strange to identify this analysis of a thing with the denial of its existence. The terms disposition, bent, bias, inclination, when justly described as moral attributes of the soul, I contend, do not mean literally a bending, a leaning, an inclining of the soul, as a substance in space; like that of a tree in its inclination to the north or south, or of an animal body in its recumbency on the side of a rock; for it is the attribute of a soul, whose essential nature it is to think and to will. It cannot be otherwise described, I insist therefore, than as the bent, inclination, or disposition, which consists in willing, and which terminates on some object which sustains to the mind the relation of an ultimate object of choice.

2. Another instance, relates to my views of the heart. "The Professor does indeed insist that when the Scriptures speak of an evil heart, they mean nothing more than the sinful volitions of the heart, independently of their cause," [the heart.] The heart consisting in the volitions of the heart, independently of the heart itself! A thing consisting in some other thing, besides itself, independently of itself! What a representation, I will not say of my theology, but of my understanding! The Discourses deny that the heart "exists in any thing apart from the active preferences of the agent himself:" and consequently an evil heart denotes that state of mind which consists in wrong immanent preferences of the being. "We have nothing for this interpretation of such expressions," the reviewer adds, "but his own assertion." Taking such an interpretation as he has reported to his readers, I deny that he has, for it, even my assertion; but to say that the interpretation which I did give, rests on bare assertion, is but enhancing the misrepresentation; unless he apply the term assertion, to the assertion of admitted facts, and the assertion of unanswered

reasons.

3. Another instance, relates to the source of moral action. He is not one of those who think that our thoughts have no cause of their existence in the soul itself. This he ad

mits: but denies that there is any moral evil in this cause however sinful its effects may be." I am here represented to hold, not, as might be thought at first sight, that the soul itself is the real source of moral action or that the soul itself thinks and wills; but that there is in the soul, attached and appended to it some other thing that thinks and wills; i. e. causes the existence of evil thoughts and willings; which thing is not itself evil. But, in contradiction to such a view, I have said in amount that the soul itself always thinks and wills; and that it is, just as sinful, as its preferences and choices are for the moral state of the soul is always that of a voluntary being or willing subsistence. With a recent author, the sentiment of the Discourses is in unison: "It is the nature of mind to choose. To prefer the world, or God, is the unavoidable result of free agency. Not to choose at all, is the attribute of a stock, or stone; but not of a rational, accountable being." Under the term, cause, the reviewer has confounded the distinction between a voluntary being, who always wills and does, and the influence which leads him to will in one manner rather than another. If he will not admit the propriety of such a distinction, he must admit that I have made it, and that every representation in which he has confounded it has been false.

4. Another instance, relates to the disposing cause which forms the ground of certainty that we will, at first, in a sinful manner. My denial that this cause is to be accounted the sin of the being, is set forth in these very singular terms. "The heart is diseased, but there is no evil in the disease until it put forth acts; and although the disease of the heart is the sole cause of the evil of the actions, yet the heart which produces these streams of moral evil, partakes not at all of that malignity which it communicates. While the thoughts and volitions which it sends forth are abominable and deserving of eternal death, the source itself is pure and entirely free from fault." Why does this writer apply the term, heart, to that which I denominated

the disposing cause? In the Discourses it was defined to be "that which occasions the certainty of the being preferring one ultimate good to another." Nor was it represented to be the producing cause of the actions themselves: for they are the acts of the agent. Nor was it admitted to create a physical necessity of those actions, to render them any other than acts of will or choice. In contradistinction to this, the sin of the being, or his sinful heart, was thus described: "the will of the sinner is, from the first, fastened on the gratification of his own appetites as the end of pursuit." The difference here is just as plain as between temptation and compliance with it; and as well might the reviewer have spoken of the former as sending forth abominable volitions, and applied to temptation all the terms he has done in the present case: only the misrepresentation would not so easily take with his readers.

5. Another subject on which I am misrepresented is that of original sin.

First I am exhibited as unwilling to state the cause of the universal depravity of man. The Professor seems exceedingly unwilling to come to an explanation of what constitutes this necessity of sinning in all Adam's posterity." With the utmost decision and frankness, I asserted the cause of their sinning to be the sin of Adam, operating on them" through that constitution of the Creator which made him parent of the human race." In accordance with the opinions of the universal church, on which this writer appears to know so much, and lay so much stress, that cause I have stated, over and over again, to be descent from sinning Adam. I said indeed the connexion we must admit, whether we could explain the manner of it or not: and will this writer deem it essential to state in what particular mode this cause affects us, when it is stated so to affect us as that the result is a complete moral depravity from the first? Yet have I not forborne to suggest a mode in which it might be supposed to operate; viz., through the original

strength of such susceptibilities as, in Adam and Eve, were excited by temptation; in which case sin may be said to be by birth, in their descendants, as, in them, it was by temptation.

Next I am represented as stating original sin to consist simply in the fact of there being a first sin. "Professor F. knows as well as any one that there never existed a heretic who denied original sin, according to this definition. For as all men sin, there must be a first sin." But, in this representation, he leaves out two essential conditions of my statement. One, that I hold the original sin of the descendants to be, sin at their moral origin. This is involved in the statement itself: "nothing can in truth be called original sin but his first moral choice or preference being evil.” This condition of my statement is essential to it; because it represents the character of man, as depraved at the first, in consequence of the sin of Adam. The other condition is, that I hold wrong moral preference, in a moral agent under the dominion of God, to form, itself, without reference to any preceding cause, a ground of the continued and entire depravity of the agent. In another place the reviewer allows this; and makes the following comment. "This is a new philosophy of the human mind; that if a moral agent make one wrong choice, it is a matter of constitutional necessity [I said it "occasions the certainty"] that all consecutive acts should be evil also. ["Unless some cause intervenes" &c., referring to grace.] It seems to have been invented for the occasion, to assist in harmonizing the new system; for thus, without any inherent principle of evil, total depravity can be accounted for. But this new dogma is contrary to all experience, and therefore ought to be rejected as false." The experience to which I appealed, for proof of such a principle, was the only experience, known to apply to the case, in the universe of moral agents, the one under consideration only being excepted: viz., that of the first sin of angels and the first sin of Adam and Eve, which were,

in fact, followed with such results and formed the ground of the certainty of such results, say what you will about an inherent or adherent principle of evil! I will now add, that the declaration of Christ that whosever sins is a servant, under the dominion of sin, John viii. 34, and the annunciation of the divine law of the consequences attendant on the soul that sinneth, Ez. xviii. 20, confirm the same principle: and I care not whether that philosophy be called new or old, an invention, discovery, or any thing else, which exactly corresponds with the facts in the case, and the declarations of God; for I seek after the distinctive features of truth.

On this unconnected statement of a first sin, he asserts: "Pelagius, if this be a correct definition, held the doctrine of original sin, as fully as Augustine and much more correctly, if we receive this theory." If Augustine held that there is sin in any one before sin begins to be, or that there is sin in any without beginning; or if he affirmed that sin begins in something totally different in kind from all choice or preference of mind; verily, on this specific point, I must look somewhere else for truth and correctness, even if I wander, in search of it, to the door of Pelagius. But whether on all the points embraced in this subject, Pelagius, Chrysostom, Jerome, have the truth with them; or Augustine, with him; or neither of them; it will never make any truth to be error because Pelagius held it, or any error to be truth because it fell from the lips of Augustine: though an appeal to names may be considered by the ignorant to be the ultimatum of evidence, and may be very convenient for resort to a writer who is at a loss for weightier reasons.

5. Another point on which I am misrepresented is that of radically departing from the theology of President Edwards.

Whether such a charge has any connection with the discussion of a theological topic, or what is the extent of obligation imposed on me to follow Edwards, in every minute part of his speculations, I will not now inquire. In as