ence and a disapproval differing from mine? For, mine at least terminates on something! Because he has made no discrimination himself, in things which lie back of specific volitions, as I have done, is he thereby authorized to declare a variance? or to claim, to himself and vouchers, a greater degree of "pain and humiliation?" The definite things which "precede specific volitions and from which they take their character," are distinguished in the Discourses, into the following things: the being himself; his powers of agency; his ultimate and supreme choices, called states of the will; the particular objects in view of the mind at the time: all which things properly precede a given volition. Now if the thing intended by the reviewer, lies in none of these things, what can the thing be which gives him such "pain and humiliation?" But if it does; it can lie only in that one of them which I have specified and so he turns out to be a mere logomachist in his opposition, and a vain boaster of superior "pain and humiliation."

But in searching after the sense of this writer, I find that, after giving his definition, he has made one other attempt at explanation: and if any light is here thrown on the peculiar sources of his pain and humiliation, the thing may appear which he intends to designate by something. "We admit, indeed, that sin in the heart previously to action, is latent, and that while it remains so, we can have no direct consciousness of it. But when by a succession of evil acts it betrays itself, we are as certain of its existence as of the acts of which we are conscious; and we have no more doubt about the depravity of the principle than of the acts which proceed from it: just as when from a concealed fountain poisonous streams issue, we are assured that the fountain itself is poisoned; or when we find bitter and unwholsome fruit produced by a tree, although the nature of the tree is hidden from us, by its fruit we know that it is evil. This last is our Saviour's own illustration, 'the tree is known by his fruit.'" Now in all this exposition of the thing, it ap

pears that the reviewer and his vouchers are not conscious of this something in itself, but only infer it to exist from acts of which they are conscious. If I could determine how far his consciousness goes in regard to acts, perhaps I could derive some definite idea of this wonderful "IT" which exists back of acts, and excites disapprobation. Is he not conscious of his existing, his exercising a love to some ultimate object, as well as of his volitions to secure an ultimate object? If so, what is this "it" of which he is not conscious? How does it appear, moreover, that the thing which "betrays itself" always "in acts" and only in acts, is not an essential part of the acts themselves? In Adam, could this sinful "it" exist, before his first act of sin? The illustration of our Savior was applied, by him, not to any unknown thing in ourselves, as if we had not the power of an internal inspection of ourselves; but to the ultimate purposes of others. Their ultimate intentions are known to themselves by consciousness-the tree, in this case, is an intelligent being that can look in upon itself, and judge of the intents of the heart, without self-deceit, if it chooses :-but to others, their ultimate intentions are discovered by those outward actions only in which they are prosecuted. The Savior says: "by their fruits ye shall know them :" you shall discover what the real designs of such pretenders are; (for, he was speaking with reference merely to false teachers coming among them :) not, ye shall discover in yourselves an unknown "something," an unknown "it," distinct from all the ultimate and immediate choices of which you are, or can be conscious, ealled principles !

I am therefore reduced to the conclusion, that the pretended principles of the reviewer which cause him pain and humiliation, so far as he has any distinct perception of these principles, are identical with the ultimate preferences of which I have spoken: which makes his experience tally, well enough, with mine, for the safety of the argument. In so far as he attempts to think of something else, back and

beyond ultimate purpose, unknown and unseen, I hesitate not to say, that a sense of guilt cannot possibly terminate on an unknown thing; and that so far as he withdraws his view from himself, the agent, and his conduct, as I have defined it, to rove after an unknown thing as the foundation of guilt, he does but impair, in him, a sense of guilt and violated obligation; or substitute, in its place, a sense of direful calamity, and unimputable injury: which experience he may call "pain," but not "humiliation."

The second argument in the Discourses, was derived from the practical sentiments of men. This is met like the first, with the pretended opposing sentiments of the reviewer :and with a remark, which I made in the Discourses myself, that it is essentially the same as the first, except it be a different way of arriving at the dictates of conscience. Passing this latter remark of the reviewer in silence, therefore, I have but a word to say on the validity of his objection. "If the universal sentiments of men are in favor of Professor Fitch's doctrine, then we are of the same opinion with him. But we beg leave to enter a dissent, at least, in favor of ourselves and a few others-we suspect more than a few." What does this writer mean by declaring his dissent in opinion from me? Is the fact that he will not believe the truth which I advocate, at all related to my argument? Does he really suppose, that in appealing to the universal sentiments of men, I was appealing, as he flagrantly misrepresents me, to their belief concerning the proposition? Attempting to prove a truth to my fellow-men, by the assertion that they believed it already! I appealed to a totally different thing from their theoretic opinions, or belief concerning this or any other proposition. I spoke of sentiments, merely as the feelings men evinced in their conduct with each other in life. I appealed barely to a natural sense of justice in men, evinced in their conduct with one another, as Paul does in his epistle to the Romans: and moreover guarded the state

ment itself against the very misrepresentation of this writer, with this specific declaration: "that when they have no particular theory to maintain-when they are acting out in life the unbiased dictates of their sense of justice-they restrict sin to the conduct, &c." And the argument was not that men have, without the exercise of reason or the aid of revelation, a perfect standard and knowledge of all obligations in their natural feelings; but simply, that their natural sense of justice indicates, with strong probability, the nature of God's government. This appeal to the natural sentiments of men, is certainly not without the example of high authority. I have already alluded to that of Paul. I might quote many uninspired authorities, but content myself with mentioning one only, which has great weight with this reviewer: I mean Edwards. Our natural sense is that this bad choice or disposition, is evil in itself:"-" if a thing be from us and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blame-worthiness or ill-desert, according to our natural sense."

Now if this writer lays claim to practical sentiments, essentially differing from these, he will have some color of ground for dissent. But I think it will be exceedingly hard for him to act upon any other, in his dealings with his fellowmen; or if he should, still harder to screen himself from their indignation. If his feelings, peradventure, dictate to him the propriety of accusing, censuring, or punishing others, without reference to any conduct of theirs and if he proceeds to acts of accusing, censuring, or punishing his neighbors or his children; without regard to any conduct of theirs, but for an undefined something which he may imagine to be inherent in them, altogether distinct from any intention or choice of theirs; he will, I think, find exceedingly few to sympathize with him in his very peculiar feelings; and find no shelter from the operation of the laws of his country or the indignant feelings of an offended sense of justice in the community around him, but in occupying some retreat for the insane. I speak these things merely to as

sert that a claim to a sense of justice differing essentially from that I have described, is but a claim to insanity; not to lay any such charge against the reviewer: for he has in fact made no such claim; and such considerations show me that it is exceedingly improbable that he ever will. But until he make it, there is nothing in the fact that he will not assent to the proposition, that, in any way, affects the validity of the argument derived from the natural sentiments of justice in men.

The third argument was derived from the views of God, expressed in revelation.

This, I am said, by the reviewer, in language of no very great precision or elegance, "to have run away with, rather than to have set it before our eyes in a clear light." I suppose, by "our eyes," he refers to his own, of course; and if I could tell how far his view extends, or how distinctly it embraces objects within the field of vision, I might perhaps better say whether the fault is in my running away with the argument, or in his wilfully closing his eyes to it, when I had placed it clearly within his view. When I had shown that the amount of all God's requirements of us, the whole ground of his last judgment with respect to us, and the tenor of his direct descriptions of us as sinners, all pointed to our voluntary conduct in respect to duty, or our exercises of moral agency, as the alone sum and substance of our sin; I did suppose that I placed something so clearly within the range of common vision, as that no one could fail to see it, unless he wilfully closed his eyes. I did suppose that I set a criterion before them of all sin--all which God forbids in his law; all which he punishes in his kingdom; all which he testifies to exist among men.

And how does this writer evade the force of this evidence, and attempt to sustain, before others, the clearness and accuracy of his own vision in not seeing its force? The amount of all which he has alleged in his own defence, while