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need.* Weygand, having accomplished his task, returned to France and met with an enthusiastic reception, being called the Savior of Poland" and receiving the highest public commendation by Marshal Foch. Toward the end of August the Soviet Government was hurrying all available reserve forces to stem the Polish tide, recruiting was going on extensively, Soviet munition plants were working day and night, and plans were being laid to throw new armies against the Poles. General Weygand himself admitted that the Poles were by no means guaranteed against the future. The Soviet concentrations were in the northeast, at Grodno, Lithuania, and on the Galician front, where Budenny's raids continued. The Poles, on their part, were resting and regrouping after pushing the Bolsheviki across the Bug River, but continued their resistance around Lemberg, aided by Ukrainian forces under Pavlenko. Both from Great Britain and America Poland received warnings not to transgress again the ethonographic frontiers of Poland. Marshal Pilsudski, however, on Aug. 30 declared that it was impossible for the Poles to halt on the eastern front and maintain a solely defensive attitude, as the Allies desired; they would either have to advance until the enemy was destroyed or make peace at once and be resigned to further Russian aggressions. Regarding the ethnic line laid down by the Entente, Pilsudski declared that to halt at this line "would be to affirm by deed that this illusory eastern frontier corresponds to aspirations." The losses of the Bolshevist Army amounted to at least 100,000, said Pilsudski, and it would take the Soviet Government a long time to reorganize; now was the time, if ever, to strike a decisive blow.

our

Soon after this Pilsudski left again for the front, in preparation for a new stage of the war with Moscow. The centre of interest was the Lemberg theatre, where Budenny's cavalry was operating independently, with a Russian infantry army on the north and south respectively. [For Lithuanian phases see Baltic States.] Early in September the Lemberg movement was repulsed by

*M. Daszinski leader of the Socialist Party in Poland, took the position of Vice President of the Council in the new coalition Cabinet created on July 24 under the Presidency of M. Witos, the peasant leader. The Witos Ministry came in at a critical moment when the Poles were undergoing defeat bythe Red armies. The other members of the new Cabinet were: M. Skulski, former President of the Council, Secretary of the Interior; M. Grabski, Minister of Finance; Prince Sapieha, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Both M. Daszinski and M. Witos were said to possess great influence with the Polish masses. M. Daszinski, on Aug. 2, issued a statement recognizing the grave moment at which the new Government had assumed power. The struggle against Russian imperialism, he declared, could not fail to lead to the creation of a Government representing the workers and peasants of Poland, which was the best guarantee for the national defense and for awakening renewed confidence in the countries of the Entente.

fensive had met with virtually complete

success.

The peace discussions at Minsk were brought to a close at the end of August, when the Polish delegates insisted that the negotiations should be transferred to Riga, in Latvia, and should be conducted

PIAST WITOS Peasant Premier of Poland

on an entirely different basis. The Bolsheviki, having believed Warsaw within their grasp, had sought to play the victor; to this the Poles would not submit. It was made clear to the Bolsheviki that they must go to Riga in a wholly different frame of mind.

The peace delegates were recalled by Warsaw on Sept. 2. Several of them had fallen ill because of the insanitary conditions at Minsk. Prince Sapieha, the Polish Foreign Minister, declared that Poland was still ready to make peace, but not on the basis of a conquered nation, and that Poland would never agree to disarmament, which was one of the fifteen Bolshevist points rejected at Minsk. On his return to Warsaw, Roman Dmowski, head of the Polish delegation, stated that he had good hopes of reaching a settlement at Riga. Karl Radek, he said, the personal representative of Tchitcherin, had come to Minsk and asked to meet the Socialist members of the

Polish delegation privately. Having obtained consent to this, he told these delegates that Soviet Russia was ready to meet Poland's fundamental conditions, but that it must be assured in the event that France urged Poland to unite with Wrangel, whom it had recognized, in another war on Moscow, Poland would refuse assent. The Polish Socialists, said Dmowski, were convinced that this declaration was sincere, and it was really this intervention which had prevented a complete rupture. The Riga Conference was to open Sept. 15.

The departure of Sir Reginald Tower, Allied High Commissioner at Danzig, for Paris, on Sept. 4, marked the end of a lively dispute regarding the unloading of Polish munitions and supplies at Danzig. A troubled situation had developed there during the Polish offensive, owing to the resolution of the Assembly of the Free City declaring that Danzig must maintain neutrality, and to the refusal of the German dockworkers, filled with hatred of the Poles, to unload the Polish munition ships. In order to avoid serious trouble, the High Commissioner had refused to permit the unloading of ships that arrived, and had asked for a force of 20,000 men to maintain order in case the unloading were insisted upon. The dispatch of French and British warships finally solved the problem, and the dock laborers at the end of August voted to carry on their work.

The conflict between the Soviet Government and Great Britain over the terms which the Bolshevist leaders sought to impose on Poland became again acute after the meeting of Lloyd George with Signor Giolitti, the Italian Premier, at Lucerne. Following the decision taken at this conference, a communiqué was sent by the joint powers asking Moscow's intentions regarding terms, and protesting against the Soviet demand that a Polish civic guard of workingmen be sanctioned by the Polish Government, and against Polish disarmament. In an accompanying note, published on Aug. 24, Mr. Balfour pointed out that Moscow's terms were in "fundamental contradiction" to those which Mr. Kamenev, the Bolshevist envoy to London, had submitted through

Lloyd George. A reply was asked by Aug. 27. This communiqué and the covering note were sent both to the Bolshevist envoys and to M. Tchitcherin. An answer received from Tchitcherin, on Aug. 26, stated that the Soviet Government, in order to bring about peace with Great Britain, was prepared to yield in the matter of the Polish civic guard of workers, and would withdraw this offending clause. It did so, however, with expressions of astonishment that this clause should be objected to. The note also contained a long argument on the Soviet system and its advantages.

Mr. Balfour's reply was made public on Sept. 2. It was widely commented upon as a masterpiece of argument. Balfour pointed out Tchitcherin's error in supposing that Great Britain ever recognized the limitation of the Polish Army to 50,000 men. It had merely said that it would not consider such a clause as a reason for active intervention. Mr. Balfour further discounted Tchitcherin's "surprise" over Great Britain's objections to the proposed Polish civic militia, implied Moscow's bad faith in dictating this clause, which was not in the first official draft of conditions submitted to Kamenev; declared that it would amount to the dictation of one class over all the rest of a vanquished population, and reaffirmed England's unalterable opposition to such dictation, irrespective of what class it might be drawn from, whether workmen or capitalists. In a few brief, ironical words Mr. Balfour replied to the long argument in the Soviet note lauding the ad

vantages of the Soviet system of government.

Secretary Colby on Aug. 18 assured representatives of American citizens of Polish birth that the United States would do all in its power to preserve Polish independence. It was officially announced from Washington on Aug. 25 that the Washington Government had warned Poland against engaging in territorial aggression on Russia, asking for an official disclaimer of such an intention. Poland's reply was made public on Sept. 2. In effect it avoided a direct answer by maintaining that "it could hardly be considered fair that artificial boundaries that do not bind our opponent should interfere with the military operations of Poland." Though this was followed by the expressed hope for a just and speedy peace, the disinclination to give an explicit disclaimer, such as the United States had requested, was unmistakable. It was stated semi-officially in Washington on Sept. 2 that the United States would request Poland to restate her aims, and to repudiate all purpose of conquest, following the policy outlined by Secretary Colby in his official letter to the Italian Ambassador, which had declared for the integrity of the Russian national frontier. Mere temporary crossing of the ethnic line for strategic purposes was not objected to by the United States, which sought only assurance that after the period of belligerency was over the Poles would permanently withdraw within the boundaries laid down by the all'ed powers as legitimate.

raging, inasmuch as the main condition for a resumption of trade and peace relations made by Great Britain and France jointly had been that all such discussions must be preceded by a settlement of the whole Polish question. A sore point for Moscow was Britain's alleged favoring of General Wrangel, the anti-Bolshevist leader in South Russia. Furthermore, the relations between the Allies and Soviet Russia had again become strained. Following the discussions between Lloyd George and Signor Giolitti, the Italian Premier, at Lucerne, Switzerland, a note was sent by Lloyd George, through Mr. Balfour as Lord President of the Council, which called on the Moscow Government to cut out of the peace terms to Poland all clauses which would be subversive to Poland's independence. Partly as a result of this note Kamenev, the Bolshevist envoy, left London and returned to Moscow. It afterward transpired that Moscow had sent a considerable sum of money to The Herald, a London labor organ controlled by Mr. Lansbury, a Soviet sympathizer, to promote Bolshevism in England, and that a stormy scene between Lloyd George and Kamenev on this account had preceded the departure of the Soviet envoy. The British Premier accused Kamenev of Bolshevist propaganda, including interviews with the so-called "Council of Action," a radical labor organization opposed to intervention in Russia.

The nervousness of the Soviet authorities over the Wrangel campaign was increased by the recognition of Wrangel by France. Wrangel continued his policy of establishing cordial relations with the peasants by giving land grants and a considerable degree of local autonomy, and by refusing to follow the Soviet custom of requisitioning the peasants' grain. His efforts to unite the elements in South Russia, which, under the régime of General Denikin, were continually involved in internal disputes, leading finally to Denikin's collapse, were rewarded with complete success in the case of the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan districts,

with whom he signed a treaty late in August, according to which the Cossacks acknowledged the authority of Wrangel in military affairs and foreign relations, while retaining full power over domestic administration in Cossack territories. By this treaty the territory of Wrangel was extended to the fertile Cossack regions covering an extended territory to the north and east of the Crimea.

General Wrangel's military activities were increasingly successful. His actual Crimean front was based on the Sea of Azov and ran northwest to the Dnieper at Alexandrovsk on the Dnieper. He began an offensive on a wide front en Aug. 17, after receiving the first news of the Polish rally. The Bolsheviki were driven across the Dnieper, and large numbers of prisoners were captured.

In an interview at his headquarters in Sebastopol on Aug. 22, General Wrangel expressed deep gratification both at the recognition accorded by France and at the attitude of the United States, as expressed by Secretary Colby in his official note to the Italian Ambassador. In other interviews he declared that his policy would be one of federation and the acknowledgment of Russia's foreign obligations. He would not cease fighting, he declared, until the Soviet régime was overthrown and a truly representative people's Government was established. Though he suffered some reverses along the Dnieper at the beginning of September, most of his lines were still firmly held. Professor Paul N. Milukov, former Foreign Minister of Russia, left Paris for the Crimea on Sept. 1 to take an important position in the Wrangel Government. The possibilities of the combined successes of the Poles and Wrangel led on Aug. 23 to the passing of a resolution by the Moscow Communists which reads as follows:

Bearing in mind the fact that our western army has suffered a serious defeat, owing to France's increased support of Poland, and simultaneously that General Wrangel's front is acquiring primary importance, the Moscow party conference recognizes the necessity of affording all assistance to the western front and at the same time of liquidating General Wran

gel's front entirely by means of forces now situated at our rear.

It, therefore, calls upon all party organizations to carry out a party mobilization with the same accuracy and rapidity as before and to arrange for businesslike discussions of measures to be taken to assist on Wrangel's front.

Also, widespread agitation must be developed among the masses, workers and peasants in favor of a volunteer movement for the Red Army in the struggle against Wrangel.

A special order issued by Trotzky to the Ninth Army on Sept. 3 directed that Wrangel must be destroyed "at all costs."

The Ukrainian National Committee in Paris on Aug. 13 issued a declaration to the effect that the Ukrainian people would never make peace with the Bolsheviki, on the ground that the present Soviet régime is founded on terrorism, Communism, and the negation of universal suffrage, and that Ukrainia favored the restoration of Russia on a federal basis and the settlement of the agrarian question in favor of the peasantry, not only of Ukrainia but of all Russia. The so-called Ukrainian Republic, set up and controlled by Moscow, is not recognized by the committee. Petlura, the so-called peasant leader, still continues his resistance to the Red forces scattered through the Ukraine. Whole sectors, however, are free from the Reds and are protected by armed peasant forces of respectable size. The general attitude of the Ukrainian peasants is one of hostility toward the Bolsheviki.

The situation in Siberia was marked toward the end of August by the revolt of Western Siberian peasants against Soviet rule. Independent peasant Soviets were set up at Tomsk, NovoNikolaevsk, Omsk and other important towns. The general movement of insurrection was led by the Khirgis tribesmen, following the withdrawal of Bolshevist troops for the Polish front. The Khirgis were joined by Cossacks and detachments of anti-Bolshevist troops, including a number of Russian officers released from Soviet prisons. The cities captured are situated in the richest farming districts of Siberia. It was reported on Sept. 7, however, that Soviet

forces, aided by German and Hungarian war prisoners, had recaptured Omsk and had also regained possession of a portion of the railway.

One important change in the Siberian situation was the closing by General Semenov, the anti-Bolshevist leader in the Trans-Baikal region, of his campaign against the Reds in this district. General Semenov, Cossack Ataman, bandit, guerrilla, at one time an associate of Admiral Kolchak, long an ally of Japan, had for many months held the centre of the political stage in Siberia. He had been a military dictator, with power of life and death over the Siberian people, and many atrocities were charged against him. Arrangements were completed by the Chinese General Staff on Aug. 28 for the passage of some 20,000 of his troops and those of the antiBolshevist General Kappel through Manchuria on the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Russian maritime province. This liquidation followed the withdrawal of the Japanese forces that had been supporting Semenov and Kappel.

Early in September the signing of an agreement between Semenov and the Vladivostok Government was officially reported. This agreement provided for the unification of the Semenov and Vladivostok régimes under a National Assembly. Semenov was to retain his authority over the Cossacks, but relinquished all other powers. After signing this agreement, General Semenov issued an appeal to all Russians not to submit to the Bolsheviki or to the monarchical elements of the Czar's régime, proclaiming that the right to govern rested only with the people.

The Japanese continued to occupy Saghalin in force, and prepared to erect Winter encampments for their soldiers there. The Assembly of the Republic of Vladivostok-also occupied by the Japanese, with the rest of the maritime province had accomplished little, owing to the doubtful attitude of the population. The complexion of the new Far Eastern Republic at Verkhne-Udinsk continued to be strongly pro-Bolshevist under the Americanized Russian Communist Tobelson. Japan was maintain