such lands, notwithstanding the previous and subsequent occupation
by the licensees, and payment of rent by them, which, under the cir-
cumstances, did not constitute a tenancy from year to year, or give
the licensee any title to the lands in question. The Queen v. Dallimore

2. R. F. & R., partners in business, and dealing with F. S. & Co.,
took T. & S., clerks in their employment, into partnership with them.
The partnership was constituted by deed, to continue for three years,
and a balance-sheet shewing the liabilities and assets of the existing
firm was drawn up and admitted by all the partners. The new firm
continued to trade, up to the period of its insolvency, upon the same
footing and with the same books as the old firm-no distinction being
made in their payments, or balances, or between the debts or assets of
the new, or what was the old firm. F. S. & Co. continued to deal
with the new as they had done with the old firm. R. F. & R. having
become insolvent, F. S. & Co., creditors to a large amount, proved
against the estate of the new firm. R. & B., also creditors of the new
firm, proved against their estate, and sought to expunge the proof of
F. S. & Co., on the ground that their debt having accrued previous to
the new partners being taken in, was due from the old, and not from
the new firm :-

Held, by the Judicial Committee (affirming the judgment of the
Supreme Court), that there was sufficient proof in the dealings and
transactions of the several parties to shew that the new firm on its
formation adopted the liabilities of the old firm, and that F. S. & Co.
had consented to accept the liability of the new firm, and to discharge
the old firm, their original debtors.

The Act, 5 of Vict. No. 17 (the principal Insolvent Act of the
Colony of Victoria), sect. 39, enacts," that any creditor who shall
have or hold any security or lien upon any part of the insolvent
estate, shall, when he is the petitioning creditor, be obliged upon oath,
in the affidavit accompanying the Petition; and when he is not the
petitioning creditor, in the affidavit produced by him at the time of
proving his debt, to put a value upon such security, so far as his debt
may be thereby covered, and to deduct such value from the debt
proved by him, and to give his vote in all matters respecting the
insolvent estate as creditor only for the balance, &c. And in case any
creditor shall hold any security or lien for payment of his debt, &c.,
upon any part of the said estate, the amount or value of such security
or lien shall be deducted from his debt, and he shall only be ranked
for, or receive payment of, or a dividend for, the balance after such
deduction:"-

Held, that this enactment does not destroy the distinction between
the joint and separate estate of an insolvent, so as to compel a cre-
ditor so holding a mortgage security on the separate estate, to estimate
and deduct its value before he can be allowed to prove against the
joint estate.

The English law of Bankruptcy, which allows a joint creditor,
though holding a security on the separate estate, to prove against the
joint estate without giving up his security, prevails in the colony of
Victoria, and is not altered or varied by the Insolvent Acts of the
Colony. Rolfe and The Bank of Australasia v. Flower

3 According to the law of New Brunswick, freehold lands of
debtor, if the personal estate is exhausted, may be sold under a fi. fa.
Wickham v. The New Brunswick and Canada Railway Company

4. By Art. 1314 of the Code Civil, the law prevailing in
Mauritius, it is provided that "Les maîtres et les Commettants sont
responsables] du dommage causé par leurs domestiques et préposés dans
les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employés :”—

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Held, that in order to make the "Commettant" responsible for
damage occasioned by the negligence of the "Préposé," it is necessary
to establish that the "Préposé" was acting "sous les ordres, sous la
direction et la surveillance du Commettant."

"Préposé," in Art. 1384, means a person who stands in the same
relation to the "Commettant" as "Domestique" does to “ Maître "—
namely, a person whom the "Commettant" has instructed to perform
certain things on his behalf.

A. hired certain Indians, who were the heads of gangs of labourers,
to clear a piece of land of weeds and brush wood, at a job price, to be
paid to their gangs. Through the negligence of the persons employed,
the sparks of fire kindled on A.'s land set fire to and burnt down a
house in the immediate neighbourhood belonging to B. It was
proved in evidence that A. interfered with the work, and directed the
Indians where to work :-

Held, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court at Mauritius,
that A. was the "Commettant" and the labourers "Préposés," within
the meaning of the Art. 1384 of the Code Civil, and that as the fire
was occasioned by the men employed by 4. he was responsible for
their negligence, and liable to B. for the damage sustained by the fire.
Sérandat v. Suïsse

5. The Code Civil of France, which is in force in the Island of
Mauritius, Liv. III. Ch. IV. tit. i. "Des successions irrégulières,"
Art. 765, provides as follows:-"La succession de l'enfant naturel
décédé sans postérité est dévolue au père ou à la mère qui l'a reconnu ;
ou par moitié à tous les deux, s'il a été reconnu par l'un et par l'autre :"
and Art. 76 provides, "En cas de prédécès des père et mère de l'enfant
naturel, les biens qu'il en avait reçus passent aux frères ou sœurs
légitimes, s'ils se retrouvent en nature dans la succession: les actions
en reprise, s'il en existe, ou le prix de ces biens aliénés, s'il est encore
dú, retournent également aux frères et sœurs légitimes. Tous les autres
biens passent aux frères et sœurs naturels, ou à leurs descendants:"—

Held, that the word "descendants" in Art. 766, is not limited to
legitimate descendants, so as to preclude the natural children of a
natural brother succeeding to their natural uncle's property :-

Held, further, that there is no restriction with respect to the word
66 descendants" in Art. 766: that natural children are "descendants"
within the meaning of Arts. 765 and 766, which constitute a special
law for determining the succession of natural children dying without
posterity; and that "postérité" and "descendants" in those Articles
are convertible terms.

B., an illegitimate child duly acknowledged, survived his parents;
and died domiciled in the Island of Mauritius, of which he was a
native, intestate, leaving self-acquired property. He had no legitimate
relations, but had two nieces, illegitimate daughters of an only ille-
gitimate brother, who predeceased him, by whom they were duly
acknowledged, as also by B. One of the nieces died shortly after B.,
having previously constituted her sister Légataire universelle. The
Government claimed the succession of B. :-

Held, that the surviving niece was entitled to succeed to B.'s pro-
perty in preference to the claim of the Government on the ground of
bastardy. Her Majesty's Procureur and Advocate-General v.
Bruneau

6. It is no answer to the rule, that persons standing in the situation
of Trustees or Agents must account to their Cestui que trusts, or
Principals, or for all benefit which they themselves obtain by virtue
of that character, that in the course of acquiring the benefit which has
been derived by the Trustee or Agent, he incurred a possibility of

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loss; it is sufficient, if the transaction has resulted in gain obtained by
virtue of the Trusteeship or agency, to give the benefit to the Cestui
que trust.

The Law of Jersey, which in case of Bankruptcy entitles the
Creditors in succession, ranking from the latest Creditor, to take the
whole of the Bankrupt's estate, with its liabilities, and become in fact
the Assignee; when acted on, whether it be a profitable proceeding, or
a damnosa hereditas, does not alter the right of the Cestui que trust,
or, because of its risk, give a Trustee or Agent acting under it a legal
title to property so acquired. Williams v. Stevens

7. By the old French Law prevailing in Lower Canada, an At-
torney acting as such in his own cause, and on his own behalf, is
entitled under a judgment in his favour " avec dépens," upon taxation
of costs, to the same fees as are allowed by the tariff to Attorneys in
all ordinary cases. So held by the Judicial Committee on appeal,
overruling the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (on the appeal
side) in Lower Canada, and the authorities relied on by that Court for
a contrary rule. Gugy v. Brown

8. Article 8 of the Acte of the States of Jersey, of the 24th of June,
1851, confirmed by the Order of Her Majesty in Council of the 7th of
August, 1851, containing the law relating to Wills, provides as fol-
lows:-"Pour que les legs d'immeubles contenus dans un Testament
soient valables, il faut que le Testateur, en présence des deux témoins,
ait apposé sa signature à la fin, ou ait reconnu sa signature ainsi
apposée, et que les deux témoins présens en même tems aient alors
apposé leurs signatures au Testament, en présence du Testateur. Si le
Testament n'est pas olographe, la lecture en sera faite en présence du
Testateur et des deux témoins. Pour qu'un Testament olographe soit
valable, l'attestation des témoins devra étre datée."

Article 10 declares: "Les legs d'immeubles, faits dans les quarante
jours qui ont précédé la mort du Testateur, seront nuls, à moins que la
mort n'arrive par cas fortuit."

To a holograph Will, disposing of both real and personal estate,
dated and signed by the Testator in the presence of two witnesses, an
attestation clause was appended, in the following terms: "Le présent
Testament olographe a été signé par le Testateur en notre présence, et
nous y avons apposé notre signature, comme témoins, en présence du
dit Testateur, et en présence l'un de l'autre, le dit jour :”–

Held, affirming the judgments of the Inferior, as well as the Superior
Number of the Royal Court of Jersey, that the words "le dit jour," in
the attestation clause, referred sufficiently to the date contained in the
Will to comply with the requisition of the 8th Article; and that the
Will being holograph was, notwithstanding the provisions of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Acte 1851, a valid and efficient instrument. Mauger v.
Le Gallais

..

9. Action en bornage to ascertain the boundary line between the
contiguous properties of the Plaintiff and Defendant, which property
was formerly one Lot, and described as containing between 140 or
150 acres.
This was afterwards sold in two Lots. The Plaintiff's,
the eastern portion, was described in the deeds as containing " 90 acres,
more or less." The Defendant's, the western portion, "about fifty
acres;" but the descriptions in the deeds did not agree as to the way
the line of boundary was to run. The effect of a surveyor's report,
which the Court in Canada homologated, was to make a boundary
line, by which the Defendant got sixty-one acres, and reduced the
Plaintiff's to eighty-two acres. Upon appeal, held (reversing the
decrees of the Superior Court and the Court of Queen's Bench), that

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those Courts were wrong in their construction of the deeds and
evidence as to the boundaries, the rule being that, if in a deed con-
veying land the description of the land intended to be conveyed is
couched in such ambiguous terms that it is very doubtful what was
intended to be the boundaries of the land, and the language of the
description equally admits of two different constructions, the one
making the quantity conveyed agree with the quantity mentioned in
the deed, and the other making the quantity altogether different, the
former construction must prevail.

Held, further, that the case differed from a conveyance of a certain
ascertained piece of land accurately described by its boundaries on all
sides, with a statement that it contained so many acres, "or there-
abouts," when, if the quantity was inaccurately stated, it did not
affect the transaction.

By the law of Lower Canada the term of prescription is thirty

years.

To sustain a plea of prescription, the evidence must shew peaceable
uninterrupted possession and ownership for upwards of thirty years.
Herrick v. Sixby

10. Action by Seigneur to recover possession of a piece of ungranted
land forming part of his Seigneurie, against a party claiming under an
informal deed from one who had no title deed, but who, with the
Defendant, had been in undisturbed possession for thirty years :-

Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for
Lower Canada), that a plea of prescription of thirty years' possession
was a bar to the action, as :-first, that it made no difference that
during the time of such adverse possession the Seigneur had, under the
Statute, 6 Geo. 4, c. 59, for the extinction of Feudal and Seignioral
rights in the province of Lower Canada, surrendered the Seigneurie
to the Crown for the purpose of commuting the tenure into free and
common socage, the issuing of the Letters Patent regranting the same
being uno flatu with the surrender to the Crown, and that, both by
the ancient French law in force in Lower Canada as by the English
law, prescription ran in favour of a party in actual possession for thirty
years; and, secondly, that such adverse possession enured in favour
of a party deriving title to the land through his predecessor in pos-
session:-

Held, further, that such junction of possession did not require a
title, in itself translatif de propriété, from one possessor to the other;
but that any kind of informal writing, sous seing privé, supported by
verbal evidence, was sufficient to establish the transfer. Macdonald
v. Lambe ..

11. Art. 6 of the Ordonnance of Louis XIII. (26th November, 1639),
in force in Lower Canada, is in these terms:-" Voulons que la
méme peine (de la privation des successions) ait lieu contre les enfans
qui sont nés de femmes que les pères ont entretenues, et qu'ils épousent
lorsqu'ils sont à l'extrémité de la vie :”—Held, first, that as the above
article of the Ordonnance was a restrict of natural liberty and penal
in its nature, it was to be strictly interpreted, and only when the fact
of a party being in extremis at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage was clear and beyond doubt could it be applied. Second,
that although death had taken place two days after a marriage had
been celebrated, such article of the Ordonnance did not affect the
validity of the marriage, unless the party was at the time sensible
that he was in his last illness, and in immediate danger of dying.

Suit for nullity of marriage, and to set aside a marriage contract, on
the ground that at the time of its celebration the husband was delirious
and of unsound mind, arising from an attack of delirium tremens,

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from which disorder he died two days afterwards. The evidence in
chief of one of his medical attendants being to the effect that he was
unconscious, and, in his opinion, from the nature of the disease,
incapable at any time of contracting such marriage:-

Held, on a general review of the evidence, to be rebutted, especially
by the conduct of the same medical witness in speaking of the pro-
bability of deceased's recovery; and by the evidence of the Priest,
Notary, and witnesses at the marriage, of his capacity; and the
judgments of the Courts in Lower Canada sustained. Scott v.
Paquet
COLONIAL LEGISLATIVE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY-The Legis-
lative Assembly of Dominica does not possess the power of punishing
a contempt, though committed in its presence and by one of its
Members; such authority does not belong to a Colonial House of
Assembly by analogy to the lex et consuetudo Parliamenti, which is
inherent in the two Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom, or
to a Court of Justice, which is a Court of Record; a Colonial House of
Assembly having no judicial functions.

Where, therefore, a Member of the Lower House of Assembly of
Dominica, who had been taken into custody by the Serjeant-at-Arms,
and committed to the common gaol, by virtue of the Speaker's war-
rants, for a contempt committed in the face of the Assembly, brought
an action for trespass and false imprisonment, and obtained damages:
it was held by the Judicial Committee (affirming the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of the Island) on demurrer to pleas of justifi-
cation, that the House of Assembly had no such power to commit and
punish as had been assumed, and that the Speaker and Members were
liable.

The cases of Kielley v. Carson (4 Moore's P. C. Cases, 63), and
Fenton v. Hampton (11 Moore's P. C. Cases, 347) decide conclusively,
that Legislative Assemblies in the British Colonies have, in the
absence of express grant, no power to adjudicate upon, or punish for,
'contempts when committed beyond their walls. Doyle v. Falconer.
COMMETTANT AND PRÉPOSÉ-DEFINITION OF TERM: See
COLONIAL LAW, 4.

COMPULSORY PILOTAGE: See PILOT.

CONDITIONS OF SALE, VARIATION OF: See ACTION, 1.
CONSECRATION OF CHURCH: See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, 1.
CONSIGNEE AND MORTGAGEE: See LIEN.
CONSOLIDATION OF APPEALS: See APPEAL, 3.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ROYAL COURT OF JERSEY-By the
constitution and law of the Island of Jersey, the Royal Court is com-
posed of a Bailiff and twelve Jurats, and upon the voluntary resigna-
tion of a Jurat it is the prerogative of the Crown to admit such
resignation, and to authorize a new election to fill up the vacancy so
occasioned.

Secus, on a vacancy occurring by the death of a Jurat, when the
Royal Court have power alone to order a new election.

The States of Jersey passed two Actes accepting the resignation of
two Jurats on the ground of their length of service and inability to
continue to perform the duties of their office. These Actes were ob-
jected to by certain landowners and others in the Island, who peti-
tioned the Crown against confirming the same, and to suspend the
filling up of those offices until a reform, long in contemplation, of the
Royal Court had taken place; but, although it was considered by the

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