feems the idea most intimately connected with and affential to body, fo as no-where else to be found or imagined, but only in matter. And though our fenfes take no notice of it, but in maffes of matter, of a bulk fufficient to cause a fenfation in us; yet the mind, having once got this idea from fuch groffer fenfible bodies, traces it farther; and confiders it, as well as figure, in the minutest particle of matter that can exist: and finds it infeparably inherent in body, wherever or however modified.

Solidity fills fpace.

Distinct from space:

§. 2. This is the idea which belongs to body, whereby 'we conceive it to fill space. The idea of which filling of space is, that, where we imagine any space taken up by a folid fubftance, we conceive it fo to poffefs it, that it excludes all other folid fubftances; and will for ever hinder any other two bodies, that move towards one another in a ftraight line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them, in a line not parallel to that which they move in. This idea of it the bodies which we ordinarily handle fufficiently furnish us with. §. 3. This refiftance, whereby it keeps other bodies out of the space which it poffeffes, is fo great, that no force, how great foever, can furmount it. All the bodies in the world, preffing a drop of water on all fides, will never be able to overcome the refiftance which it will make, foft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our idea of folidity is dif tinguifhed both from pure fpace, which is capable neither of refiftance nor motion; and from the ordinary idea of hardness. For a man may conceive two bodies. at a distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching or difplacing any folid thing, till their fuperficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear idea of space without folidity. For (not to go fo far as annihilation of any particular body) I afk, whe ther a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one fingle body alone without any other fucceeding imme diately into its place? I think it is evident he can: the idea of motion in one body no more including the

idea of motion in another, than the idea of a fquare figure in one body includes the idea of a fquare figure in another. I do not afk, whether bodies do fo exift that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another? To determine this either way, is to beg the queftion for or against a vacuum. But my queftion is, whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved whilst others are at reft? And I think this. no one will deny. If fo, then the place it deferted gives us the idea of pure fpace without folidity, whereinto any other body may enter, without either refiftance or protrufion of any thing. When the fucker in a pump is drawn, the space it filled in the tube is certainly the fame whether any other body follows the motion of the fucker or not: nor does it imply a contradiction that,. upon the motion of one body, another that is only contiguous to it, fhould not follow it. The neceffity of fuch a motion is built only on the fuppofition that the world is full, but not on the diftinct ideas of fpace and folidity; which are as different as refiftance and not refiftance; protrufion and not protrufion. And that men have ideas of fpace without a body, their very dif putes about a vacuum plainly demonftrate; as is fhowed in another place.

§. 4. Solidity is hereby alfo differenced

nefs.

from hardness, in that folidity confifts in From hards repletion, and fo an utter exclufion of other bodies out of the fpace it poffeffes; but hardness, in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter, making up malles of a fenfible bulk, fo that the whole does not eafily change its figure. And indeed, hard and foft are names that we give to things only in relation to the conftitu tions of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain fooner than change figure by the preffure of any part of our bodies; and that on the contrary foft, which changes the fituation of its parts upon an eafy and unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the fituation of the. fenfible parts amongst themselves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more folidity to the hardest body in in the world, than to the fofteft; nor is an adamant

H 3

one

one jot more folid than water. For though the two flat fides of two pieces of marble will more eafily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water or air, than if there be a diamond between them : yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more folid than thofe of water, or refift more; but because, the parts of water being more eafily feparable from each other, they will, by a fide motion, be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place by that fide-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble as much as the diamond; and it would be as impoffible by any force to furmount their refiftance, as to furmount the refiftance of the parts of a diamond. The foftest body in the world will as invincibly refift the coming together of any other two bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He that fhall fill a yielding foft body well with air or water, will quickly find its refiftance and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleafed to make a trial with the air inclosed in a foot-ball. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water and exactly clofed, which farther fhows the folidity of fo foft a body as water. For the golden globe thus filled being put into a prefs which was driven by the extreme force of fkrews, the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal; and, finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outfide, where it rofe like a dew, and fo fell in drops, before the fides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compreffion of the engine that squeezed it.

On folidity depend impulfe, refiftance, and protrufion.

§. 5. By this idea of folidity, is the extenfion of body distinguished from the extenfion of space: the extenfion of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of folid, feparable, moveable parts; and the extenfion of fpace, the continuity of unfolid, infe

parable,

of

parable, and immoveable parts. Upon the folidity of bodies alfo depend their mutual impulfe, refiftance, and protrufion. Of pure space then, and folidity, there are feveral (amongst which I confefs myself one) who perfuade themselves they have clear and diftinct ideas; and that they can think on fpace, without any thing in it that refifts or is protruded by body. This is the idea pure fpace, which they think they have as clear, as any idea they can have of the extenfion of body; the idea of the distance between the oppofite parts of a concave fuperficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any folid parts between; and on the other fide they perfuade themfelves, that they have, diftinct from that of pure fpace, the idea of fomething that fills fpace, that can be protruded by the impulfe of other bodies, or refift their motion. If there be others that have not thefe two ideas diftinct, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how men, who have the fame idea under different names, or different ideas under the fame name, can in that cafe talk with one another; any more than a man, who, not being blind or deaf, has diftinct ideas of the colour of fcarlet, and the found of a trumpet, could difcourfe concerning fcarlet colour with the blind man I mention in another place, who fancied that the idea of fcarlet was like the found of a trumpet.

§. 6. If any, one afk me, what this fo- What it is... lidity is? I fend him to his fenfes to inཏི form him: let him put a flint or a foot-ball between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a fufficient explication of folidity, what it is, and wherein it confifts; I pto mife to tell him what it is, and wherein it confifts when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it confifts; or explains to me what extenfion or motion is, which perhaps feems much eafier. The fimple ideas we have are fuch as experience teaches them us, but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we fhall fucceed no better, than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's H 4 mind

mind by talking; and to difcourfe into him the ideas of light and colours. The reafon of this I shall show in another place.

THE

CHA P. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senfes.

HE ideas we get by more than one fenfe are of fpace, or extenfion, figure, reft, and motion; for thefe make perceivable impreffions, both on the eyes and touch and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extenfion, figure, motion, and reft of bodies, both by feeing and feeling. But having occafion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHA P. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

Simple ideas §. 1.

are the ope rations of the

T

HE mind, receiving the ideas, mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and obferves its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.

mind about its other ideas,

The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from refection.

6. 2. The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently confidered, and which are fo frequent, that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are thefe two: Perception or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.

The