serting the grounds and reasons of our faith, I take it, we are to go, beyond the tenets of other men, to the original sources from which all must derive their faith. But in setting me forth as a young man, forming my opinions with haste, and imbibing such as are totally subversive of the radical principles of Edwards, this writer no doubt, supposed he could wield an instrument much more convenient for the overthrow of my opinions than any argument whatever-by enlisting against me the prejudices existing in favor of authority. I will not deny that in the statement of some points I should differ from Edwards, and do differ: what theological writer in New-England would not, for instance, on the subject of imputation? But what I deny is that the radical and fundamental principles of Edwards in theology are forsaken and subverted by me, according to the impression which the language of this writer is adapted to convey to his readers.

I assert then that Edwards, in the very explanation which he gives of original sin, implies, distinctly, the following things, which are altogether accordant with the views contained in the Discourses; and which form, indeed, the great and radical principles of my own statements:

1. The first sin of Adam and the first sin of his posterity are connected with each other by the union which was established by the Creator in constituting him parental head of the race. "The co-existence of the evil disposition, (implied in Adam's first rebellion,) in the root and the branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity: but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin."

2. The first sin of Adam and the first sin of his posterity are comprised in voluntary action. “His guilt [Adam's] was all truly from the act of his inward man; exclusive of which, the motions of his body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument." His posterity participate with him, "in the consent and concurrence of their hearts."

3. The immediate disposing cause of this first sin in Adam and his posterity, arises from the constitution of man and the measures of Providence. "The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam was by God's permission, who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by giving such influences of his spirit as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it: which it is plain in fact he did withhold: and whatever mystery may be supposed in this affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God's holiness and righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had been guilty of no offence before." "Consequently [consequent on the union constituted between Adam and his posterity] an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam's posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart when he eat the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an influence as might be effectual to prevent it: as appears by what was observed in the former chapter." The reference is to the theory asserted in the former chapter of his treatise, that certain "principles pertaining to man in innocence," were the occasion of his sin and depravity; when excited, and not prevented by superior influences. "Man did immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of God."

4. The continuance of depravity in Adam and the continuance of it in his posterity is a consequence and punishment of the first sin pertaining to each. "An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle, that came by God's forsaking him, which was a punishment of his first transgression." The depravity remaining an established principle in the heart of a child of Adam and as exhibited in after operations, is a consequence and punishment of the first apostacy thus participated, [participated in by the first concurrence,] and brings new

guilt." What is this but asserting, that such is the constitution of moral agents and their relation to the divine government, that the first sin, in any, subjects them to a total depravity? According to this theologian, the posterity of Adam are depraved entirely or under the dominion of sin in consequence of sinning at the first, as really as was Adam.

Now if one single thing in the theory of Edwards be omitted viz. the strange philosophy by which he attempts to make Adam and his posterity one identical being; I see not why all the positions, taken in the Discourses, do not exactly concur with the principles of Edwards: and in that strange philosophy, he explains away even that literal imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity denied by me viz. The culpability of his one sin, added to the guilt of their own sin for "the first depravity of heart and the imputation of that sin are both the consequences of that established union: but yet in such order that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself." "Therefore I am humbly of opinion that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter."

The particular specifications which have now been made, may serve to substantiate the charge that this writer, in his zeal, has lacked either attention or candor; and, from whichever cause, has subjected me to the injustice of being misrepresented to his readers.

CHAP. V.-HIS REMARKS ON THE IMPUTATION OF THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED.

"If ingenious men did not involve themselves in a mist of metaphysics," this writer observes, "they never could persuade themselves, that such a theory as we are now considering, would have any tendency to remove the objections which are made to the scriptural doctrine of original sin. The doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin is first rejected as unreasonable and unrighteous-and what then? Why men, in consequence of being the children of Adam, are born in a state of inherent depravity." "This scheme of inherent depravity is rejected by some, and a new theory is invented. Men, it is said, do not inherit from Adam sin of any kind imputed or inherent but only the causes of sin." "Will the cavilling rationalist be satisfied with this?" "In the upshot, it all amounts to the same thing. Man is under a moral necessity of becoming a sinner; and for this sin, the causes of which are entailed upon him, he must die. What is there in the imputation of the first man's sin, more unreasonable or unrighteous than this."

The denial which I made concerning the imputation of the sin of Adam was this: viz. that mankind are directly blamed and punished for his one sin. And my position is, that whatever causes, external or internal, might lead the fallen angels astray, or Adam, or, in connection with him, his posterity; acts of retributive righteousness on the part of God, always respect, as their basis, the real sin which each and every one commits. My attempt was to show, not merely to the unsubmissive caviller, but to the studious believer, that the measure of divine providence which constituted Adam our parental head invested with the power of affecting our state at our origin, was a measure of trust

involving in it no invasion upon this fundamental principle of retributive righteousness, that each soul shall be judged according to its own deeds and doings. The caviller may indeed complain, and the acquiescing believer may think it dark and mysterious, that God should have adopted any course of Providence over the world, that could have proved an occasion, even, of involving it in so great evils as sin and condemnation; but so long as it appears that in fact all these beings are voluntary agents rebelling against God, and that he condemns them for nothing but their own doings, every mind must acquiesce in the justice of his retributions, Rom. iii. 19. My sole purpose was to clear his retributive acts as a Moral Governor over individuals, from the aspersion of wandering out of the record of their own deeds, to the deeds of others, for the grounds of accusation. I inquired not into those reasons, surely, which induced God to commence a providence over the world, in the particular manner he did; but threw it upon the objector to show that in introducing this measure into "a system of providence over a universe of such beings, which is the best adapted for promoting the general and eternal interests of virtue;" he did not take the best measure he possibly could do, for the interests of this particular world; and asked him to "submit to that providence which does the best it can for the interest of all the beings who are thrown upon it, and to blame alone the beings who, in such a system, refuse to follow the known will of their Creator and choose the path of evil.”

When therefore I have shown that the measure of divine providence in constituting Adam the head of the race involved not, in it, any such perversion of retributive justice, as that of accounting us blameable and punishable for his act, or of charging upon us, as sin, the physical properties of our nature,-(the additions of men, which only can be pleaded as rational objections ;)-I lay it before others, for their acquiescence, as a measure of boundless wisdom,