but ...
... field researchers. The authors were all asked to organize their papers using a framework prepared by Ronald Oakerson (1986). That meant that all of the papers would address not only the physical properties of the resource systems but ...
Page xiv
... field researchers who had conducted multiple studies or were themselves reviewing findings from multiple studies. We ... fields, and develop the coding forms. During this process, several papers were written in an attempt to elucidate a ...
... field researchers who had conducted multiple studies or were themselves reviewing findings from multiple studies. We ... fields, and develop the coding forms. During this process, several papers were written in an attempt to elucidate a ...
Page 12
... Field 1984, 1985b). It is presumed that each herder will now choose X/2 animals to graze as a result of his own profit incentive." Privatization as the “only” way Figure 1.5. Game 5: Self-financed contract-enforcement game. 12 Governing ...
... Field 1984, 1985b). It is presumed that each herder will now choose X/2 animals to graze as a result of his own profit incentive." Privatization as the “only” way Figure 1.5. Game 5: Self-financed contract-enforcement game. 12 Governing ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
References | 245 |
Index | 271 |
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 1990 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commitment commons complex continue costs court decisions dependent described developed discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules set of rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion types variables village West Basin yield zanjera