Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
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Results 1-5 of 68
Page viii
... monitoring 42 The problem of supply 42 The problem of credible commitment 43 The problem of mutual monitoring 45 Framing inquiry 45 Appropriation and provision problems 46 Multiple levels of analysis 50 Studying institutions in field ...
... monitoring 42 The problem of supply 42 The problem of credible commitment 43 The problem of mutual monitoring 45 Framing inquiry 45 Appropriation and provision problems 46 Multiple levels of analysis 50 Studying institutions in field ...
Page ix
... monitoring A framework for analyzing institutional choice Evaluating benefits Evaluating costs Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities The process of institutional change Predicting institutional change A challenge to ...
... monitoring A framework for analyzing institutional choice Evaluating benefits Evaluating costs Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities The process of institutional change Predicting institutional change A challenge to ...
Page 10
... monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration. Without valid and reliable information, a central agency could make several errors, including setting the carrying capacity or the fine too high or too ...
... monitoring capabilities, sanctioning reliability, and zero costs of administration. Without valid and reliable information, a central agency could make several errors, including setting the carrying capacity or the fine too high or too ...
Page 12
... monitoring and sanctioning activities to enforce their division of the grazing area (B. Field 1984, 1985b). It is presumed that each herder will now choose X/2 animals to graze as a result of his own profit incentive." Privatization as ...
... monitoring and sanctioning activities to enforce their division of the grazing area (B. Field 1984, 1985b). It is presumed that each herder will now choose X/2 animals to graze as a result of his own profit incentive." Privatization as ...
Page 18
... monitoring system may break down. The external enforcer may not be able to enforce ex post, after promising to do so ex ante. A myriad of problems can occur in natural settings, as is also the case with the idealized central-regulation ...
... monitoring system may break down. The external enforcer may not be able to enforce ex post, after promising to do so ex ante. A myriad of problems can occur in natural settings, as is also the case with the idealized central-regulation ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
References | 245 |
Index | 271 |
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 1990 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commitment commons complex continue costs court decisions dependent described developed discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules set of rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion types variables village West Basin yield zanjera