issue of his own operations. Nothing can be more dishonorable to God than to imagine that, the system. which is actually formed by the divine hand, and which was made for his pleasure and glory, is yet not the fruit of wise contrivance and design.

VII. That the introduction of sin is, upon the whole, for the general good. For the wisdom and power of the Deity are displayed in carrying on designs of the greatest good; and the existence of moral evil has undoubtedly occasioned a more full, perfect, and glorious discovery of the infinite perfections of the Divine nature, than could otherwise have been made to the view of creatures. If the extensive manifestations of the pure and holy nature of God, and his înfinite aversion to sin, and all his inherent perfections, in their genuine fruits and effects, is either itself the greatest good, or necessarily contains it, it must necessarily follow that the introduction of sin is for the greatest good.

VIII. That repentance is before faith in Christ. By this is not intended that repentance is before a speculative belief of the being and perfections of God, and of the person and character of Christ; but only that true repentance is previous to a saving faith in Christ, in which the believer is united to Christ, and entitled to the benefits of his mediation and atonement. That repentance is before faith in this sense, appears from several considerations. 1. As repen

tance and faith respect different objects, so they are distinct exercises of the heart; and therefore one not only may, but must be prior to the other. 2. There may be genuine repentance of sin without faith in Christ, but there cannot be true faith in Christ without repentance of sin; and since repentance is necessary in order to faith in Christ, it must necessarily be prior to faith in Christ. S. John the Baptist, Christ and his apostles, taught that repentance is before faith. John cried, Repent, for the kingdom of Heaven is at hand; intimating that true repentance was necessary in order to embrace the gospel of the king

dom. Christ commanded, Repent ye, and believe the Gospel And Paul preached repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ.

IX. That tho men became sinners by Adam, according to a divine constitution, yet they have and are accountable for no sins but personal; for, 1. Adam's act, in eating the forbidden fruit, was not the act of his posterity; therefore they did not sin at the same time he did. 2. The sinfulness of that act could not be transferred to them afterwards, because the sinfulness of an act can no more be transferred from one person to another than an act itself. 3. Therefore Adam's act, in eating the forbidden fruit, was not the cause, but only the occasion of his posterity's being sinners. God was pleased to make a constitution, that, if Adam remained holy through his state of trial, his posterity should in consequence be holy also; but if he sinned, his posterity should in consequence be sinners likewise. Adam sinned, and now God brings his posterity into the world sinners. By Adam's sin we are become sinners, not for it; his sin being only the occasion, not the cause of our committing sins.

X. That tho believers are justified through Christ's righteousness, yet his righteousness is not transferred to them. For, 1. Personal righteousness can no more be transferred from one person to another, than personal sin. If Christ's personal righteousness were transferred to believers, they would be as perfectly holy as Christ and so stand in no need of forgiveness. 3. But believers are not conscious of having Christ's personal righteousness, but feel and bewail much indwelling sin and corruption. 4. The scriptures represent believers as receiving only the benefits of Christ's righteousness in justification, or their being pardoned and accepted for Christ's righteousness' sake and this is the proper scripture notion of imputation. Jonathan's righteousness was imputed to Mephibosheth when David shewed kindness to him for his father Jonathan's sake.

The Hopkinsians warmly contend for the doctrine

of the divine decrees, that of particular election, total depravity, the special influences of the Spirit of God in regeneration, justification by faith alone, the final perseverance of the saints, and the consistency between entire freedom and absolute dependence; and therefore claim it as their just due, since the world will make distinctions, to be called Hopkinsian Calvinists.

DISSERTATIONS ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

NO. 2.

The doctrine of man's moral accountability to his Maker, is an idea which few or none pretend to dispute. We believe it is equally as important, as it is indisputable. By this doctrine is tried the moral tendency of religious thecries; and their importance, or want of importance, may be accounted in proportion, as they are calculated to strengthen, or weaken, a sense of moral accountability to God. Now it is evident that an accountable state always presupposes a time of rendering account; hence, as might naturally be expected, we read in the Bible of "the day of judgement," "the judgement-seat of Christ," and other expressions of a similar meaning. That man possesses certain powers of agency, that he is capable of abusing, but is required to do otherwise, I think is likewise inferable from the idea of a moral accountable state. Whether the conclusion necessarily follows from such a state or not, it is plain that such is the condition of man, and such the principle on which he acts. We gather, therefore, from these ideas, that if man be a subject of suffering or punishment now—as all grant he is he must continue to be such a subject, till the judgement of the present period, or state of his accountability, is brought to a close. We see no proper means by which such a judgement can be brought to a close, till the responsible person has rendered a proper account for the last moral actions of his life, or the last actions of the present period of his accountability.

From these considerations we gather an argument in favor of the doctrine of future punishment. For as the time of rendering account must be posterior to the actions for which a person is made responsible, it necessarily follows that an account rendered for the last moral actions in life, must be in a state beyond the present, or not at all. And as trial or judgement clearly implies, in the subject, an imperfect state, it argues thus much in favor of the doctrine for which we contend.

An attempt to avoid the force of this argument, by stating that judgement to be future to moral actions, could never take place, because men may be supposed to be accountable to their Maker during eternity, has little force when we consider, that any person amenable to a law, may be called at any particular period to answer for actions that are past, and still remain accountable. But when men cease to be vile, there will be no occasion to judge them for committing sin.

What now remains a subject of examination, is, how, in denying a future judgement, men may be supposed to be judged according to their works. Are all people, in this life, brought to all the judgement they need to expect, and are condemned or approved for every action, according to their works? It may be proper that we exercise some care in considering this question, for a proper answer must very materially affect the grand object of our discussions.

The af

firmative of this question must be maintained, or the doctrine of no future punishment cannot be supported. It is commonly said by our opposers on this subject, that God has fixed the sting of transgression in the act; and therefore renders to them their desert, in the guilt of their transgression, and the proproportionate exclusion from virtuous enjoyment. But where is the tribunal to which men are brought and judged in this life? Will it be said to be any other than conscience that accuses or else excuses men in their moral conduct? Should we be asked if this is not enough, we The conscience itself, if we read cor

answer, no.

rectly, is sometimes defiled, seared with a hot iron, and is evil. The conscience that is purged from dead works, must have previously been much incapacitated, for the proper and last tribunal of moral actions. Who could expect a correct decision in all cases, from a corrupt judge? and shall we look to a defiled conscience as the last and only tribunal by which the actions of men are to be tried?

Should we grant that men were brought to the tribunal of conscience for all their transgressions, which we have already found cannot be wholly true, we still meet with difficulty in reconciling the idea with those passages that speak of a day of judgement. On the hypothesis we are now considering, we must suppose the day of judgement to be a man's whole lifetime, and the reproofs of conscience to be such as he naturally experiences in that time. When Christ said, "For every idle word that men shall speak they shall give account thereof in the day of judgement," there is no doubt but he meant to impress a solemn truth on the mind, which should awaken a more keen and stricter sense of moral accountability. But if this and similar expressions are to be resolved into that which the common occurrences of the day afford, it is telling the abandoned wretch that he may expect to experience similar stings of conscience as formerly, which, notwithstanding his inclination to scepticism, he never doubted. It is likewise telling him, by an unavoidable implication, that if he can elude human authority, he need not expect any other judgement of God than what he all along experiences. which is exactly the very thing he wants.

It is argued with much plausibility that sin contains that in its nature and consequences, which is sufficient to deter any one from the practice of it. But we oppose this idea by the testimony of visible facts. Old sinners still continue to sin, and find nothing in their experience, that dissuades them from the practice. This remark, however, we do not consider wholly without exceptions. If men's feelings