Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
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Page xi
... similar problems. As Weschler and I completed our studies, it appeared that both institutional arrangements had been successful in enabling the water producers to avoid the catastrophic economic loss that would have occurred if both ...
... similar problems. As Weschler and I completed our studies, it appeared that both institutional arrangements had been successful in enabling the water producers to avoid the catastrophic economic loss that would have occurred if both ...
Page xii
... similar information from many other settings to begin to gain the empirical base necessary to improve our theoretical understanding of how institutions work and how individuals change their own institutions. My awareness of the ...
... similar information from many other settings to begin to gain the empirical base necessary to improve our theoretical understanding of how institutions work and how individuals change their own institutions. My awareness of the ...
Page 1
... Similar situations occur on diverse scales ranging from small neighborhoods to the entire planet. The issues of how best to govern natural resources used by many individuals in common are no more settled in academia than in the world of ...
... Similar situations occur on diverse scales ranging from small neighborhoods to the entire planet. The issues of how best to govern natural resources used by many individuals in common are no more settled in academia than in the world of ...
Page 3
... similar logic in another classic: “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Research: The Fishery.” Gordon described the same dynamic as Hardin: There appears then, to be some truth in the conservative dictum that everybody's property ...
... similar logic in another classic: “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Research: The Fishery.” Gordon described the same dynamic as Hardin: There appears then, to be some truth in the conservative dictum that everybody's property ...
Page 16
... similar to Game 5 is not presented as the “only way” to solve a commons dilemma. It is merely one way. But this way has been almost totally ignored in both the policy-analysis literature and the formal-theory literature. Contemplating ...
... similar to Game 5 is not presented as the “only way” to solve a commons dilemma. It is merely one way. But this way has been almost totally ignored in both the policy-analysis literature and the formal-theory literature. Contemplating ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
References | 245 |
Index | 271 |
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 1990 |
Common terms and phrases
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