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And again: If preference which is justly called moral, necesarily involves the knowledge of obligation between moral opposites; so that one is able to discern, at least, some moral opposite involved in the ultimate objects of preference existing before him, in order to constitute him a moral agent; one, acting in a responsible manner: if, I say, one cannot be a moral and accountable agent, without knowledge of this kind to discern between moral good and evil: then, so much of the proposition is true as defines sin to be acts of the agent in which he violates known duty.

And still further: If the cause which precedes moral preference occasioning the certainty why the being prefers as he does rather than otherwise, be not, itself, the sin of the being; then the original inferences, deduced from the proposition, follow. It very readily appears, that there is not a sinful heart, in any being, back of his moral preferences; that the sin of Adam, which is the remote cause of wrong moral preference in his posterity at the first, and which is altogether distinct from such preference, is not, itself, any sin of theirs; and also, that whatever be derived from him, by the laws of generation, as the immediate disposing cause of such wrong moral preference in his posterity

good. That author in his denial, that sin consists in action, misapprehends me; in supposing that, under that term, I comprehended not, with the overt action, the preference of an ultimate good, the chief or subordinate; which he calls bent of heart or disposition. With him, I define the first sin of Adam; "his preference of subordinate, to the chief good;" and with him, I agree that when the overt act is past, “if the fixed purpose exist, the man is guilty before him, who searches the heart." With great pleasure I quote from him the sentiment that because sin "proceeds from the abuse of liberty, not physical incompetency, it is chargeable on man only and is moral evil whilst every thing physical in that which is called a transgression, being from God is good." "To denominate sin a physical constituent of man's nature, is either to charge it upon God, who made him; or to account it a mere calamity." Will that much respected author pardon me for the brief use I have made of a treatise, designed rather for the eye of his flock than of the public?

at the first, yet, no more than the immediate disposing cause of the first sin in Adam was to be accounted his, is this to be accounted their, sin.

With this reviewer, therefore, the only points on which I am fairly at issue, are the three which I have now advanced, and separated into a distinct statement. If he opposes any thing contained in the Discourses, he is to oppose, definitely, some one of the three things now mentioned; if he refutes any thing, he is to refute some one or other of these particular positions: and, whatever exceptions he may take to my preaching on such a subject before young men, or expressing my sentiments upon it to the public, or however glibly he may think to slide over the parts of the Discourses, piecemeal, by assuming theories which beg the very questions in dispute, he is reduced to the simple alternative, either to be silent or to confront these particular questions with a distinct affirmation or denial. Otherwise, every denial is bare breath; every attempt at discussion, a mere efflux of words; every appearance of opposition, the shaking of the arms in air. Let the reviewer face either one of these positions and distinctly deny it; and I am ready to affirm, and be at issue with him at once. At least, until I hear something less superficial in thought, and more weighty in proof than has been advanced by this writer, directed specifically to one or other of these three points, I see no reason to justify me in surrendering my affirmation of their truth. To retract when necessary, I hope I have the humility; but to retract without evidence, I would shun the folly. Notwithstanding therefore the deep desire of the reviewer to witness a retraction and confession, I must still retain the positions taken in the Discourses, and hold all sin to be, ragaßaris, (Rom. iv. 15.) transgression of law.

CHAP. II. THE PROPOSITION AND ARGUMENTS IN THE DISCOURSES, VINDICATED FROM THE OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES OF THE REVIEWER.

In requiring" something less superficial in thought, and more weighty in proof than has been advanced by this writer," I think myself not to have made an uncharitable insinuation, or unreasonable demand. And perhaps this opinion will receive a little confirmation in the minds of others, if I lead them to contemplate, with me, his objections to the proposition maintained in the Discourses, and his replies to the various arguments alleged in its defence. If his objections and replies are shown to be feeble and inconclusive, I am justified in yielding nothing to this advo

cate.

His OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSITION are all reducible to this one viz., that it is not so broad as to include, in it, all the varieties of sin. In other words, he does not think that we can rank, under such a definition of sin, with any propriety, the following varieties-sin of heart,* sin of omission, sin of ignorance.

*I speak not here of a distinction which seems to gleam upon us, now and then, from this writer, between sin of nature and sin of practice, farther than to observe, that so far as any distinct apprehension of it is entertained by common minds, nothing appears, in it, differing essentially from the distinction between sin of heart and sin of life: the mere circumstance of a supposed period of existence in infancy before practice begins, which the former suggests, not altering the thing itself which, in their mind, is supposed to precede practice. They say, the "sin of our natures," "our sinful natures," "the sin of our hearts," and "our sinful hearts," as if they were talking of one and the same thing. And ask them why they call their hearts sinful, they immediately reply because our hearts are so set on the things of time and sense, &c., evidently meaning no more all this while, except they blind and excuse themselves by language expressive of some other agent beside themselves, than the fact that they are often, if not always, guilty of

The weakness of the objection, in respect to any of these kinds of sin, will appear at once, in the fact that it proceeds on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. He assumes the proposition to be false. For, as the proposition relates to the essential characteristics of sin, and as all the proofs bear on these; it is obvious, that if the characteristics stated in the proposition, viz., voluntary agency and knowledge of obligation, are proved to be essential to sin; they are essential, in some manner or other, to every instance and every variety of sin. In other words, if the proposition is true, it must control our views of sins of heart, omission, and ignorance. On this very principle, these sins were defined in the Discourses in accordance with the essential characteristics of sin embraced in the general proposition: and the views of them thus given, were left to stand or fall with the proofs that went to show that voluntary agency and knowledge of obligation are always essential to sin. Is it not irrelevant in this reviewer therefore, simply to thrust forward his views of such sins, as affording authority for rejecting the proposition higher than any proofs which may be alleged in its defence? I ask him to the proofs: barely reminding him, that his views will need a little correcting, if these evince the proposition to be true. In other words, if the proposition be confirmed, by evidence, he must change his views, at least so far as to see a distinction between the constitutional powers of a moral agent and his voluntary agency; between the omission which arises from there being no opportunity of choice and that which arises from a contrary preference; between the ignorance of him who is deprived of the faculty or the opportunity of knowledge, and of him who, possessing these, neglects them and, if he should be extremely reluctant to make

voluntarily and obstinately preferring these things to the high ends of their duty.

The propriety, however, of making a distinction under the former terms which shall differ essentially from the one expressed in the latter terms, will enter deeply into the discussions which follow.

such discrimination in moral matters, his reluctance to do it will by no means show any absurdity in an established proposition which requires it to be done.

But, lest he, or others, should cavil at this representation, I will consider the views he has taken of the sins which he thinks to be at variance with the proposition.

First In regard to sins of heart. He does, indeed, in that part of the review which is devoted to my explanation of the proposition in the Discourses, but question the clearness and accuracy of classing under preferences, choices, &c., such immanent acts as coveting, envying, &c., when there is no emanent volition accompanying them to defraud, to defame, &c. All I need reply to such a suggestion, however, is; that our susceptibility to such a good as the possession of property, or the esteem of others, &c., is distinct from our actually preferring either to the chief good, or preferring that the property or reputation, &c. which, of right, belong to our brother, were transferred to ourselves. In the one case, I describe the essential constitution of the being in the other, his idolatry of the world, or his coveting the good of his neighbour, envying him the possession, &c.; and the forbidden preference which is involved in coveting and envying, is as strictly an act of selfish preference, as when it is followed with the volition of some external act for defrauding or for defaming. But as we pursue the reviewer through his subsequent remarks, we find him reverting frequently to something back and beyond the immanent preferences of the being for the wicked heart, the sinful nature, which is to perform such wonders in overturning every argument used in the Discourses: which is to prove us guilty of that of which we are not and cannot be conscious which is to prove that men condemn each other for something beside their real intentions: which is to prove that the law and government of God prescribe the mode of our existence as well as of our voluntary agency: and which

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