Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionThe governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 39
Page xiv
... variables with ordinal or nominal values. Some years of hard work were required simply to read sufficient numbers of cases, study earlier efforts to synthesize findings from specialized fields, and develop the coding forms. During this ...
... variables with ordinal or nominal values. Some years of hard work were required simply to read sufficient numbers of cases, study earlier efforts to synthesize findings from specialized fields, and develop the coding forms. During this ...
Page xv
... , Edella Schlager, S.Y. Tang, and James Walker – and have spent hours refining concepts, developing models, designing instruments and experiments, and discussing how we can better search out variables from what we are reading XV Preface.
... , Edella Schlager, S.Y. Tang, and James Walker – and have spent hours refining concepts, developing models, designing instruments and experiments, and discussing how we can better search out variables from what we are reading XV Preface.
Page xvi
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom. can better search out variables from what we are reading and gathering. The help of Elizabeth Case, associate editor for this series, Sophia Prybylski at Cambridge ...
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom. can better search out variables from what we are reading and gathering. The help of Elizabeth Case, associate editor for this series, Sophia Prybylski at Cambridge ...
Page 7
... variables and explicit base conditions. As an evolving, rather than completed, theory, it provokes disagreement regarding the importance or insignificance of some variables and how best to specify key relationships." The results from ...
... variables and explicit base conditions. As an evolving, rather than completed, theory, it provokes disagreement regarding the importance or insignificance of some variables and how best to specify key relationships." The results from ...
Page 8
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom. variables in a model. If calling attention to similarities is all that is intended by the metaphor, it serves the usual purpose of rapidly conveying information in ...
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom. variables in a model. If calling attention to similarities is all that is intended by the metaphor, it serves the usual purpose of rapidly conveying information in ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
CHAPTER 2 | 29 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
CHAPTER 4 | 103 |
The litigation game | 111 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
References | 245 |
Index | 271 |
Other editions - View all
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 1990 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieve action activities affect agency agreement analysis appropriators arrangements assigned associations authorities behavior benefits California canal Central Basin Chapter choice collective commitment commons complex continue costs court decisions dependent described developed discussed district economic efforts enforcement example exist expected external face farmers field fishers fishing Further future given groundwater important included increase individuals initial institutions internal involved irrigation land limited located major models monitoring needed nets obtain occur officials operational organize Orihuela outcomes participants particular political position possible present principles problems producers pumping regulation resource resource units result rules set of rules share similar situation solve strategies structure substantial supply theory tion types variables village West Basin yield zanjera