through Christ, nor that they must become holy (if at all) by divine influence, than other men. And although they do deny that God creates the sin in them, and that sin pertains to any thing but voluntary action, yet the denial of either position is not an anti-orthodox peculiarity, for the ablest orthodox divines have ever denied both. The charge then of adopting this view of sin, for the purpose of opposing any doctrine of orthodoxy, is a slanderous charge.

Can any cause then of mental perversion be fairly charged? The human mind pervert truth and evidence for the sake of believing that to be sin, which as it is agreed on all hands, imparts to sin its most malignant aspect, and reveals its fellest tendencies? Men believe that to be sin, which deserves the deepest damnation which any thing can deserve, merely because they wish to believe it! You may as well suppose that for a similar reason, a man should believe his doom already fixed in hell itself. If there be any view of sin which human selfishness will resist to the last, it is this which so embodies all its guilt and all its terrors; it is this which as we all know, makes the conscience of the wicked writhe in anguish, and an ungodly world hate the servant as it hated the Master whom it crucified. Such a view of sin, is not a device to obtain popularity, nor to corrupt the Gospel of God.

4. The universal depravity of mankind is not inconsistent with the moral perfection of God. It is not uncommon to ask, (and I admit the facts on which the objection rests)-how could a God of perfect sincerity and goodness bring a race of creatures into existence, and give them such a nature that they will all certainly sin and incur his wrath ?—It is also added, to increase the weight of the objection,-why render this universal sinfulness of a race, the consequence of one man's act-why

not give to each a fair trial for himself? I answer, God does give to each a fair trial for himself. Not a human being does or can become thus sinful or depraved but by his own choice. God does not compel him to sin by the nature he gives him. Nor is his sin, although a consequence of Adam's sin, in such a sense its consequence, as not to be a free voluntary act of his own. He sins freely, voluntarily. There is no other way of sinning. God, (there is no irreverence in saying it,) can make nothing else sin, but the sinner's act.-Do you then say, that God gave man a nature, which He knew would lead him to sin? What if He did ?Do you know that God could have done better, better on the whole or better, if he gave him existence at all, even for the individual himself? The error lies in the gratuitous assumption, that God could have adopted a moral system, and prevented all sin, or at least, the present degree of sin. For, no man knows this no man can prove it. The assumption therefore is wholly unauthorised as the basis of the present objection, and the objection itself groundless. On the supposition that the evil which exists is in respect to divine prevention, incidental to the best possible system, and that notwithstanding the evil, God will secure the greatest good possible to him to secure, who can impeach either his wisdom or his goodness because evil exists? I say then that as ignorance is incompetent to make an objection, and as no one knows that this supposition is not a matter of fact, no one has a right to assert the contrary, or even to think it.* Suppose then God had adopted

* The difficulties on this difficult subject as it is extensively regarded, result in the view of the writer from two very common but groundless assumptions-assumptions which so long as they are admitted and reasoned upon, must leave the subject involved in insuperable difficulties.

The assumptions are these; First, that sin is the necessary means of the

a different system, who is competent to foretell or to conjecture the results, or even the results of one iota of change in the present system? Suppose God had made you just like Adam or even like Lucifer, and placed you

greatest good and as such, so far as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holiness in its stead. Secondly, that God could in a moral system have prevented all sin or at least the present degree of sin.

In further explanation of the ground taken in answering the above objection, the following enquiries are submitted to the consideration of the candid.

Is not the assumption that the degree of sin which exists, or even any degree of sin, is on the whole preferable to holiness in its stead, inconsistent alike with the benevolence and the sincerity of God? With his benevolence. If such be the nature of God, of man, of holiness, of sin, of all things, that sin is the ne cessary means of the greatest good, ought it not to be made the subject of precept-would it not be, by a benevolent moral Governor? For how can it be consistent with the benevolence of a moral governor, to require of his subjects that moral conduct which is not on the whole for the best?

If it be said that it is on the whole for the best that he should require it, but not on the whole for the best that they should perform it--what is this but to say that it is on the whole for the best that he should practice deception on his subjects? And what then becomes of his sincerity?—Let us take an example or two. Who would regard the command of a parent as sincere, it being known that he prefers on the whole the disobedience of the child to his obedience? Who would regard the invitation of a friend as sincere, being fully apprised that he prefers on the whole its rejection to its acceptance? --If it be said that no subjects of God have such knowledge of God's prefe rence of sin to holiness in their own case, then the question is whether their ignorance alters the fact; and whether he is truly sincere, when he would be justly pronounced insincere if the real fact were known?-Besides, after the commission of sin, the fact of such a preference, if there be one, is known. How then does the sincerity of God appear when it is placed beyond a doubt by the event, that he did prefer on the whole, the sin committed by the sub. ject to the holiness required in his law?--Is it then possible that God should be sincere in his commands and invitations, unless holiness in man be on the whole preferable to sin in its stead?

Further, it is extensively maintained that virtue is founded in utility, i. e. that such is the nature, relations and tendencies of things, that greater hap

in similar circumstances, do you know that you would not have sinned as he did? How do you know that had you commenced your immortal career with such aggravated guilt, God would not have found it necessary to send you

piness will result from virtue or holiness than from vice or sin. How then can sin in the nature of things be the necessary means of the greatest good? Again, if sin be the necessary means of the greatest good, who can rea sonably regard the commission of it with sorrow or even regret? What be. nevolent being duly informed, can ingenuously regret that by sin he has put it in the power of God to produce greater good, than God could otherwise produce? Ought it not rather to be matter of grateful praise that he has sinned, and thus furnished, by what he has done, the necessary means of the greatest possible good? Surely the act considered simply in the relation of the necessary means of such an end, is not a matter for regret; this bəing the very reason, why God himself is supposed to prefer it.

Is it then said, that the intention is selfish and sinful? Be it so. Had the subject however been fully apprised of the utility of the deed, and the real preference of God, (as in the case of the destruction of the Canaanites,) his own interest and his duty would have been coincident; and how does it appear that in this case he had not performed the act from a benevolent intention? And how great is the guilt of a selfish intention which, for aught that appears, is occasioned by deception on the part of the lawgiver? Is it said that the selfish intention is necessary to the action as the means of good? But where is an instance in which the good educed from a sinful action is dependent on the selfish intention of the agent? Is it said, that otherwise God could not shew mercy in its forgiveness? Does God then deceive his subjects in regard to the true nature and tendency of moral acts, and thus occasion their sin that he may have the glory of forgiving it? Is this the glory of his mercy? Besides, how does it appear that the subject did not really intend good? The law of God, according to the assumption, is no proof that transgression is not on the whole for the best; indeed the subject knows that all sin will prove to be the necessary means of the greatest good; how then does it appear that with this knowledge he was not truly benevo lent in performing the deed? What reason then for sorrow or regret remains? The second assumption now claims our notice; viz. that God could have prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin, in a moral system.

If holiness in a moral system be preferable on the whole to sin in its stead,

to hell without an offer of mercy, and that you would not have sunk in deeper woe than that which now awaits you? How do you know that what might have been true respecting yourself, had not been true of any other pos

why did not a benevolent God, were it possible to him, prevent all sin, and secure the prevalence of universal holiness? Would not a moral universe of perfect holiness, and of course of perfect happiness, be happier and better than one comprising sin and its miseries? And must not infinite benevo lence accomplish all the good it can? Would not a benevolent God then, had it been possible to him in the nature of things, have secured the exist ence of universal holiness in his moral kingdom?

Is the reader startled by an enquiry which seems to limit the power of God? But does not he eqally limit the power of God by supposing, or rath er affirming, that God COULD NOT secure the greatest good without the existence of sin? On either supposition there is what may be called a limita tion of the power of God by the nature of things. In one case, the limita. tion is supposed to result from the nature of sin; in the other, from the na ture of moral agency. If then one of these suppositions must be made, which is the most honourable to God?

Further, does not he who is startled by this supposition, limit the good. ness of God? Undeniably he does, if it be conceded that holiness is on the whole preferable to sin in its stead. For he who admits this, and maintains that God could have secured the existence of holiness instead of sin, must also admit that God is not good enough to accomplish all the good in his power; not good enough to prevent the worst of evils.And who does most reverence to God, he who supposes that God would have prevented all sin in his moral universe, but could not, or he who affirms that he could have prevented it, but would not? Or is it more honourable to God to sup. pose that such is the nature of sin, that he could not accomplish the highest good without it, than to suppose that such is the nature of free agency that God could not wholly prevent its perversion?

But the main enquiry on this point remains,-does the supposition that God could not prevent sin in a moral system, limit his power at all? To suppose or affirm that God cannot perform what is impossible in the nature of things, is not properly to limit his power. Is there then the least parti. cle of evidence, that the entire prevention of sin in moral beings is possible