Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
From inside the book
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Page i
... fisheries. Governing the Commons makes a major contribution to the analytical literature on institutions and to our understanding of human cooperation. Elinor Ostrom is co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ...
... fisheries. Governing the Commons makes a major contribution to the analytical literature on institutions and to our understanding of human cooperation. Elinor Ostrom is co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ...
Page ix
... fisheries with continuing CPR problems California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems A Sri Lankan fishery Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries Lessons to be learned ...
... fisheries with continuing CPR problems California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems A Sri Lankan fishery Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries Lessons to be learned ...
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... fishing grounds would not be in such bad shape if the federal government had refrained from its sporadic attempts to regulate the fishery in the past. The issue in this case – and many others – is how best to limit the use of natural ...
... fishing grounds would not be in such bad shape if the federal government had refrained from its sporadic attempts to regulate the fishery in the past. The issue in this case – and many others – is how best to limit the use of natural ...
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... fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no assurance that they will be there for him ... fisheries, the tragedy of the commons would be of little general interest. That is not the case. Hardin himself used the ...
... fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no assurance that they will be there for him ... fisheries, the tragedy of the commons would be of little general interest. That is not the case. Hardin himself used the ...
Page 8
... fisheries and oceans, for example, captured the color of the models in a 1980 speech: If you let loose that kind of economic self-interest in fisheries, with everybody fishing as he wants, taking from a resource that belongs to no ...
... fisheries and oceans, for example, captured the color of the models in a 1980 speech: If you let loose that kind of economic self-interest in fisheries, with everybody fishing as he wants, taking from a resource that belongs to no ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
References | 245 |
Index | 271 |
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 1990 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commitment commons complex continue costs court decisions dependent described developed discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules set of rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion types variables village West Basin yield zanjera