CHAPTER III.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE LATE PEACE.

*

It is obviously impossible to form a just opinion on the ' conditions of the late peace' without deciding how far the vanquished side was responsible for the previous war. Upon this account the last chapter was devoted-perhaps at unnecessary length-to prove that the responsibility of the rupture lay with France alone. If it be thought that that subject has lost its interest, it must be remembered that upon the questions 'growing out of it,' that is, the conditions of the peace, the future history of Europe may turn. There are English writers who go the length of arguing that the severity of the terms imposed upon France will justify her in seeking her threatened revanche when prepared to do so. The opposite view is contended for in these pages. Assuming that France was the aggressor, and what is more certain, had very frequently been so before, there was one condition which the German people had a right to demand from their representatives above all others-that once for all the French game of invading Germany should be made, if not impossible, at least, dangerous, for France. That was a primary sine qua non consistently with which the terms of peace might be modified as policy dictated. The general principles applicable to the terms of peace

A clever writer in the Pall Mall Gazette, who has always taken the side of France, expressed that opinion. His advocacy of the French cause would seem from internal evidence to be connected with long residence and perhaps closer ties with our gifted and amiable neighbours.

which a conqueror may justly impose upon the vanquished side, when that side is responsible for the war, seem few and simple.

1. The right of self-defence involves the right of taking security from the aggressor that he shall not repeat his aggressions, and the security may be penal as well as precautionary; common sense establishes such right, and it accords with our own municipal law, and probably with that of most other civilized countries.

2. The security taken must be decided by the conqueror, as there is no superior court for nations.

3. The amount of security will depend upon the greater or less probability of aggression as evinced by the character and antecedents of the aggressed, and the proportional strength of the belligerents. An approach to equality between them demands greater precautions than when the difference in strength is greatly in favour of the conqueror.

4. The fact of repetition, as aggravating the guilt of aggression, justifies a demand for additional securities and heavier penalties. This accords with municipal law, and the general sense and practice of mankind.

5. Independently of any guarantee against future attack, the conqueror may impose a fine or war indemnity as a punishment for the aggression. He may impose such fine either conjointly with some security or separately.

6. It is almost needless to add that the guarantees exacted from a vanquished aggressor, or the penalty imposed by way of war indemnity, must not violate the laws of humanity, as did the devastation of the Palatinate by the armies of the Most Christian King Louis XIV.

These principles seem not only to agree with the common sense of mankind, but with the practice of the most civilized nations from time to time, including the great settlement of Europe of 1815.

The conditions imposed upon France by Germany do not clash with these principles, but they have been denounced by some persons of authority as unduly severe, or even unjust. It has been argued

Firstly, that to deprive France of Alsace and part of Lorraine was an act of oppression not justified by military exigencies, and that the inhabitants of these districts should have been consulted as to their own fate.

Secondly, that the war indemnity of 200,000,000l. was excessive, and that Germany, in electing to take French territory, virtually ceded her right to a pecuniary penalty, as, by electing to take a pecuniary indemnity, she would have lost her right to retain territory. That to take both territory and money was an indefensible and unexampled proceeding.

The article in the Edinburgh Review, generally attributed to Mr. Gladstone, is very severe upon the iniquity of taking provinces without the consent of the inhabitants, and would, at all events, have had such a plébiscite' as had been sanctified by the example of Napoleon III. when annexing Savoy and Nice. Perhaps Mr. Gladstone thinks that, had a vote of 'Non' instead of 'Oui' been possible, it would have saved the inhabitants of Nice and Savoy from annexation. Von Bismarck, however, was not the man to manipulate ballot-boxes. If the consent of its inhabitants to the transfer of territory is to be a condition precedent of the transfer, it strikes one as unfortunate that such consent should not be made necessary to the operations of war as well as of peace. A worse fate often befalls the inhabitant of an invaded district or bombarded town than losing his nationality. A man who has lost his whole family and fortune probably thinks little of the national cockade he wears. In any case, the acquisition of a good frontier might be a military necessity; and, to make it dependent upon the wishes of the inhabitants, is an idea more amiable than

practical. The negociators of the Treaty of Vienna, among whom our Minister was not the least influential personage, had no scruple about transferring provinces, and even countries, from one government to another without consulting the populations. The first consideration with them was the arrangements that would best restrain the aggressiveness of France, shown by experience to be the chief peril to Europe. Prussia complained at that time that the frontier assigned to her was bad in a military sense, but the great Powers over-ruled her objections.

That the frontier now ceded by France is traced by consummate military skill we may assume upon the reputations of those who traced it, and that it does not exceed the military requirements of Germany is rendered probable by the fact that Belfort-a stronger position than any retained-has been voluntarily restored to France. Report says that Von Moltke was opposed to that concession, and, if so, the fact that his wishes did not prevail says much for the moderation of the Germans.

In any case, out of forty departments conquered and occupied, Germany retained but three and part of another -a territory all of which belonged to her formerly, and part of which had been dishonourably filched from her in peace.

Strasburg has been justly called one of the keys of Germany, and was, for that reason, treacherously seized by Louis XIV. in 1681. So far back as the beginning of last century, when the victories of Marlborough had reduced the fortunes of that great King and appropriator to a low ebb, it was proposed to restore Strasburg to Germany. The idea was revived in the middle of the

*About the iniquitous seizure of Strasburg by Louis XIV. in full peace there can be no doubt. Whether the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun were filched by France, or ceded by Germany, in gratitude to her, has been disputed.

century during the Seven Years' War, and the time that has elapsed since then has shown, on many occasions, the immense danger to Germany of a French Strasburg. To have restored such a base of invasion to France might have been chivalrous, but would scarcely have been sane; and the same reasoning applies to all the frontier fortresses, such as Brisach, Bitche, &c. With respect to the territory taken from France in addition to fortresses, even Mr. Gladstone, though so scrupulous about the patriotic sentiments of the inhabitants, admits that considerations of military security may justify the annexation of districts. We do not dispute the title of Germany, as matters stand, to be secured by special stipulations to place France under such limitations in regard to the exercise of her sovereignty in the districts claimed as shall virtually guarantee their military neutrality; nay, to extort the territory itself from France provided the population be willing parties to the 'severance; but not until it has been proved that transfer of the territory is the only way of giving security to Germany, can she be justified in even raising the question without some reference to that essential element.'* This is substantially to admit the claims of Germany in principle, since to make a right arising out of considerations of national security-in this case of the lives and property of the German people-subordinate to a mere sentiment, is only an amiable crotchet having no place in public law or policy.

That Germany retained more territory than she required for her security is possible, but does not seem probable, since no man was more aware of the antiGerman feeling prevalent in the districts claimed, and of the element of danger implied in their annexation, than Prince Bismarck. The new frontier line is understood to have been selected by the most competent military *Edinburgh Review, No. 270, October, 1870, p. 582.